11I6 PERSIA 



upon himself the inevitable hostility of Russia, without ever realising, it would appear, 

 that a Power to which Persia was heavily in debt would necessarily be alarmed by the 

 fact that a vigorous anti-Russian had assumed control of the Persian finances. Ignor- 

 ing the realities of the situation, which needed a delicate adjustment of British and 

 Russian relations with Persia, Mr. Shuster acted on the diplomatic fiction of Persian 

 independence. The conditions of Persian government, which provided him with an 

 ineffective Cabinet and an amenable legislature, were formally favourable to a spirited 

 policy on his part. Cabinets came and went; sometimes there was no Cabinet at all; 

 but Mr. Shuster could always get laws passed by the Mejliss. 



While Mr. Shuster was putting his house in order the Mejliss arranged to spend the 

 loan. At the end of May, however, he was ready to act. He took the view expressed 

 in a bill drafted by his own hand that " if a person undertakes a grave responsibility 

 without previously obtaining the necessary powers he is either a fool or a rogue." Two 

 bills gave Mr. Shuster the necessary powers. The first, passed on May 3oth, put the 

 loan in his hands, the second, passed on June i3th, made the Treasurer- General Shah of 

 Persia in everything but name. He was given direct control of all financial and fiscal 

 operations and was also empowered to authorise payments, could make economies, and 

 had authority over the personnel. It is not surprising that Russia felt some anxiety 

 about the debt secured on the Northern Customs. Mr. Shuster's first difficulty was 

 with the Cabinet. Sipahdar, finding his demands refused, rushed out into the street 

 and told his coachman to drive to Europe. He went as far as Resht, and returned to 

 Teheran in July. But by refusing to work with him Mr. Shuster undid all the work 

 accomplished by the Regent in the previous four months. Next came a difficulty with 

 M. Mornard, the administrator of Customs, a Belgian officer whom Mr. Shuster ac- 

 cuses of dishonesty. M. Mornard, who was supported by f .he Russian Government, 

 refused to accept Mr. Shuster as his superior. The Belgian had a case, as it was claimed 

 that his contract made him responsible only to the Persian Government. Mr. 

 Shuster never noticed the claim; for him the law of June i3th was final. 



This affair took a month to settle, and while it was still causing friction Mr. Shuster 

 requested that Major Stokes, the British military attache at Teheran, might be permit- 

 ted to accept the command of the Treasury gendarmerie which he was 

 incident. about to organise. He stated that the gendarmerie would act especially in 

 the south, but it was clear to Sir George Barclay that any attempt to con- 

 fine Major Stokes' activities would give a political colour to the appointment. It will 

 be noted that Mr. Shuster ignored the Swedish officers appointed by the Mejliss; his 

 case was that a newcomer would lack " knowledge of the language, habits and modes of 

 thought of the Persian people," and he asked for Major Stokes because he thought him 

 the best man available. The question was referred to London, which consulted St. 

 Petersburg. St. Petersburg suggested either that a Swede should be chosen or that a 

 Russian should be appointed to a separate command in the north. Such was the posi- 

 tion on July i8th, when the ex-Shah landed at Gumesh Tepe on the shores of the 

 Caspian. His arrival created the " Stokes incident." It was the desire of the British 

 Government to inform the ex-Shah that he would not be recognised. The Russians, on 

 the contrary, preferred to wait. If Mohamed Ali got to Teheran they were not prepared 

 to turn him out again by force. Sir Edward Grey appears to have desired to remind the 

 Russian Government that British views must be taken into account, and, yielding to 

 further pressure from Mr. Shuster, he now (in a telegram on July 21, 1911) went so far 

 as to say that before Major Stokes assumed the command he would have to resign his 

 commission. Mr. Shuster interpreted this as acquiescence^ overcame the hesitation of 

 the Cabinet which was on the point of resignation and formally proposed the ap- 

 pointment. The two Great Powers speedily patched up their differences. A joint note 

 regarding the conduct of the ex-Shah was presented at Teheran, and the Russians 

 suggested that Major Stokes might have Russian subordinates. Sir Edward Grey, who 

 had received a warning telegram from Sir George Barclay, wavered in his support of the 

 Treasurer-General, influenced, as Mr. Shuster believes, by the European crisis over 



