230 



PLATO 



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up to the sun itself this represents the- education 

 of the philosopher. Education is ' a turning round 

 of the eye of the soul. ' Learning, according to the 

 more startling language of the Mcno and Pluedrut, 

 is 'recollecting:' the soul in a previous existence 

 has beheld the 'ideas,' and knowledge is possible 

 just because the mind does not acquire something 

 alien to it, but recovers what is its own. The way 

 from the life of the senses and of mere vague opinion 

 to the highest or philosophical knowledge is through 

 the mathematical sciences. Mathematics, being 

 the only science which had then outgrown the 

 merest infancy, is to the Greeks the type of science 

 in general. (Plato is said to have had the words 

 'Let no one ignorant of geometry enter' inscribed 

 on the door of his school.) In the conceptions of 

 mathematics we have a clue to the understanding 

 t of Plato's t henry of ideas. The geometrician looks 

 Or at ft particular triangle, but he speaks not of this, 

 luit of the triangle. The triangles we see are 

 , , ''angles only by 'participating in' ('imitating,' 

 tl,,. Pythagoreans would have said) the triangle. 

 . \,,d' it remains true for us still that we can only 

 scieiiu 'ie:ill\ know anything in so far as we can 

 find in 7t>., a universal element, which manifests 

 itself or 'is present' (in Platonic language) in the 

 particular. TlilA. botanist, for example, knows a 

 particular plant oinj'^as a specimen of a species 

 (the Latin equivalent ofi^lato's 'idea'). But the 

 philosopher must not remain \t, n the region of the 

 various special sciences: he ha > the passion for 

 unity and universality. Plato has J). vision of the 

 t rue -eien.'e which is above all particular sciences, 

 and is the unity and ' coping-stone ' of tUiem all : 

 and this he calls in a special sense 'dialectic, ' which 

 does not like mathematical thinking need the" -help 

 of sensible images, but deals with 'ideas' alone' ni 

 their relation to one another and to the highest of 

 all, 'the idea of the good.' These ideas are not 

 mere concepts of our minds : they are, in Plato's 

 phrase, 'the most real existences.' The extreme 

 form of medieval ' Realism,' according to which 

 universals are prior to and more real than particular 

 things, is a crude version of Pluto's doctrine. It 

 is indeed an adaptation of Platonic philosophy to 

 Christian theology, for which Plato gives no sanc- 

 tion, if the idea* are called ' the thoughts of God ;' 

 but the phrase in perhaps less misleading than many 

 others which have been used uliout them. Plato 

 does speak (in Republic, \. ) of God having ' made ' 

 the ideas, as a human artificer makes things in 

 imitation of them ; but he is there talking in 

 pictorial language. God in Plato's system is rather 

 the 'idea of the good,' the good-in-itself, which is 

 the cause alike of knowing and of being, as the sun 

 in the visible world is the cause both of light and 

 of life. In the Timteus the world is said to be 

 fashioned by the Creator or Artificer after the pattern 

 of the ideas; but here also the language is figur- 

 ative. Plato's ' ideas ' must, however, be thought 

 of both as ' real kinds ' and as archetypes. Plato's 

 presentation of his theory varies : most prnliahly 

 the theory itself underwent modification. In the 

 Parmenidc* some of the objections made to it are 

 the same as were afterwards urged by Aristotle 

 a remarkable instance of n philosopher criticising 

 himself. 



