I'HII.OXU'IIKITS 



PHILOSOPHY 



Philosopher')* Slonr. See Amu M\ 



llloxOpIl). Ill a subject where Opinion ha* 



ami i- -till wi much <li\ ided. as is the case in 



philo-ophv. it would In- rain to attempt to form 

 ulate a definili.m which would be accepted by 

 every one. The object* i>f the science, its methods, 

 nay, it* very ]*. il.ility, are Htill matter of debate 

 between divergent schools. Tin- historical method 

 i- "in only Mile guide in -uch a rax*; and by it- 

 aid we are happily able to li\ II|MIM the main 

 elements that wen- present I" the mind- (if the 

 Greek thinkers wlm first consciously used the term 

 viili a specific meaning. t'raclically the lir-i 

 attempts at definition are t" be found in Plato 

 and Aristotle, and as these two philosophers dom- 

 inated the human intelleet fur two thousand years, 

 the ideas which they expressed un tlie subject 

 inevitably idiaped the oonreptinii of philn-nphy 

 eurrent during that time. In virtue of its long 

 lease of life, thin rmiception has established itself 

 in the associations of language, and is vaguely 

 pnent t" the man of ordinary culture when he 

 use- the term. It may claim, therefore, to be the 

 hi-.toric.-il sense of the term - the sense, that is to 

 say, whirh the historian of civilisation would single 

 nut as that which has persistently asserted itself 

 during more than two millennia of human progress. 

 Pronounced deviations from the accepted usage 

 occur mainly in connection with a sceptical or 

 qiis.fi sceptical theory of knowledge, and will be 

 noticed in their place. 



Tradition assigns the first employment of the 

 word to Pythagoras, and makes him use it to 

 signify merely the disinterested pursuit of know 

 ledge. Socrates plays upon the etymology of <he 

 word when he contrast* the modesty of tlie truth- 

 seeker with the more arrogant pretensions of the 

 sophist*. lint, so far, the nature of the truth or 

 knowledge which the philosopher seeks is not speci- 

 fied ; the term is still vague ami general. In tact, 

 no kind of knowledge, wax at lirst alien to the 

 philosopher. Philosophy hits lieen truly called 

 the mother of the sciences,' and it was only by 

 slow degrees that the separate s.-ii-i ..... s attained 

 an inde|M-ndcnt life. As specialisation proceeded, 

 however, philosophy could no longer I'M n I, I,,;, I 

 trnxf 'lake all Knowledge to lie her province;' 

 the details of one department after another of 

 existence were sunendered to the scientific special- 

 lint the claim of philosophy to lie the \-. 



iillllilctncnl "f the s|M-cial sciences the only 



I ..... if cxistci ..... or of tlie universe ax a whole- 

 was not therein surrendered. The siviali-t, MI 

 far as he is a men- -pe, -iali-t, i~ like the man who 

 cannot see the wood for the tree-; he loses sight 

 of the proportions of the whole in the details of 

 his own province. The co-ordination of the 



...... . the unification of knowledge, is a task 



which leimiinx to lie undertaken by the philo- 

 sophcr. I'nity or harmony in our eonception of 

 the univei-e is the aim which philosophy alwa\s 

 has in view. Whether this aim is attainable by 

 manor not is a further question ; but the idea of a 



..... f things satisfactory to the reason ami the 

 moral souse remains the inexhaustible, spring of 

 philosophic effort. The philosopher, therefore, has 

 always his eye II|HIII the Whole; his true function 

 t the attractions of the special sciences. 

 Each science iiiuke-. and must make, its own 

 working postulates or prempposJtloiM, and the 

 |Mfiah>i i. e,-r pi. me lo make the working IKW- 

 his own dcpaii mem the measuring line 

 of existence as such, lint philosophy has io review 

 II these M-ientilic iiostiilates. and 'if possible to 

 harmonise their conflicting claims by showing the 

 relative and limited validity which Wongi to each. 

