HARTMR 



IIAIIT.MANN' 



575 



lie impugned the eternity of hell-punishment, main- 

 taining the ultimate restoration of the lost; in 

 all other points his published opinions coincided 

 with tlitt Church of England, uiul lie continued to 

 the last a member of the church. He finally chose 

 tin- profe-o-ion of medicine, in which In- attained 

 con-ideraUe eminence. He practised a* a physician 

 sncce-Mvely at Newark, Bury Si Edmunds, in Lon- 

 don, and at Math, where he died on the 25th of 

 August 17.~>7, at the age of lift.y-two. 



His work on the mind, entitled Observations on 

 M<ni (174!)), on which his fame rests, was begun 

 when he was aliout twenty-live, and occupied his 

 thoughts fur sixteen years. The first part relates 

 to the constitution of the human mind ; the second 

 treats of religion and morals. His handling of 

 the mind turns throughout upon two theories or 

 hypotheses, which have very different merits. The 

 lii -t is called the Doctrine of Vibrations, or a theory 

 of nervous action analogous to the propagation of 

 sound, the suggestion of which he owed to Newton, 

 of whose writings he was a devoted student. His 

 second and most valuable innovation consisted in 

 showing that the faculties, powers, and feelings of 

 the mind might be explained to a very wide extent 

 by the principle of the Association of Ideas (q.v.) ; 

 and it should be said that he was certainly the first 

 to do justice to the applications of that principle 

 to explain the phenomena of the mind. 



The doctrine of vibrations supposed that when 

 any one of the senses is affected by an outward 

 object the effect was to set the particles of the 

 nerve in a vibratory motion, which ran along to the 

 ln.iin, and produced corresponding vibrations in the 

 cerebral substance. In like manner, when an active 

 impulse proceeded outwards to the muscles the 

 manner of communication along the nerves was of 

 the same kind. He even extended these molecular 

 vibrations to the other tissues. The dislike gener- 

 ally entertained towards this part of Hartley's 

 speculations arose from a mistaken notion of its 

 involving or -favouring materialism. See G. S. 

 Bower, Hartley and James Mill ( 1881 ). 



llartlib, SAMUEL, was born about 1600 at 

 Elbing, in Prussia, son of a Polish refugee and an 

 English mother. Coming to England about 1628, 

 he busied himself in trade, later in agriculture, and, 

 when he had exhausted his fortune in his experi- 

 ments, projected a school to be conducted on new 

 principles. It is highly probable that his idea in- 

 spired his friend Milton's famous Tractate on Educa- 

 tion, addressed to Hartlib in 1644, as well as Sir 

 William Petty's Two Letters ( 1647 and 1648). He 

 was granted by Cromwell a pension of 100, in- 

 creased later to 300, which after the Restoration 

 he petitioned parliament to renew. No letters of 

 Hartlib's are extant posterior to 1662. He wrote 

 on education and on husbandry. See Biographical 

 M< in/ ni- nf Siiniiiel Hartlib by H. Dircks (1865). 



Hartmanii, KARL ROBERT EDUARD VON, 

 German philosopher, born at Berlin on 23d Feb- 

 ruary 1842. From 1858 to 1865 he served as an 

 artillery officer in the Prussian guards, but was 

 compelled to abandon his calling owing to an affec- 

 tion of the knee. Since 1867 he has lived in Berlin, 

 busied with the elaboration of a comprehensive 

 system of philosophy. His activity may be divided 

 into two periods ; in the first, from 1868 to 1877, he 

 was chiefly working out his ideas on methodology, 

 the philosophy of the natural sciences, psychology, 

 metaphysics, and the theory of knowledge ( Erkennt- 

 nisstheorie ) ; in the latter, from 1878 onwards, he 

 has been chiefly concerned with ethics, the philo- 

 sophy of religion, and {esthetics. His system is a 

 synthesis of Hegel's and Schopenhauer s systems, 

 which he has reduced, by means of Schelling's con- 

 ception of the Unconscious and his doctrine of prin- 



ciples, to a concrete monism ; and his substructure 

 is built upon an empirical l>a.-is with the aid of the 

 inductive methods employed in the natural sciences 

 and history. In his own words ' AH I have followed 

 Sehelling's precedent in uniting Hegel's one-aided 

 identification of the world's sulmtance with the 

 logical Idea with Schopenhauer's similarly one-sided 

 identification of it with Will, HO I have also endea- 

 voured to effect a higher unity letweeii Hegel's 

 coldness and want of feeling, wherein- the individual 

 is degraded to an insensitive instrument of the Idea, 

 with whose fate, with whose, weal or woe, philosophy 

 does not concern itself, and Schopenhauer's lacfc of 

 interest in the process of the All, and his insistence 

 on the redemption of self from an individual exist- 

 ence of pain as the sole end of life. In a similar 

 manner I have corrected Hegel's idea of the philo- 

 sophy of religion. He has endeavoured to interpret 

 Christianity in a false and un historical manner, in 

 that speculatively he makes it the almolute religion 

 of the intellect (Geist). This faulty conception I 

 have amended with certain elements of thought 

 derived from Schopenhauer, to wit, a recognition of 

 the deep and peculiar significance of the Indian 

 religions, of which Hegel had no comprehension and 

 with which he had consequently no sympathy. In 

 my ethics I have assigned to Schopenhauer's emo- 

 tion morality its proper place beside Hegel's intellec- 

 tual morality, and have linked Hegel's demand for 

 the subordination of the individual to the teleological 

 end of the absolute Idea to Schopenhauer's concep- 

 tion that the ethical subordination of the individual 

 is conditioned by the unity of substance which ob- 

 tains between all separate individualities and the 

 one world -substance. But in all these departments 

 of thinking the richer and more important factors 

 were contributed by Hegel's philosophy, whilst 

 Schopenhauer's less elaborated system 'furnished 

 me with complementary elements. In aesthetics 

 the only thing I had to do in principle was to 

 emphasise still more sharply than Hegel himself 

 has done the antithesis between his concrete ideal- 

 ism and the abstract idealism of Schelling and of 

 Schopenhauer.' 



The great aim Ed. von Hartmann has set before 

 himself is that of harmonising and reconciling 

 philosophy with science, by gathering up the 

 varied results of modern scientific investigation 

 into an all-comprehensive philosophic conception 

 of the world (Weltanschauung). His speculative 

 system is commonly believed to be pessimistic in 

 temper ; but that is not the case. The Unconscious 

 ( the universal monistic principle ) is both real and 

 ideal, both will and presentation the substantial 

 and intelligent principles respectively. And the 

 world-process, instead of being negative, is a pro- 

 cess or evolutionary optimism. The substantial 

 principle involves intrinsically an excess of pain 

 over pleasure in the world ; and this excess of pain 

 can only be abolished by the annihilation of the 

 substantial principle, Will, and its specific energy, 

 willing, not, however, in individual beings, but 

 once for all universally. The agency by which this 

 ' best possible ' consummation is to be achieved is 

 the intellectual principle, working through its own 

 creations, consciousness and individuality, along the 

 lines of progressional development. And this strikes 

 the keynote of the philosophic temper in which 

 Von Hartmann writes. He is an ardent champion 

 of evolutionary progress, a believer in the mission 

 of western energy and enlightenment,, and in its 

 teleological justification, an admirer of the modern 

 spirit of enterprise, its robust vigour, its keen 

 delight in struggle and conflict, and its restless 

 practical activity. Hence he proclaims himself 

 as opposed to the teaching and attitude of the 

 prophets of the Weltschmerz; hence he condemns the 

 temper of oriental passivity, the unmanly fashion of 