The relation of the hierarchy of the ideas to 

 the supreme idea of the good is now here worked 

 out by Plato. Dialectic lem.-iins only an ideal 

 science. The true dialectician is he who will see 

 things in their unity I compare Mr Herliert Spein 

 definition of philosophy as 'completely unified 

 knowledge'): lie will also 'divide things rightly 

 ae.-ording to their kinds.' The method of philo- 

 sophy is a bringing together and a dividing (*yna- 

 gogctuid diatresis). In this we may recognise the 

 germ of Aristotle's ' induction and deduction. ' 



The Tiiiueus is the one work which Plato has 

 devoted to the philosophy of nature; and though 

 it has exercised directly and indirectly an enormous 

 influence over the ancient and medieval world, as 

 it has specially attracted mystical and thcosophical 

 commentators, in Plato's own view it oo-upi> 

 very subordinate position. \Ve are again and 

 again warned by him not to expect strict truth, 

 hut only approximations and figurative statements 

 ('myths') m dealing with Mich subject*. The 

 notion of 'emanations,' which plays so great a part 

 in later philosophy is latent in the Timmu. The 

 Cosmos, or order of the universe, is the 'one only, 

 begotten ' image of God, its father and creator 

 i 1 1' miourqos i.e. 'artificer'). The Creator wan 

 good, and wished to make the world as like hinT-J 

 self as possible ; but no created or visible thing ran 

 be perfect. The material out of which the orderly 

 world is made introduces imperfect ion into it. 

 (This conception of matter as evil had a potent 

 influence in later times, especially when combined 

 with Oriental ideas e.g. in Gnosticism, <\.\.) So, 

 too, the denial Creator could not make the world 

 eternal like himself, and in making it made Time, 

 'the moving image of eternity." To the obscure. 

 details of Plato's cosmology and physics it would 

 be unprofitable to refer here. Cosmology is again 

 introduced, but briefly, and with similar warnings 

 that it is to lie treated as mythical, in connection 

 with the immortality of the soul in the Phcedo and 

 Iti-^iiililii: The soul of 111:111 I like the 'soul of the 

 universe') is intermediate between the ideas and 

 the corporeal. The human soul, us it exists in th" 

 body, has three parts or elements : ( 1 ) the rational ; 

 (2) the spirited element; (3) the appetitive. The 

 rational element alone, which is the soul in its true 

 iM'ing as it is apart from mixture with body, is 

 properly immortal. The doctrine of immortality 

 .(i.e. the pre-existence of the soul as well as its exist- 

 ence after death) is introduced in the J'lunlria, 

 !,'</, < I,/ ic, and Pineda, and is the main subject of 

 the ti'.iird. In all Plato makes use of the Pytha- 

 gorean notion of transmigration. What he says 

 must !" i' a ken as largely mythical and figurative. 

 His whole pbiloaophioa] thinking implies the cter-1 

 nity of llea-. in. but how far he believed in what is' 

 now understood by personal immortality has )M>. n 

 and may be doubted. Wordsworth's famous (til ,,n 

 Immortality is generally considered 'Platonic;' 

 but it turns on a misapplication of Plato's doctrine 

 of 'recollection.' f'lato would certainly not hold 

 that the new IHIHI infant is nearer perfection than 

 the aged philosopher. 



Plato is so far true to the example of Socrates 

 that, though be has metaphysical interests which 

 were alien to his master, yet "the practical interest 

 always predominates. Philosophy is to him not (_ 

 mere intellectual speculation, but a habit of mind 

 and a manner of living As we have seen, tin- 

 highest of the ideas is 'the good.' He cannot 

 accept the Cyrenaic view that pleasure is the good ; 

 but neither does he agree with the Cynics that all 

 pleasure i evil. Pleasures are good or bad, high 

 or low, according to the part of the soul to which 

 they belong. Socrates had identified virtue and I 

 knowledge, had asserted that virtue was one, ami I 

 that virtue could l tauglit. All these doctrines! 

 Plato accepted; but n odifications gradually I 

 aiipear. In the Republic, the dialogue in which 

 all the various elements ,,f his philosophy are 

 united more than in any other, Plato accepts 

 without proof the popular distinction of four 

 'cardinal virtues' (as tnej afterwards came to be 

 called), and lit* them ii with his psychology. 

 Wisdom is the virtue of tl,e reason. Courage of the 

 spirited element, Temperance (i.e. Moderation. Self- 

 control in general ) is the virtue of the lower parts 

 in their relation to the higher, while Justice 