 PbDoMphy i- in this coin ..... tion the critic of the 

 the |tulales which they make and 



the conceptions which they use; and she cv; 

 this critical ollice in the interest of the 



. 



Something like this was present to Plato's mind 

 when he descrilied the philosopher as *i/m,/<r//.,,.v. 

 a man who insists on seeing things together, who 

 i. -fuses to consider the parts out of their relation 

 to the whole whose parts they are. ami who is 

 therefore the inexorable foe of crude and preinatui.- 

 gMMrmttMtioai from this or tl ..... ther department 

 of investigation which happen- for the time to In- 

 most in evidence. 



In Plato we find, however, already established 

 a second account of philosophy, which, though un- 

 questionably true in itself, has led, in the opinion of 

 tlie present writer, to many questionable develop 

 inents. The philosophers, says Plato, 'are those who 

 are able to grasp the eternal and immutable.' -ili..~.- 

 who set their affections on that which in each case 

 really existo.' The philosopher, an the man who 

 apprehends and follows after the essence or reality 

 of things, is thus opposed to the man who dwells 

 in appearances and the shows of sense. This dis- 

 tinction may be said to be implied in the demand 

 for any explanation at all, and is present in (ireek 

 philosophy from the beginning. What i- the snli 

 stance or unitary reality underlying all the diver- 

 sity of the world around us? So ran the question 

 which the early Greek thinkers asked themselves : 

 and the explicit opposition l*etween the world as 

 it appears to sense and the world as reason recog 

 nises it to be had already appeared in the system- 

 (otherwise diametrically opi>oscd ) of ("armenide- 

 and Heraclitua. In the Platonic doctrine of tian- 

 cendent Ideas the opposition receives a question 

 able expression ; it appears more legitimately in 

 the Aristotelian doctrine of Substance and Cm. 

 The philosmiher, indeed, must always continue to 

 ask himself. What is the essence, the ultimate 

 realitv of things? who or what is the lleing that is 

 manifested in 'all thinking things, all objects of all 

 thought?' In this sense philosophy is still defin- 

 able, in Aristotle's phrase, as Ontology, the science 

 of lieing as being. 



To very many, however, in modern times the 

 search for this ultimate reality seem- a Impel. -- 

 quest, and philosophy therefore, in the form of 

 metaphysics or ontology, is condemned by them 

 as a disease of the human spirit, from which. 

 under the influence of scientific habits of thought, 

 it is now happily recovering. The Kmpiricism 

 which hases itself on Hume, the Positivism which 

 found- on ( 'omte. and various phases of Kantian 

 thought agree in this repudiation of metaphysics. 

 'flic distinction between phenomena and noumena 

 lias licen revived in a somewhat different form, 

 and has become current in popular thought. Sen- 

 ible objects and their laws may 1- known, it is 

 argued, because in such an investigation we an- 

 nul .allied hcvond the facts of present and possible 

 ex|>erience ; they are phenomena. Hut if we refuse 

 to take this sensuous phantasmagoria simply a- it 

 stands it' we insist on referring it to - ........ iltiimite 



ground of existence as an explanation of why and 

 now there is a phenomenal world at all the object 

 of our search is variously said to be noumenal. 

 metaphysical, inetcmpirical, or transcendental, and 

 to Iw unattainable by human reason. To those 

 who hold this view philosophy becomes conveil- 

 ible with K.pistemology or Theory of knowledge 

 ( Krkenntniss-tlieorie). It becomes an 'inqiiin 

 intu the human understanding,' or a 'criticism ' 

 of the forms and categories of human thought. 

 by way of fixing the limits of our necessai\ 

 ignorance, and thus justifying the negative posi 

 tion assumed towards metaphysics. To Hume 

 and Comic, and to Kant himself in some of his 

 moods, philosophy is thus a preventive again-t 

 it -elf, or at least against what has ordinarily 



