THE WORLD'S ARMIES 43 



rior naval power of the Triple Entente, which is largely due to British fleets, if main- 

 tained, together with their peculiar advantages of situation, should enable Great Brit- 

 ain and France to keep their oversea channels of trade and food supplies open to the 

 world during war, while they closed up those of their more or less land-locked enemies 

 of the Triple Alliance, with the gravest economic consequences, especially in the case 

 of Germany. Finally, if their superior naval strength gained them complete command 

 of the sea, both France and Britain might be able to draw reinforcements from their 

 armies abroad, and perhaps if necessary, from Russia. 



The Balkan League. If the Balkan League, with or without addition to its compo- 

 nent states, becomes a permanent factor of European policy, a new great military Power 

 may be added to those which constitute the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. In 

 this case the results of the Balkan war may completely transform the conditions which 

 have so far governed the balance of power. At the opening of 1913 it was impossible 

 either to anticipate exactly the land and sea frontiers and the ultimate component 

 states of the League, or to say whether its policy would be one of isolation from the two 

 rival groups of great Powers or an alliance or other understanding with one of them 

 with regard to common action in the event of war. It has become clea,r, however, that 

 the balance of power in Europe may henceforth depend to a great extent upon the policy 

 of the League. The general situation of its territories places its armies on the flank of 

 Austria and may possibly place them on the flank of Russia, while its future fleets can 

 be based on the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The intervention of the League, 

 therefore, in favour of either group of Powers would be of the utmost consequence and 

 might prove the determining factor of victory in a war between them. The very 

 possibility of such intervention must lead to careful reconsideration, and in some cases 

 perhaps to modifications, of the strategic principles upon which the respective war 

 plans of the Powers have been based. 



The Balance of Power in Asia. No recent development of naval, military or political 

 activities tends at the present time to disturb the balance of power in Asia as adjusted 

 by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. On the contrary the good relations existing between 

 the three great Asiatic Powers, Russia, Britain and Japan, have enabled them to deal 

 with difficult and even dangerous problems in a spirit of amity and mutual consideration 

 which makes for the maintenance of peace. Possible rivalries in the south-west and 

 north-east of Asia have been averted by the division of Persia into Russian and British 

 spheres of influence, while the Chinese provinces of Mongolia and Manchuria have been 

 divided into Russian and Japanese spheres of influence. As a result the recent Persian 

 and Chinese revolutionary movements have not reacted unfavourably upon the inter- 

 national situation in Asia or elsewhere. It is impossible to forecast exactly the con- 

 sequences of what may prove to be the practical expulsion of the Turks from Europe 

 and their concentration in Asia Minor, but there is no reason to suppose that these 

 changes will disturb the balance of power in Asia in the immediate future. 



The International Situation. The international situation is never free from elements 

 of uncertainty and danger. It is also subject to continual change because its political 

 activities are generally measures of temporary expediency adapted to the play of forces 

 which unite or divide nations according to the agreement or conflict of their interests 

 at any time. So long as the balance of power between the various groups of allies in 

 any part of the world is maintained, the danger to peace from issues between them is 

 minimised. The moment the balance of power between these groups is seriously dis- 

 turbed, the danger to peace from such issues becomes acute, for the very, foundation 

 upon which the international structure rests is weakened or fails to support it. Thus 

 the gravest perils of the political situation at all times are not concrete issues between 

 rival groups of allies, which as a rule tend to unite the nations of each group more closely 

 together in defence of their common interests and, as it were, automatically lock the 

 scales of power at an even balance. They are usually forces which disturb the balance 

 of power itself by weakening or disintegrating one of the groups essential for its main- 

 tenance or by altering the grouping of nations so as to make any one combination 



