42 THE WORLD'S ARMIES 



admitted on the highest authority that the Territorial Force, which is intended for the 

 defence of Great Britain and presumably Ireland in the absence of the Regular Army 

 abroad, is unfit to meet good Continental troops in the field, and that this weakness can- 

 not be remedied until some months after the outbreak of war. 1 



This then is the position of Great Britain. Her obligations to the Triple Entente, 

 as well as her own vital interests and ultimate security, might and most probably would 

 demand the despatch of the Expeditionary Force to the help of her allies on the continent 

 immediately war broke out or very soon afterwards. Sound strategy in any event 

 would also demand this step, in order to develop the greatest possible strength at the 

 decisive point, which in this case is the Continent. But under the circumstances Brit- 

 ain could not fulfil her obligations to her allies nor act in her own interest to the best 

 advantage and in accordance with the principles of sound strategy, without leaving 

 herself to a serious extent defenceless in the event of invasion for some months after 

 hostilities commenced owing to the unreadiness of the Territorial Force. Theoretically 

 she might be well advised to despatch the Expeditionary Force to the continent and 

 take what strategists would term the " minor " war risks of invasion by raiding forces. 

 Actually this is what she might do if the principles of strategy were the sole considera- 

 tion and statesmen and soldiers were perfectly free to act upon them. Once war broke 

 out, however, many other factors would be certain to influence and determine the nation- 

 al councils. It is possible that the instinct of self-preservation might impel a frightened 

 people to forbid the despatch of the Expeditionary Force until too late or perhaps alto- 

 gether, because rightly or wrongly they would feel that its absence would leave them 

 insufficiently protected against the dreaded risk of invasion. In this case neither the 

 demands of national honour and interests nor those of sound strategy might be able to 

 make head against the clamour of popular fear whether it were justified or not. It 

 must be remembered that panic clouds the vision and dominates the acts of nations as 

 well as men, and that statesmen without distinction of party have never been more 

 subservient to the force of public opinion than at present. 



For these reasons it is not sufficiently certain that Britain would be able to render 

 military aid to the Triple Entente in the event of war with the Triple Alliance. 1 The 

 counterstroke of invasion would probably be threatened or made by Germany with 

 the object of frightening the British people into retaining the Regular Army at home 

 and depriving their allies of its assistance. If the military offence of Britain were par- 

 alysed the balance of advantage from the recent changes under discussion would seem 

 to lie in favour of the Triple Alliance as against the Triple Entente. But this conclu- 

 sion, together with estimates based upon it regarding the value of Great Britain to the 

 Triple Entente, must be modified when other essential factors of the problem, such as 

 wealth and sea-power, are taken into account. The nations of the Triple Entente, 

 whose resources include the immense wealth of Britain, are better able to sustain the 

 financial strain of war, especially if it becomes prolonged, than those of the Triple 

 Alliance whose individual and combined economic strength is not so great. The supe- 



It is questionable whether it would be sound strategy for him to do so before the power of the 

 formidable armies arrayed against him were broken, or finally defeated. 



1 It is argued that the defects of the Territorial Force under existing conditions are to some 

 degree irremediable, as its armament in artillery and rifles is inferior, as it is without ade- 

 quate and efficient rearward services and other necessary equipment such as aircraft, which 

 cannot well be improvised hastily, while its officers, upon whom will devolve the duty of 

 training and leading it, are themselves to a large extent untrained. 



2 Certainty as to the power of Britain in this and perhaps in any event to intervene effec- 

 tively in hostilities on the continent by despatching a military force appears to depend upon 

 three essential conditions. The first is the readiness and fitness of an adequate force to under- 

 take the military defence of the British Isles against Continental troops immediately war 

 breaks out. The second is public confidence in the military arrangements for dealing with any 

 hostile forces whirh may succeed in invading the British Isles during the absence of the 

 Regular Army. The third is power to despatch the reinforcements and material necessary 

 to make good the wastage of war, and maintain the Expeditionary Force in the field, while 

 providing amply for the requirements in men and material of garrisons in naval bases, forts, 

 etc., and of field forces in tne United Kingdom. 



