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The diihi ulti'-- of communication ami tin- (ii<-< k 

 .if autonomy secured the independence of the 

 colonies as far its tlic inntlicr Mate- were concn ned, 

 luit M int neighbouring and foreign powers. 



Tim-, tin- A-iatic Greeks fell an easy prey, first 

 t<> tin- I. \iliiiii monarch Cnesus (560), and then to 

 n < '\iu-. the conqueror of Crcesus (.~>4r>). 

 \inl Mm- ilif 1'ersian empire was brought into the 

 f all-culling or endeavouring to absorb 

 e in tin- same way as the Human empire 

 .impelled ti annex Britain ; in the one case 

 .in, in the other Greece, ollered a refuge and a 

 ' rujijnii to fugitives and instigators to revolt. 

 In tin- one case Gaul, in the other the Asiatic 

 colonie-. would never cease struggling for inde- 

 pendence a- lung as their kinsfolk across the sea 

 were tire. \\hat the course of events was which 

 iai-ed up in Greece a power competent to repel the 

 lluml of barbarism which threatened to extinguish 

 tlie art, literature, and philosophy of Greece, and 

 therefore of the world, we must now briefly state. 



The weakness of Greece in the face of an invader 

 was that although the Greeks were no longer 

 nomads but hail reached the stage of city life, and 

 aUliuu^h the bond of blood and kinship was being 

 displaced by the tie of neighbourhood and ter- 

 ritorial organisation, the numerous communities 

 \\ere subject to no central government. The state 

 of things in Greece may lie compared reasonably, 

 for it had its origin in similar circumstances with 

 that in England at the time of the so-called Hep- 

 tardiy, except that there were many more than seven 

 independent states in Greece, and scarcely any of 

 them were as large as even a small English shire. 

 Most of them were cities with but three or four 

 miles of territory ; only two succeeded in reaching 

 tin- si/e of an English county. Those two were 

 the greatest names in Greece, Attica and Sparta. 

 By what process of coalescence (or synoikisnios, as 

 it is called ) the various village-communities of 

 Attica became united with Athens for the seat 

 of government we know not. Nor can we do more 

 here than say that before the Persian wars Attica 

 had passed through several social and political and 

 politico-economical crises ; Solon's reforms remedied 

 the latter, but his political measures did not pre- 

 vent the institution of a tyranny, that of Pisi- 

 st rat us and his sons. The tyrants, however, were 

 expelled, and the democracy of Athens placed on 

 the path which it was to follow by Clisthenes. 



Meanwhile in the Peloponnese Sparta was obtain- 

 ing that position of supremacy which subsequently 

 enabled the Greeks to offer resistance to the Persians 

 with some show of unity. Not only did Laconia 

 -land to Sparta somewhat in the same relation as 

 Attica to Athens, but Sparta conquered the neigh- 

 bouring territory of Messenia (after two desperate 

 wars), and deprived Argos, hitherto the leading 

 Mate in the Peloponnese, of the district between 

 I'ainon and the sea, and of Cythera. Here, how- 

 ever, Sparta's career of conquest and annexation 

 \\a- ^nested by the sturdy and successful resistance 

 of t lie small city of Tegea ; and henceforth Sparta's 

 policy was confederation, not annexation. The 

 league of states which had followed Argos was 

 broken up : Kpidaurus, Phlius, Tnczene, Hermione, 

 and even .K-jina went over to Sparta. Elis had 

 become lioiuid by community of interest to Sparta in 

 the Messenian wars ; and Tegea and Arcadia having 

 resisted annexation, submitted to confederation. 

