THE WORLD'S ARMIES 35 



THE WORLD'S ARMIES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT 



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7. Tendencies of Military Progress, 



During the years 1910-12 no very large increase in numbers has been made in any 

 army. On the other hand certain European armies have suffered more or less serious 

 losses in men and war material as the result of recent campaigns. No important change 

 in organisation is recorded except in the case of the Russian army which is now being 

 reorganised. In some armies organisation has been modified with a view to perfecting 

 arrangements for rapid and secure mobilisation and for increasing the numbers available 

 on the outbreak of war. The most important as well as general change in military arma- 

 ments has been the employment of aircraft, the influence of which upon land warfare is 

 an interesting problem, while in some cases improvements and increase in artillery and 

 machine guns are also recorded. Both the intercommunication and rearward services 

 of armies generally have been improved through the development of wireless telegraphy 

 and mechanical transport. 



The tendency of military progress undoubtedly continues to lie in the direction of 

 constant readiness for war based upon very complete and thorough previous prepara- 

 tions. The Great Powers have been concentrating their energies and resources during 

 peace in developing the power to strike with their whole strength and with the fullest 

 effect immediately hostilities commence. It is considered in military circles that wars 

 between neighbouring civilised states in adjacent territories will not under existing 

 conditions be long or protracted. They will tend to be comparatively short, but ex- 

 tremely severe struggles. Under these conditions the power to strike quickly and with 

 overwhelming force at decisive points is essential for success. Modern strategy accord- 

 ingly aims at securing the initial advantage by surprise if necessary, and pressing it by a 

 sustained offensive until resistance is crushed without affording either time or opportuni- 

 ty for the enemy to recover his morale and strength. The whole object of good strategy 

 is to gain the initiative and strike the first effective blow, and then follow it as quickly 

 as possible with a decisive blow. 



It is possible, of course, that conflicts between civilised peoples may still be protracted 

 as in the case of the South African and Manchurian campaigns, if armies have to be 

 despatched great distances over land or sea to operate in vast theatres of war thinly 

 populated with civilised men or inhabited by savage races and lacking in adequate 

 supplies, roads, railways and other facilities for communication. But in wars between 

 neighbouring states such as the first phase of the Balkan campaign of 1912, or in con- 

 flicts between Great Powers, when opposing armies will come quickly into touch and 

 operate in thickly populated theatres of war well supplied with roads and railways, 

 which make it possible for troops, with the help of efficient rearward services and mechan- 

 ical transport, to move rapidly over considerable distances, the final crisis cannot under 

 ordinary circumstances be delayed very long. It is highly improbable that such 

 struggles will be protracted, more especially in the case of great industrial communities. 



Apart altogether from the loss of life and expenditure involved in actual fighting, 

 which in conflicts between Great Powers must be stupendous, the interruption of the 

 normal activities of national existence and particularly the paralysis of trade and in- 

 dustry consequent upon warlike operations on a vast scale, coupled with the probable 

 shortage and increased cost of the necessities of life, will all seriously drain the resources 

 and sap the strength of the combatant peoples if continued for any length of time. 

 There is moreover the possibility that such conflicts, owing to factors that are considered 

 below in relation to the Balance of Power, may become almost universal, involving many 

 allied peoples whose territories comprise whole continents with calamitous effects which 

 must be felt throughout the world. Although these considerations are not likely to 

 deter nations from engaging in wars upon sufficient provocation in the present temper of 

 humanity, they will certainly tend to make them more onerous and costly and therefore 

 less protracted. 



In view of these tendencies success in war to-day depends primarily upon readiness 



