BALKAN WAR 2Q 



ooo) at Serres and a detachment of 15,000 near Gumuljina, keeping touch between the 

 Turkish Eastern and Western armies. There were also independent groups of 18,000 

 under Essad Pasha in Epirus, between Janina and the Greek frontier; and of 20,000 

 chiefly Albanian Redifs, at Scutari and Tuzi under Hassan Riza Pacha. The above 

 figures are necessarily only estimates, representing the best information available at 

 Christmas 1912. The numbers in Thrace were being constantly augmented by the 

 arrival of troops from Asia. AH Riza Pasha was in chief command in Macedonia. The 

 supreme command of the whole Ottoman forces was given to Nazim Pasha. 



As regards the maritime forces, the Greek Navy (i modern cruiser, 21 torpedo craft 

 and i submarine) was assembled off Salamis; 4 destroyers purchased in England and 3 

 obtained from Germany were still on their way out. The Bulgarian flotilla (6 coast- 

 defence torpedo boats) was at Varna, which port, like that of Burgas, was fortified and 

 defended by mine fields. The Turkish Fleet (3 battleships, 2 cruisers and 20 torpedo 

 craft) was in the Bosporus and the Dardanelles; both these Straits were defended by 

 powerful coast defences; while the Dardanelles channel was mined at Chanak. 



Eastern Theatre of War. 



Operations of the Bulgarian Armies. The Turks hoped to complete their concentra- 

 tion on the railway while the Bulgarians wasted their strength against Kirk Kilisse and 

 Adrianople. They apparently believed that the latter fortress, which lies on the natural 

 line of invasion from Eastern Rumelia, would be the first objective of the invaders. 

 General Savoff's initial dispositions were designed to confirm this impression, though his 

 main attack was really to be directed against Kirk Kilisse. 



On October igth the 2nd Army (Ivanoff), which had advanced from about Simenli- 

 Tirnova, moving on both banks of the Maritza, occupied the frontier post of Mustapha 

 Pasha; on the two following days it closed on Adrianople from the north and west; 

 meanwhile, the 3rd Army (Dimitrieff) was advancing on Kirk Kilisse from the north in 

 four columns, on a front of 30 miles (Petra to Samakov); the ist Army (Kutincheff) 

 advanced on the right (west) of the 3rd army. 



From October 22nd to the 24th the ist and 3rd Bulgarian Armies were engaged north 

 and north-west of Kirk Kilisse. It appears that the Turks, who had brought 70,000 men 

 up to this flank, attempted a night attack, which was repulsed by the Bulgarians, and 

 that a panic then ensued among certain Redif divisions. Kirk Kilisse was captured 

 on the 24th with large quantities of supplies, and the Turkish army, much disorganised, 

 fell back to the railway and to Bunarhissar. Dimitrieff 's centre was moved forward 

 to Kavakli, where a Turkish rearguard was driven back after an obstinate fight. 



Meanwhile, the 2nd Army had attacked Adrianople (22nd-23rd), but had failed to cap- 

 ture any of the main defences; a Turkish sortie had been repulsed with the loss of 12 

 guns. On October 23rd the ist Bulgarian Army pushed its right wing to the Tunja 

 Valley, north of Adrianople; it next advanced its left wing to the Maritza Valley, south 

 of that fortress, thus completing the investment (Oct. 2Qth). The Bulgarian cavalry 

 occupied Eski Baba (Oct. 27th), capturing 4 locomotives and 243 trucks. 



While these operations were in progress, the 2nd Bulgarian Division had crossed the 

 Rhodope range from the north, and defeated a Turkish force at Kirjali (Oct. 2oth) ; part 

 of this division then descended the Arda valley to join the 2nd Army before Adrianople. 

 Further east, the main body of General Todoroff 's force in the Struma Valley had cap- 

 tured the important Kresna defile and was approaching Demirhissar, while a force 

 detached to the Mesta Valley had occupied Buk on the Salonica-Dedeagach railway, 

 thus severing communication between the Turkish Eastern and Western Armies; other 

 portions of the 7th Division had advanced south-west,to Kochana and Strumnitza. 



The Bulgarian ist and 3rd Armies made no further advance till October 28th; the 

 pause, which was perhaps due to the failure of the attack on Adrianople, enabled 

 Abdullah Pasha 1 to effect a change of front to the line Lule Burgas -Viza; this 

 position, 20 miles in extent, was held by the 4th, ist and 2nd Corps (in order from left to 



Accounts differ as to whether Nazim Pasha or Abdullah Pasha was in command. 



