56 



endeavour to carry out their provisions in so far as applicable to the military operations 

 involved. The rules laid down at the Hague have more than the nature of " pious 

 wishes." They were the deliberate enunciation of international law based on universal- 

 ly acknowledged principles, as understood by specialists on the subject from every 

 quarter of the world. They have been, in turn, incorporated by specialists and teachers 

 in the common law of civilised states, and, ratified or not ratified, where principles and 

 deductions therefrom are involved the Hague Conventions are now law as international 

 law has never before quite been law. 1 It will be seen below that something similar has 

 happened as regards the Declaration of London, and it is well-known that though neither 

 Spain nor the United States were parties to the Declaration of Paris, they both observed 

 its provisions during the war of iSgS, 2 simply because the provisions of that Declaration 

 had become a part of the public law of Europe, and not to have observed them, irrespec- 

 tively of the Declaration, would have been illegal. 



The future of the Declaration of London seems, in this respect, likely to be similar to 

 that of the Declaration of Paris. The Declaration consisted of a series of articles relat- 

 ing to blockade, contraband of war, destruction of neutral prizes, transfer to the neutral 

 flag, convoy, resistance to search etc., which had been drawn up for the guidance of the 

 International Prize Court, provision for the establishment of which had been made un- 

 der No. 12 of the Hague Conventions. 3 



The Convention for the establishment of the Court had provided under Art. 7 that 

 in the absence of a treaty between the parties, governing the case, the Court should apply 

 " the rules of international law," and that if " no generally recognised rule "existed, 

 the Court should give judgment in accordance with " the general principles of justice 

 and equity." The London Conference was called for the purpose of " laying down the 

 generally recognised principles of international law in accordance with Art. 7 of the 

 Convention " in question. On December 8, 1911 the Naval Prize Bill, providing for 

 the accession of Great Britain to the Convention and consequentially to the Declaration 

 of London, was adopted in the House of Commons by a majority of 172 to 125 votes. 

 On the i3th of the same month it was rejected by a majority of 145 to 53 votes in the 

 House of Lords. Under the Parliament Act it might still become law in two years with 

 other bills thrown out by the House of Lords, but this would require three successive 

 adoptions by the Commons and rejections by the Lords, and public feeling in Great 

 Britain has not seemed sufficiently friendly to the measure to warrant any certainty 

 that the Government would be able to count on ultimate success for the Bill even in 

 the Commons. The objections formulated against the Bill referred both to the com- 

 position of the International Prize Court and to provisions of the Declaration itself.^,; 



The two subjects are really distinct, though the British Government has seemed to 

 regard them as inseparable. The fact that the preamble is worded in such a way as to 

 assume ratification of the Convention for the establishment of an International Prize 

 Court, has not prevented the Italian and Russian governments from- treating the 

 Declaration as a statement of the international law of prize. :By a Royal Decree, dated 

 October 13, 1911, the Italian government issued instructions " in conformity with " the 

 Declaration of Paris and with the principles laid down in the Hague Conventions " as 

 well as in the Declaration of London of February 26, 1909, which the Royal Government 

 desires should be equally observed in so far as the dispositions of the laws of the Kingdom 



1 See E. B. xiv, 694, "International Law." 



2 See E. B. vii, 914, "Declaration of Paris." 



J That Convention had provided that "jurisdiction, in matters of prize 1 , is exercised in the 

 first instance by the Prize Courts of the belligerent captor" and that "the judgments of the 

 national Prize Courts" might be "brought before the International Prize Court '-(l) when 

 the judgment of the national Prize Courts affects the property of a Neutral Power or individ- 

 ua-1, (2) when the judgment affects enemy property and relates to (a) cargo on board a 

 neutral ship, (b) an enemy ship captured in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, when 

 that Power has not made the capture the subject of a diplomatic claim, (c) a claim based 

 upon the allegation that the seizure has been effected in violation, either of the provisions of 

 a convention in force between the belligerent Powers, or of an enactment issued by the 

 belligerent captor. (Arts. 2 and 3). See E. B. xxii, 374, "Prize." 



