476 



PSYCHOLOGY 



interpreted by motor sensations, and out of these 

 elements there gradually emerges the perception 

 of one's own laxly, by relation to which other 

 things are localised in space. Thus, although the 

 perception of space is implied in that of body, the 

 two perceptions grow to clearness together. Even 

 admitting this empirical analysis, however, it may 

 still be held as Lotze holds that there is an a 

 priori mental tendency to form the perception of 

 space. 



The opposed views of Nativisin and Kmpiricisui 

 are applied to the perception of time as well as 

 to that of space. And the perception of time only 

 seems a simpler question than the other because 

 we are apt to confuse the succession of presenta- 

 tions on which it is based with a presentation of 

 succession, which, of course, would be a presenta- 

 tion of time. The elements from which this pre- 

 sentation of time is derived may be somewhat as 

 follows : When a nninlier of presentations are 

 successively presented, each grows fainter as atten- 

 tion passes from it, and hence arises a vague dis- 

 tinction between present and not-present. After- 

 wards, on the same series being repeated, the 

 second member will lie rising in intensity when 

 the first is presented, and therefore in full intensity ; 

 when the second is presented, the first will he sink- 

 ing in intensity, while attention will be passing on 

 towards the third, whose intensity will therefore be 

 rising ; and so on throughout the series. Hence 

 the vague distinction of present and not- present 

 1 "dunes more definite as a distinction of past, 

 present, and future, and this is the presentation of 

 time. 



Memory and Expectation. Both of these are 

 distinguished from the mere succession of ideas 

 and images by involving a reference to one's own 

 conscious life as a succession in time. When an 

 image is remembered its various parts have a fixed 

 order and posit ion. it is accompanied by a number 

 of attendant or accessory ideas, and it is recog- 

 nised as l>elonging to one s past self. The expected 

 image has not always the same fixed position or 

 number of attendant ideas ; but it, too, is referred 

 to self one's future self, and it is characterised by 

 an element of striving or tension and by an increas- 

 ing degree of intensity. The phenomena of memory 

 and expectation are a recognised difficulty for the 

 theory which seeks to derive mind from the succes- 

 sion of presentations. 



Thought. In the process of thinking different 

 mental contents are related together generalised 

 into notions or concepts, discriminated, and, in the 

 higher forms of thought, arranged in an orderly 

 manner under some scientific or other ideal. 

 Thinking is further distinguished from perception 

 and imagination by dealing with classes of things 

 rather than particular objects, and by living mainly 

 voluntary, whereas perception is mainly automatic. 

 lint the distinction is not an absolute one. In 

 imagination and even in perception a process of 

 voluntary selection may lie involved, and every 

 elear perception involves a conception of a class 

 to which the object is referred. Further, the re- 

 lating process which is characteristic of thinking 

 may IK; found, though in a less explicit manner, 

 involved in perception : for the percept has been 

 shown to consist of a variety of elements connected 

 together in definite ways. Carrying the analysis 

 further, we can lind no conscious content without 

 such relations. This has been commonly brought 

 out by emphasising the necessity of difference for 

 consciousness. Thus, Hohhes made the assertion 

 that ' to have always the same sensation and to 

 have no sensation at all come to the same thing ;' 

 and this has been formulated by Bain into the 

 Law of Ilelativity, that all consciousness is con- 

 nciounnexs of diUcrcnce : not, indeed (as Bain some- 



times puts it), that we are conscious only of differ- 

 ence, but thai all consciousness involves difference 

 or discrimination ; as it may also be shown to 

 involve likeness or assimilation and synthesis. 



Relations are thus invohed in all consciousness 

 equally with elements related. J-'e>ling< ' and 

 'relations between feelings' (to use Mr Spencer's 

 terminology ) must lie regarded as eunally ultimate 

 in mind. The Kn-lish Associationiste made con- 

 sciousness liegin with separate unite of sensation 

 or 'feeling;' and those writers who have received 

 and carry on the tradition of the Assoeiationiste 

 have devoted much attention to determining the 

 nature of these relations. But if the ultimate 

 datum of consciousness is i,,i separate atoms of 

 presentation, hut what Dr Ward calls a present a- 

 \\on-riiiitiiiiiinii, and it the growth of mind consists 

 not merely in additions to that continuum, but in 

 drawing new lines of distinction and connection 

 within it, we may see how neither the so-called 

 'feeling' nor the so-called 'relation lietween feel- 

 ings ' is independent and conceivable by itself, and 

 how both are simply abstractions from the state of 

 mind which even at its simplest is a concrete 

 phenomenon. In other words, what is character- 

 istic of thought as well as what is characteristic of 

 sensation is involved in all consciousness. 



Feel i HI/ iiinl tin Emotions. The term Feeling is 

 of very ambiguous signification in psychology. 

 But there is a pretty general agreement to use 

 it for the second of the three elements in the tri- 

 partite division of mind (although, unfortunately, 

 it has not been restricted to that use). The psy- 

 chology of feeling has two chief problems to (leal 

 with : first, to determine the nature and conditions 

 of pleasure and pain, as contrasted with other ele- 

 ments of mental life ; and secondly, to analyse into 

 their elements, and trace the growth of, the com- 

 plex feelings or emotions. The Emotions are coin 

 plex states of mind in which a feeling of pleasure 

 or pain is predominant. This feeling is connected, 

 more or less distinctly, with a presented or ideal 

 object, and is complicated with elements of organic 

 sensation, and, usually, with tendencies to action 

 or elements of desire. These complex slates of 

 feeling, or emotions, take very various forms, 

 according to the elements of which they are com- 

 posed, and their mode of origin. The elassiti.a 

 tion of the emotions and the nature and origin 

 of such emotions as sympathy and the moral sen 

 linieiit are still vexed questions of psychology. 



Desire and Volition. In these phenomena we 

 have the development of the active element in 

 mind complicated with feeling and manifesting 

 itself in muscular activity. Writers who regard 

 this active element as ultimately due to the play 

 of merely presented or external factors have at- 

 tempted to derive volition from spontaneous move- 

 ment (Bain) or from reflex action (II. Spencer) 

 factors which enter consciousness merely as motor 

 presentations. As opposed to this we have the 

 view that the fundamental act of will is the direc- 

 lion of attention to certain ideal elements or groups. 

 \\helherlhisdirectionof attention is itself deter- 

 mined solely by pleasure and pain is a question 

 which has raised more controversy than perhaps 

 any other question in psychology (see WILL). In 

 Desire there is present the conception of an object 

 or ideal end, accompanied by feeling and by an 

 element of striving. Normally, when the concep- 

 tion of the end has been associated with definite 

 means to its realisation, the desire is followed by 

 a volition or act of will. The development of voli- 

 tion is a process of growing complexity ami definite- 

 ness. Beginning with the act of attention, the 

 power of will is gradually extended over the bodily 

 movements controlled by muscles in connection 

 with the motor nerves. Movements which are at 



