PERSIA 



confusion again. A Russian officer of Persian extraction started a movement in Azer- 

 baijan in favour of the ex-Shah. The Russians captured the rebel at once, but the 

 Nationalists were not to be pacified. Matters went from bad to worse. In June there 

 was trouble in Tabriz, followed by Russian action. At the end of the same month the 

 unrest in the south grew more acute, spread to Kermanshah, and found expression in 

 damage to the telegraph. The British issued further warnings. The Nationalists put 

 all the blame on the Cabinet, which they turned out of office on July i2th. Four days 

 later a political murder was committed in Teheran. The two Khans from the north had 

 reached the capital, and a serious outbreak appeared imminent. 



On receipt of this news Sir Edward Grey suggested an immediate and unconditional 

 advance of money. Taken six months earlier this step might perhaps have saved the 

 situation. But in July the British representative (Sir G. Barclay) had to report that 

 such a proposal would only convince the Nationalists that the two Powers were schem- 

 ing to put financial fetters on Persia. Besides, 400,000 would no longer suffice. Sir 

 Edward Grey accordingly fell back on warnings to Persia and an appeal to the Russians 

 to support strong action. Happily the danger was averted by promptitude in Teheran. 

 The Ministry formed in the last week in July was a coalition Government, with National- 

 ists in charge of Foreign Affairs and Finance. But it saw that the ultra-patriotic ele- 

 ments must be subdued. Their disarmament was ordered, and on August yth, after fight- 

 ing, during which Sattar Khan was wounded, the government asserted its authority. 



The effort exhausted its energies. Besides, the health of the Regent, Asad-ul-Mulk, 

 had begun to fail, and intriguers were busy with the question of his successor. The 

 Regent died on September 22nd, and Nasr-ul-Mulk was elected on the fol- 

 lowing day. The choice of a moderate man, reputed capable, was a good 

 omen. But Nasr-ul-Mulk was in Europe, and much was to happen before 

 he reached Teheran. In the closing days of September Sir George Barclay telegraphed 

 that nothing had been done to tranquillize the south. The Minister of the Interior had 

 resigned on the question of Southern policy, and no successor had been appointed. On 

 October i4th, a British ultimatum was presented. Unless order was restored on the 

 Ispahan-Bushire road within three months police work would be undertaken by a loyal 

 force 1,000 to 1,200 strong under British officers lent by the Government of India. 



It was high time that action was taken, for throughout October chaos had prevailed 

 in the south, and it had even been necessary to land a small force of British blue-jackets 

 at Lingah. The Persian Government, however, pointed to an increase in Customs re- 

 ceipts as proof that things were improving, and explained that the trouble was due partly 

 to the presence of foreign troops, partly to lack of funds. With this latter argument 

 the British Minister agreed. The need of a loan was urgent. 



The British ultimatum had, as will be seen below, considerable effect in Teheran, 

 but it resulted in no permanent improvement in the south, and the events there may be 

 noted before returning to the situation in Teheran. Something, indeed, 

 vvas ^ one - Nizam-es-Sultaneh, who had made a successful Governor of 

 the south. Kermanshah, was transferred to Fars, and preparations were made to send 

 a force of 2,000 to 3,000 men to Shiraz. However, robberies ceased to be 

 recorded after the beginning of December, though the new security was due rather to 

 the severity of the weather than to the vigour of the administration. In January the 

 British Government expressed itself fairly satisfied, adding, however, that it would renew 

 its demands if need arose. The words were not followed up, though the need arose soon 

 enough. In March 1911, the road was again blocked, and a little later there was trouble 

 at Shiraz. The troops were without pay and got out of hand. In May 1911 Sir Ed- 

 ward Grey inquired with some anxiety whether Europeans in Shiraz were safe in case 

 the Shiraz Consulate was attacked, and towards the end of the same month the British 

 Government reported protests from Manchester firms against the insecurity of the 

 roads. Sir George Barclay did not regard these protests as justified, and apart from the 

 strengthening of the Consular guards nothing more was done either then or later. By 

 June 1911 anarchy again prevailed, and time brought no improvement. In the autumn 



