xn8 PERSIA 



ployed at Teheran. On its merits this appointment was defensible. But Mr. Lecoffre 

 was a British subject and a strong Russophobe. The Russians protested, but Mr. 



Shuster was past all listening. On the contrary, he was forcing a crisis over 

 Friction hi s attempt to confiscate the properties of the ex-Shah's brother, Shoa-es- 

 C Mr. C shasfer. Sultaneh. The Prince was officially a Turkish subject, but a house of his 



close to the Russian Consulate General had been mortgaged to the Russian 

 bank. When Mr. Shuster's officials arrived at this house, the Russian Consul-General, 

 a strong advocate of a Russian forward policy, sent his men to chase them away. Next 

 day Mr. Shuster dispatched one of his American assistants to explain matters. At the 

 same time he sent a hundred of his gendarmes to seize the house. There was a scene. The 

 Russians accused the gendarmes of aiming their rifles at them. The Persian Govern- 

 ment or Mr. Shuster acting through it peremptorily demanded the recall of the 

 Russian Consul-General. It was more than the Russians could stand. On November 

 nth, they presented an ultimatum in Teheran. The Treasury gendarmerie must be 

 withdrawn and an apology tendered. The Persian Prime Minister ordered Mr. Shuster 

 to withdraw his men. Mr. Shuster demanded an order signed by the whole Cabinet, 

 a most unfair proceeding, as he knew there was no Cabinet in existence. Meanwhile the 

 Russians were preparing to back up their ultimatum with 4,000 troops from the Cauca- 

 sus. As soon as it was clear that an immediate apology would not be forthcoming, Sir 

 Edward Grey strained every nerve to avert a Russian occupation of Teheran. The 

 Russians, fully realising the difficulty of his position, let it be known that if their troops 

 once entered Persia a new situation would be created and it would no longer suffice for 

 the Persians to accept the ultimatum of November nth. Matters would have to be 

 put on a stable footing for good, and important constitutional changes were suggested. 

 Sir Edward Grey said that Mr. Shuster was the root of all the trouble and advised the 

 Russians to formulate a case against him before marching on the capital. The Russians, 

 who had now got everything they wanted, replied that the formulation of a case would 

 lead to much futile diplomatic friction. But they would think over the idea of demand- 

 ing the dismissal of Mr. Shuster, and would not move their troops past Resht until the 

 Persians had had ample time to consider their final demands. On November 24th, 

 thirteen days after the presentation of the ultimatum, a Cabinet was finally got together 

 and an apology tendered to the Russian Minister. M. Poklewski intimated, however, 

 that further satisfaction would be required before the Russian troops could be with- 

 drawn, and on November 2Qth, a second ultimatum was presented. It demanded that 



Persia should dismiss Mr. Shuster and Mr. Lecoffre, should obtain the 

 'dismissed!* consent of the two Powers before offering further posts to foreigners, and 



should pay the costs of the Russian expedition. The ultimatum was laid 

 before the Mejliss on December ist, and was rejected by an unanimous vote, a few 

 Deputies abstaining. With its rejection disappeared the last hope that the Russians 

 would immediately withdraw their troops. The danger now arose that they would 

 march on Teheran and re-instate the ex-Shah. It seemed as though the complete 

 collapse of authority in the capital would provide them with an excuse. There were 

 bread riots, there was danger of fighting between Yeprim's police and the Bakhtiari 

 tribesmen, there were boycotts of British and Russian goods, there was the Mejliss with 

 its open provocation of Russia. The Cabinet tried to destroy the Mejliss, by persuading 

 some twenty deputies to resign and thus make it impossible for a quorum to be formed. 

 That plan failing, Ministers asked for full powers. At last, when the Russian troops 

 had reached Kasvin, it was agreed that a small committee of the Mejliss should be em- 

 powered to approve the Cabinet's action. The language of the clause ordering Persia to 

 submit her nominations for approval was softened, and on December 24th the ultima- 

 tum was accepted. Mr. Shuster handed over his papers on January 7, 1912, and a 

 week later was out of Persia. 1 M. Mornard, the Russian nominee, succeeded him and 

 his gendarmerie was taken over by the Swedes. 



The surrender had come a few days too late. On December 22nd there were fights 

 1 Mr. Shuster's own account is given in his book, The Strangling of Persia (1912). 