 Thus, iu the Peloponnese at least, Sparta was 

 the undoubted leader of the Greeks; and, outside 

 the Peloponnese, Athens promptly set the example 

 "t acknowledging Sparta to be the proper leader of 

 all (Jreece against the Persians. But in 490 B.C., 

 when Dat is ami Artaphernes, at the command of 

 R-uius, led the first Persian expedition a<jain-t 

 , it w a > Athens alone that withstood them, 



and single bunded won the jjloriouH victory of 

 .Marathon, thanks to the ^ciiin* of .Miltiade- and 

 the valour of her sons. For a time the danger of 

 invasion was averted, but only for a time. If, 

 howe\er, \etxe-, the Miecessor of Darius, availed 

 biiii-i If of tin- interval for enormous preparations, 

 Athens, also under the keen-sighted guidance of a 

 ^ieat statesman, ThemistoelcN, was also preparing 

 that navy which wan to deal the final, fatal blow at 

 Xerxes. The numlter of that monarch's troops we 

 have no means of estimating ; we may safely say it 

 was the greatest army that ever took the field. 

 The Greeks' first line of defence the pass of Teniue 

 was given up localise it could ]>e turned. The 

 second Thermopylae and Artemisium was turned, 

 and the famous band of Spartans were sacrificed by 

 the hesitation and procrastination of the Spartan 

 government. Then the Persians ravaged Attica 

 and destroyed Athens, but not the Athenians. They 

 had fled to the neighbouring island of Salamis, and 

 there they defeated, thanks tx> Themistocles, the 

 Persian fleet, and sent the Persian monarch home in 

 flight (480 B.C.). Then, indeed, the Spartans made 

 up their minds to join the Athenians in attacking 

 the Persian commander who bail been left behind 

 in Greece with a large force. With his defeat at 

 Plattea (479 B.C.) and the victorious attack made 

 by the Greek fleet on the enemy in his o\\ n 

 waters at Mycale (479 B.C.) the Persian wars came 

 to an end, and the seeds of a far more fatal 

 struggle, because internecine, were sown. That 

 struggle was between Athens and Sparta. 



The position of undisputed leadership which 

 Sparta had enjoyed at the beginning of the Persian 

 wars she had fost before the end of them. For this 

 the main reason must be admitted to be that 

 Sparta acted with disgraceful selfishness, Athens 

 with glorious self -sacrifice, throughout. When, 

 therefore, the Greeks of the islands formed a league 

 the Confederation of Delos for defence against 

 the Persians, it is not surprising that the foremost 

 place in it was accorded to Athens. In course of 

 time many members of the league preferred to pay 

 monetary contributions rather than supply .ships 

 and men ; Athens on the contrary was ever eager 

 to provide both men and ships. Thus Athens came 

 to nave the power of the sword and therefore of 

 the purse in the confederation, which now was 

 practically constituted not of allies but subjects. 

 Not content with the command of the sea she thus 

 acquired, Athens by a series of victories and under 

 the guidance of Pericles attained a position of 

 commanding influence in continental Greece, 

 which, however, only endured from 456 to 445. In 

 spite, however, of the loss of influence occasioned 

 to Athens by her defeat at Coronea (447), and in 

 spite of the Thirty Years' Truce concluded in 445 

 between Athens and Sparta, in 432 Athens and 

 Sparta, making a quarrel between Corinth and 

 Corcyra their pretext, began their great duel, the 

 Peloponnesian war. Sparta was by its con- 

 stitution a predatory, Athens an industrial state. 

 The Spartans were farmers, the Athenians mer- 

 chants. Sparta's strength was on land, Athens' 

 on sea. Sparta prided herself on the ignorance of 

 her sons, Athens on being herself the instructress 

 of Greece. Sparta represented and received the 

 support of oligarchy ; Athens, democracy. For 

 thrice nine years, as the oracles prophesied, the 

 war lasted. Its varied and tragic fortunes cannot 

 here be traced. Suffice it to say that there were 

 three things which brought al>out the defeat of 

 Athens : the early death of her greatest statesman, 

 Pericles ; her attempt, magnificent and tragic, to 

 cun.|iier Sicily ; and the Persian gold which Sparta 

 was base enough to accept and use. 



Thus the supremacy of Sparta (404_.S7P-) was 

 established. But it was no sooner established than 



