THE WORLD'S ARMIES 41 



pean armies in the field, and in view of the exigencies of warfare it is not certain whether, 

 or to what extent, or when, any of them would be available for service abroad. Nor is 

 it certain whether or how far, the Regular Army in India, Egypt and the Colonies to- 

 gether with the native Indian Army would be available as reinforcements for Britain or 

 her allies at decisive points either at the decisive moment or at all. 



The British Empire is not one in a military sense. Its navies do not command the 

 seas as a whole against those of the Triple Alliance. Even with the help of the French 

 and Russian fleets it is improbable that its shortest and most direct line of sea communi- 

 cations with Egypt, India and Australasia through the Mediterranean would be suffi- 

 ciently secure for the transport of troops at the outbreak of war and while the Austrian 

 and Italian fleets were in being. These facts, considered in connection with the ten- 

 dency of any wars between great European Powers to be comparatively short in dura- 

 tion, make it probable that the effective military intervention of Britain in such a war 

 would be confined to troops from the United Kingdom. Unless the struggle became 

 prolonged or the combined fleets of the Triple Entente in its early stage gained complete 

 command of the sea aad more especially of the Mediterranean, it is improbable that 

 reinforcements from India, the Colonies and the Dominions would arrive in time to 

 intervene effectively in Europe as part of a British force. It might, moreover, be im- 

 possible either in time for effective action or at all for the British to withdraw troops 

 from certain parts of the Empire without imperilling their safety or disturbing the 

 tranquillity of territories inhabited by vast alien and subject populations. 



Thus British military intervention in Europe, in the early stage of war at any rate, 

 would probably be limited to troops from the United Kingdom, namely the Expedition- 

 ary Force, which includes practically the whole of the Regular Army in home stations, 

 brought up with reserves to six divisions, numbering with cavalry about 168,000. These 

 troops, would probably be despatched to co-operate with the French army. At first 

 sight the intervention of 168,000 men in a struggle between armies together numbering 

 over 17,000,000 men on war establishments may seem unimportant, especially as it 

 would still leave the French troops numerically inferior to the German. This small 

 force, however, might prove of the utmost value to its allies, especially if the Germans 

 attempted to advance through Belgium, for the British command of the sea would 

 enable it, with or without French or Belgian reinforcements, to threaten the enemy's 

 flank and lines of communication from the coast an operation the risks and difficulties 

 of which are clearly great but not insuperable. If utilised with judgment, skill and 

 daring, and provided it could be despatched in time and maintained -in the field, the 

 British Expeditionary Force might help materially to turn the scales of advantage in 

 favour of the Triple Entente, and enable the French and Russian armies to gain the 

 initiative and press a vigorous attack against the Germans and their allies. 



It is, however, doubtful, whether the Expeditionary Force could be despatched to 

 the Continent in time or at all. The position of Britain in the event of war between the 

 Triple Alliance and the Triple. Entente will disclose the reason for this doubt. If the 

 fleets of the Triple Entente gain command of the sea Britain is practically secure from 

 military offence by the Triple Alliance. If Britain loses command of the sea her power 

 of offence is paralysed and her existence is at stake on the fortune of war upon the con- 

 tinent and perhaps in any event. With her fleet " in being," Britain is considered 

 secure from military offence by the Triple Alliance, except for possible raids. In theory 

 it is considered that the results of these raids would be limited to their moral effect upon 

 the nation, which might be very great, and to the loss and confusion occasioned by the 

 possible destruction of naval bases, of communications such as bridges and railways, 

 and of property in harbours, industrial centres and generally. The invasion of the 

 United Kingdom, despite British fleets in being, by a hostile raiding force of at least 70,- 

 ooo men has authoritatively been declared to be a practical possibility, and there can be 

 no certainty that its strength will never exceed this number. 1 It is both asserted and 



. ,- 1 . It may, however, be that the enemy would not be able to detach largely from his force 

 for the invasion of Britain, at any rate in the early stages of the struggle under consideration. 



