294 PHILOSOPHY 



For each individual has its unique qualitative character, by which it is distinguished 

 from every other, and the course of phenomenal events thus depends on two factors, 

 the unique characters of individuals and the universal relations between them, and 

 the former factor is obviously incalculable with certainty just because it is what is not 

 common to two or more individuals. Hence the actual course of things is only partly 

 calculable, and this admission of contingency, or spontaneity in the individual, involves 

 no breach with the principle that it is for Philosophy to satisfy our intellectual demands. 

 We may call the element of spontaneity a-logical (since logic is concerned solely with 

 the universal laws of interconnection and interaction), but not irrational. 



At this point arises the supreme issue for a philosophical interpretation of the uni- 

 verse, an issue which is one of value or worth. The question is whether we regard the 

 principle of organisation in the universe as immanent, and manifesting itself in an endless 

 succession of individuals which are all transitory, or whether we are to think of it as 

 itself a transcendent individual, and of the finite individuals in which it exhibits itself 

 as permanent factors in the universe. In the former case, the values of the individuals 

 will be all relative, and there will be no meaning in attaching value or purpose to the 

 world-order itself, as it is only the individual which properly has either; in the second 

 case, there will be a meaning in regarding the values we ascribe to human personalities 

 as absolute, and we shall be able to ascribe value and purpose to the universe as a whole, 

 no less than to its various members. Varisco's view is that Philosophy as such cannot 

 decide this issue between an impersonal immanent principle of order and " the traditional 

 Christian conception of God." Our decision will turn upon the intensity of our faith 

 in the correspondence between the order of facts and our spiritual ideals. His own 

 preference is for the Christian solution, as an expression of personal faith. 



In the sphere of Ethics, the attention of philosophers of all schools seems to be more 

 concentrated now on the inquiry into the presuppositions and methods of science than 

 Ethi on *^ e interpretation of our inner life. Erkenntnisthcorie is at present more 



in the- fashion than " discourses on conduct." This is, as has always been 

 the case, specially true of the work of the Neo-Kantians, who are always with us as a 

 testimony to the exceptional eminence of Kant in modern thought. Special notice is 

 perhaps due to the important volume, Substanzbegrijff und Funktionsbegriff (1910), by 

 the distinguished Neo-Kantian writer, E. Cassirer, which is specially valuable for its 

 insight into the real character of the universals, or laws, of exact physical science, and 

 for its criticism of the work done on the philosophy of mathematics by distinguished 

 " new realists." In the sphere of " philosophy of religion" one may perhaps give special 

 commendation to Evelyn Underhill's brilliant attempt to make a thorough study of 

 the meaning and worth of the mystic " way of life " (Mysticism, 1910), as well as to the 

 important and elaborate restatement of the principles of " idealism," with special appli- 

 cation to the problems of religion, by Prof. Bosanquet in his Principles of Individuality 

 and Value (the Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh for 1911) and its sequel, The Value and 

 Destiny of the Individual (Gifford Lectures, 1912). 



Some note should be made of the remarkable vitality exhibited by the Thomist 

 philosophy as pursued particularly at Paris and Louvain. The achievements of Neo- 

 _. Thomism in adapting itself to the criticism of scientific methods and 



Thomism. . . ,,*.,. . . r ,. 



principles and in contributing to the positive advance of such studies as 

 Anthropology and Experimental Psychology, have chiefly to be studied in the year- 

 books of the centres where it is cultivated, such as e.g. the newly founded Annales de 

 VInstitut Superieivr de la Philosophic (torn, i, Louvain, 1912), but we may perhaps men- 

 lion as a work of general interest to students, Prof. Sertillanges' 5. Thomas d 1 Aquin 

 (Paris, 1910, in the series of Lcs Grands Philosophes.) 



The interest in the historical study of the great ancient and modern philosophers 

 continues to be maintained. It is worth noting that 1912 has seen the publication of 

 the first two volumes of another handsome edition of Kant under the general editor- 

 ship of E. Cassirer, following hard on reissues (published by Meiner, of Leipzig) of the 

 principal works of Fichte (6 vols. 1911-12), Schelling (3 vols.), and Hegel (12 vols). 



