SPENCER 



623 



society, and morality. In pursuance of this com- 

 prehensive design Spencer has published First 

 Principles (1862); Principles of Biology (2 vols. 

 1864-67); Principles of Psychology (2d ed. 2 vols. 

 1870-72) ; Principles of Sociology (3 volg. 1876-96) ; 

 Principles of Ethics (2 vols. 1879). In the pre- 

 face to the third volume of the Sociology (1896) 

 completing the Synthetic Philosophy, the author 

 explained that the two volumes of the original de- 

 sign had expanded to three ; a fourth ( Linguistic, 

 Intellectual, Moral, ^Esthetic) must remain un- 

 written by reason of age and infirmity. 



These works follow a different plan from his 

 earlier writings. In his occasional essays already 

 referred to he proceeded by means of observation 

 and induction ; and in them the law of evolution 

 was the result of a generalisation. But the method 

 of his System is deductive ; though the deductions, 

 large and small, are always accompanied by in- 

 ductive verifications. Even the law of evolu- 

 tion only finds a place in it )>ecause it can be 

 deduced from a higher and ultimate principle. 

 Just as certain special sciences mechanics, for 

 example have already entered into the deductive 

 stage, so, in Spencer's System, completely co- 

 ordinated knowledge, to which he gives the name 

 of philosophy, becomes deductive. Hence the 

 importance of determining what is the ultimate 

 test of truth. This, according to him, is the 

 mental inconceivability of the negation of the pro- 

 position by the individual thinker. The validity 

 of this test is supported, according to him, by two 

 considerations : first, because no other test is 

 obtainable, and secondly, by the consideration 

 that mental inconceivability is the result of certain 

 uniformities in our experience which are due to 

 uniformities in nature. His appeal to this test, 

 and the way in which he employs it, formed the 

 subject of a controversy with J. S. Mill, and 

 brings out the distinction between his method and 

 principles and those of the empirical philosophy. 



Metaphysically, Spencer's system is founded on 

 the doctrine of relativity deduced by Hamilton and 

 Mansel from Kant, but carried by him, as he says, 

 a step further. Along with the definite conscious- 

 ness of things known in relation to one another 

 there is implied an indefinite consciousness of an 

 absolute existence, in the recognition of which as 

 inscrutable science and religion find their recon- 

 ciliation. All definite consciousness or knowledge 

 is of the manifestations of this unknowable power ; 

 and knowledge, completely unified, is philosophy. 

 The data of philosophy are necessarily tnose 

 organised components of our intelligence without 

 which philosophising could not go on. ' Our 

 postulates are : an unknowable power ; the exist- 

 ence of knowable likenesses and differences among 

 the manifestations of that power ; and a resulting 

 segregation of the manifestations into those of 

 subject and object.' Within each segregated mass 

 there are likenesses and differences involving 

 secondary segregations. The modes of cohesion 

 under which manifestations are invariably pre- 

 Hi-ntcd are called, when contemplated apart, space 

 and time ; when contemplated along with their 

 manifestations, matter and motion. All these are 

 traceable to experiences of that mode of conscious- 

 ness whose reality is shown by its persistence to 

 force. Hy the ' persistence of force is meant the 

 unchanging quantity both of that mode of force 

 which is revealed to us only by opposition to our 

 own powers, and is not a worker of change, and of 

 that mode which is a worker of change actual or 

 potential, and is specifically termed energy. The 

 persistence of force i.e. the persistence of some 

 cause which transcends our knowledge and con- 

 ception is the truth which all other truths imply, 

 and from which they all (including the law of 



evolution) are derived. From the fact that force 

 can neither arise out of nor lapse into nothing 

 follows the uniformity of law. Force never dis- 

 appears ; it is only transformed. Motion follows 

 the line of least resistance, and is perpetually 

 reversed within limits is rhythmical. So far of 

 the factors of phenomena. The phenomena them- 

 selves must be under a law of the concomitant 

 redistribution of matter and motion, which holds 

 of every change. The law of the entire cycle of 

 changes passed through by every existence is loss 

 of motion and consequent integration i.e. evolu- 

 tion, eventually followed by gain of motion and 

 consequent disintegration i.e. dissolution. In its 

 complete shape the 'formula of evolution' is thus 

 stated : ' Evolution is an integration of matter and 

 concomitant dissipation of motion ; during which 

 the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent 

 homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity ; 

 and during which the retained motion undergoes a 

 parallel transformation.' This law of evolution 

 applies equally to all orders of phenomena ' astro- 

 nomic, geologic, biologic, psychologic, sociologic, 

 &c." since these are all component parts of one 

 cosmos, though distinguished from one another 

 by conventional groupings. So long as evolution 

 is merely established by induction it does not 

 belong to philosophy. It must be deduced from 

 the persistence of force. And this can be done. 

 For any finite aggregate being unequally exposed 

 to surrounding forces will become more diverse in 

 structure ; every differentiated part will become 

 the parent of further differences ; at the same time, 

 dissimilar units in the aggregate tend to separate, 

 and those which are similar to cluster together 

 ('segregation'); and this subdivision and dissipa- 

 tion of forces, so long as there are any forces un- 

 balanced by opposite forces, must end at lost in 

 rest ; the penultimate stage of this process, ' in 

 which the extremest multiformity ana most com- 

 plex moving equilibrium are established,' being 

 the highest conceivable state. 



The various derivative laws of phenomenal 

 changes are thus deducible from the persistence 

 of force, and it remains to apply them to inorganic, 

 organic, and super-organic existences. The detailed 

 treatment of inorganic evolution is omitted from 

 Spencer's plan (which is, he remarks, even too 

 extensive without it), and he proceeds ' to interpret 

 the phenomena of life, mind, and society, in term& 

 of matter, motion, and force.' 



It is impossible to give here any but the most 

 general idea of the contents of the volumes in 

 which the law of evolution is applied to these 

 different departments. It is not only made to 

 account for the phenomena within each group, but 

 also for the connection between one science and 

 another. The researches of Darwin had accumu- 

 lated ample material for showing the continuity of 

 development, structural and functional, in plants 

 and animals ; and Spencer's view of biology, and 

 the definition of life he proposes ( ' the definite 

 combination of heterogeneous changes both simul- 

 taneous and successive in correspondence with 

 external co-existences and sequences'), are meant 

 to show its connection both with inorganic changes 

 on the one hand and with mind on the other. 

 Now, just as biology has to deal with the connec- 

 tion between phenomena in the organism, and as 

 physical science treats of the connection between 

 phenomena in the environment, so psychology has 

 to do with the connection between these two con- 

 nections. For this is said to be the objective 

 aspect of what states of consciousness are sub- 

 jectively. The functions dealt with by the psy- 

 chologist are more special than those dealt with by 

 the biologist ; but they belong to psychology, not 

 merely because they are more special, but also 



