NAPOLEON I. 



389 



de la Pagerie, widow of General Vicomte Alex- 

 andre de Beauharnais, and left Paris for Italy two 

 days later. 



On joining the army Bonaparte inaugurated a 

 new era in the Avars of the Republic. Previously 

 the leading motives had been pure patriotism and 

 love of liberty ; Bonaparte for the first time, in 

 his proclamation on taking command, invoked the 

 spirit of self-interest and plunder, which was to 

 dominate the whole policy of France for the next 

 twenty years. Evil as were the passions which he 

 aroused, Napoleon's great military genius flashed 

 forth in its full brilliancy in this his first campaign. 

 His power lay in the rapidity and boldness of his 

 decisions, and in the untiring energy with which he 

 carried them out, confounding his enemies by the 

 suddenness and lightning rapidity of his blows, 

 which never gave them time to recover. He 

 found the French army about 36,000 strong, dis- 

 tributed along the crests of the mountains from 

 Nice to Savona, and opposing 20,000 Piedmontese 

 under Colli and 38,000 Austnans under Beaulieu. 

 These two generals had, however, differing in- 

 terests : Colli's main object was to protect Pied- 

 mont, Beaulieu's to cover Lombardy. Hence, if 

 Bonaparte could penetrate the point of junction of 

 the two armies, it was probable they would sepa- 

 rate in their retreat, and could be beaten singly. 

 He therefore attacked the centre of the allied line, 

 and, driving back the Austrians from Montenotte 

 on the 12th April, turned against the Piedmontese 

 and defeated them at Millc^imo the next day. 

 Losing no time he left a division under Atigereau 

 to keep the Piedmontese in check, and led the 

 bulk of his army against the Austnans, defeating 

 them heavily at Dego on the 14th. The allied 

 armies then retreated in diverging directions as 

 expected, and Bonaparte, following the Piedmon- 

 tese, beat them at Ceva and Mondovi, and forced 

 the king of Sardinia to sign the armistice of Cher- 

 asco, leaving him free to deal with the Austrians. 

 He crossed the Po at Piacenza on the 7th May, 

 ami obliged the Austrians to retreat to the Adda. 

 Following them he forced the bridge of Lodi on the 

 llth May, and entered Milan amid the rejoicings 

 of the people on the loth. But his ill-omened pro- 

 clamation nad done it work ; violence and pillage 

 were rampant in the French army, and he could do 

 little to restrain them. Indeed, he himself showed 

 an example of plundering, though under more or- 

 ganised forms. Heavy contributions were exacted, 

 curiosities and works of art were demanded whole- 

 sale and despatched to France; and the Directory, 

 demoralised by the unaccustomed wealth that 

 flowed in upon them, became fully as eager as 

 Napoleon for fresh conquests and their accruing 

 spoils. Insurrections followed at Pavia and in the 

 Milanese, but were ruthlessly put down, and on the 

 27th May the army left Milan to follow lieaulieu 

 to the Mincio. The Austrian* defended the whole 

 line of this river, but Napoleon, drawing the bulk 

 of their fnrci-t northward by a feint, broke through 

 their centre at Ifcrghetto, and Beaulieu retreated 

 into Tyrol, leaving the line of the Adige to Napo- 

 leon. This he at once occupied, taking Verona and 

 Legnago from the neutral republic of Venice, 

 whom he frightened into submission. 



The Anstnans still held Mantua, which Napoleon 

 now besieged, occupying himself at the same time 

 in consolidating his conquests. The Austrians 

 made strenuous efforts to save the fortress. They 

 had about 20,000 men in Mantua, and Wurmser 

 advanced through Tyrol with 50,000 more, while 

 the French were only some 45,000 strong including 

 the siege corps. Wurmser moved in three columns : 

 ori>^ descended the Adige and threatened Verona, 

 another moving lietween the Adige and the Lake 

 of Garda drove Joubert and Maasena from Kivoli 



and Corona, while the third under Qnasdanovich 

 moved west of the Lake of Garda and seized 

 Brescia, threatening the French communications. 

 Napoleon's position was very critical, but he made 

 a rapid decision, raised the siege of Mantua, spik- 

 ing nis guns and destroying his stores, moved all 

 the force he could collect against Quasdanovich, 

 and defeated him at Lonato on the 31st July. 

 Wurmser moving on Mantua found no enemy 

 there, and missed l>eing at the decisive point at 

 the right time. Napoleon, leaving a small force 

 to watch Quasdanovich, turned rapiulv back against 

 the other two Austrian columns wliich were not 

 yet fully united, and beat their most advanced 

 troops at Lonato again on the 3d August and 

 \Vurmser himself at Castiglione on the 5th, driving 

 him back into Tyrol with the loss of half his army. 

 Mantua was again invested, but, the siege-artil- 

 lery having been lost, the operations against it 

 were reduced to a blockade. In the beginning of 

 September Napoleon took the offensive against 

 Wurmser, and passing boldly behind him defeated 

 him at Bassano, cut off his retreat, and forced him 

 to take refuge in Mantua on the 15th September. 

 Again, at the end of October, an Austrian army of 

 50,000, but mostly recruits, advanced under Alvinzi. 

 Napoleon could now dispose of from 38,000 to 

 40,000 men, having in the meantime formed the 

 Cispadane Republic and raised an Italian legion 

 which set free most of his garrisons. Alvinzi 

 arrived before Verona, while a column under David- 

 ovich moved by the eastern shore of the Lake of 

 Garda. Napoleon hastily caused the positions of 

 Kivoli and Corona to -be reoccupied to check 

 Davidovich, and moved himself by night from 

 Verona down the right bank of the Adige, crossed 

 it at Ronco, and came upon Alvinzi's rear. Then 

 followed the three days' battle of Arcola, during 

 which Napoleon had a very narrow escape, but 

 which ended in Alvinzi's defeat and retreat on 

 Tyrol. From Arcola Napoleon dated his lirm 

 belief in his own fortune. Once again, in Janu- 

 ary 1797, Alvinzi tried to relieve Mantua. 

 Feinting against Legnago to deceive Napoleon, 

 he intended to make his main advance between 

 the Adige and the lake. But Napoleon was 

 too skilful to take decided action without full 

 knowledge, and keeping his reserve half-way 

 between Rivoli and Legnago waited for more 

 certain news. When he ascertained the direc- 

 tion of the real attack, he moved in full force on 

 Kivoli and won a decisive battle there on January 

 14, the Austrian detachnient on the Lower Adige 

 having to lay down their arms next day at Rover- 

 bella. Wurmser capitulated at Mantua on the 2d 

 February, Naixtleon treating him with generosity. 

 This first Italian campaign was perhaps the most 

 skilful of all those of Napoleon. Everything was 

 done accurately and rapidly, and without throwing 

 away chances. Some of his later campaigns, 

 though equally brilliant, show him acting more 

 with the gambler's spirit, running unnecessary 

 risks with almost a blind reliance upon his star, in 

 the hope of obtaining results which should dazzle 

 the world. 



In political matters during this time Napoleon 

 was acting less as a servant of the French Directory 

 than as an independent ruler. He entirely ignored 

 the instructions he received from Paris, levying 

 contributions, entering into negotiations and depos- 

 ing princes at his own will, and writing that he 

 is not fighting 'for those rascals of lawyers." 

 Hi policy was in fact regulated in accordance 

 with his own ambitious schemes ; and we find 

 him adopting a conciliatory attitude towards 

 Koine with an eye to the future support of the 

 church. 



When his position in Italy was secured by 



