CHINA 979 



Army, the country at large was still more agitated over the Government's action in 

 resorting to large foreign loans. Two loans were at this period the subject of negotiation 

 one of 10,000,000 for currency purposes, and a railway loan, subsequently known 

 as the Hukwang Railway (Four Nations') Loan of 6,000,000. Public feeling was op- 

 posed to any loan that had not received the assent of the National Assembly, and the 

 demand arose foi a special session of that body. Delegates from the provincial assem- 

 blies arrived in Peking to press their demand, but their request was refused, and the 

 Currency Loan was signed on April 15, 1911. A month later the Railway Loan agree- 

 ment was signed. By way of placating public opinion the Throne announced the 

 appointment of a Cabinet in the place of the Grand Council. The new body comprised 

 eleven Manchus and four Chinese, under the presidency of Prince Ching, who was 

 regarded on all sides as the arch-enemy of reform, and its constitution did not go far 

 towards satisfying popular demands. 



From the date of the edict sanctioning the Four Nations' Loan for the construction 

 of the Canton-Hankow and Hankow-Szechuan Railways the agitation against the 

 Government steadily gathered force. Szechuan was chiefly concerned in the loan. 

 In spite of the fact that the great western trunk line had long been pledged to foreign 

 capital the province had resolved to build the railway itself. Money had been raised 

 by various devices, and construction had been begun. While the line was making little 

 progress in Chinese hands, it was known that the money raised had been finding its way 

 into channels in no way connected with railway construction or the legitimate invest- 

 ment of railway funds. The people of Szechuan were easily persuaded that they would 

 never see their money again, if the line were handed over to foreign construction, and 

 riots broke out in Chengtu, the capital, in July. Throughout August the conditions in 

 Szechuan remained critical and by September the province was in open rebellion. 

 Chao Erh-feng, Warden of the Tibetan Marches, and one of China's most capable 

 officials, had been appointed Viceroy in August; by the end of September order seemed 

 in a fair way to being re-established. A few days later, however, further rioting oc- 

 curred in fresh centres, and once more the rebellion gained the upper hand. While the 

 affairs of the province were in this critical condition, a bomb exploded on October 9 

 in the Russian concession at Hankow. From that moment the Szechuan question be- 

 came merged in the more formidable problem of the revolution. 



. The bomb explosio'n in a house in Hankow was immediately followed by an attempt 

 of the inmates to burn down the premises, but in this they were foiled. Documents 

 revealing the existence of a revolutionary plot were seized and a number of 

 revolution. arrests were made, Jui Cheng, Viceroy of Hupeh and Hunan, appreciat- 

 ing the gravity of the. discovery, gave orders for the execution the next day 

 of four men who were regarded as ringleaders, and he jeported to Peking that he had 

 prevented a revolution. He reckoned, however, without the revolutionaries. A meet- 

 ing the same day among some of the troops in Wuchang gave them their opportunity. 

 Making common cause with the soldiers, they compelled General Li Yuan-hung to put 

 himself at the head of the movement and the revolution began. 



The ground in the Yangtze valley had been prepared to some extent during the year. 

 Repeated rumours of an intended rising indicated that revolutionary agents were at 

 work, but little attention was paid to the reports, mainly because the notorious lack of 

 cohesion among the various provinces seemed to foredoom to failure any anti-govern- 

 ment movement. The temper of the people, however, had for years been growing more 

 and more hostile to the dynasty. Floods and famine had been of annual occurrence 

 along the Yangtze, and the doctrine that the Manchus were in league with foreigners 

 to partition or destroy the country had been sedulously preached. The revolutionaries 

 had no elaborate organisation prepared ; they had been working to stir up as much feel- 

 ing as possible among the people, and had even imported arms and ammunition for a few 

 centres. When the revolution came, the control of the movement did not extend be- 

 yond Wuchang. Emissaries hurried about the country urging the people to revolt, but 

 each locality was left to take care of itself and to carry out its revolution in its own way. 



