STATUTES 



STAUROLITE 



697 



ascertained, it generally receives a beneficial con- 

 struction which l>est 'suppresses the mischief and 

 advances the remedy.' Sometimes words receive 

 an unusual stretch of meaning ; for instance, a 

 married woman living apart from her husband 

 would be included in the expression a 'single 

 woman,' where the object of the act was to give 

 the mother of an illegitimate child a claim on the 

 father for its support. So a generic term usually 

 includes species which did not exist when the act 

 was passed. Thus, an act of George II. against 

 copying copyright engravings includes photographic 

 copies, and one of William IV. against ' furious 

 driving ' applies to bicycles, though photography 

 and bicycles were not then known. In the same 

 spirit all devices resorted to for evading a law, or 

 misusing powers which it conferred, are defeated 

 by including such attempts within it. 



To give effect to the intention expressions are 

 sometimes strained ; for instance, ' beyond the 

 seas ' is read in an old act as equivalent to ' out 

 of the British dominions. ' Sometimes the colloca- 

 tion of the words is altered, or they are rejected 

 altogether, or even words are interpolated. But 

 such modifications are made only when obviously 

 necessary in correction of a careless text which did 

 not make sense or was incomplete as it stood. 



Beneficial construction is applied less freely to 

 penal acts. There in a reluctance to supply in 

 them the defects of language, or to eke out their 

 meaning by doubtful inferences. Where a word 

 or phrase is open to reasonable doubt, the benefit 

 of the doubt is given to the subject. An omission, 

 also, would probably not be supplied ; but the 

 extreme strictness of construction of former times 

 has now materially given way to the paramount 

 rule that a statute is to be expounded according 

 to the real intention. Acts which impose on the 

 subject burdens or formalities, or otherwise restrict 

 natural liberty, or create monopolies, or confer 

 privileges are construed in the same spirit as 

 penal acts. The language of local and personal 

 acts, which invest persons or bodies with rights 

 and privileges for their own profit or interfere 

 with the rights of others, is regarded as rather 

 that of its promoters than of the legislature, and 

 is consequently construed most strongly against 

 them. 



Certain constructions are always rejected, if the 

 language can admit it. Any which would lead to 

 inconvenience and injustice or absurdity would be 

 avoided as probably foreign to the real intention. 

 For this reason a construction which made an act 

 operate retrospectively on vested rights would be 

 avoided ; and so would any which conflicted with 

 international law a construction, for instance, 

 whicli extended a criminal statute to a foreigner 

 for an offence committed abroad. Again, an act 

 would not be read as affecting the prerogative 

 rights or property of the crown, unless the inten- 

 tion was plainly expressed or irresistibly inferable. 

 A like reluctance is felt to attribute an intention 

 to onst the jurisdiction of the superior courts, 

 or to extend that of new or inferior tribunals and 

 authorities. 



If two statutes, or two passages in one, are con- 

 tradictory, the earlier is abrogated by implication. 

 But, as self-contradiction was probably not intended , 

 such a construction is rejected unless inevitable, or 

 unless there lie inconvenience or incongruity in both 

 enactments being in force, or the later would be in- 

 operative if the earlier was not repealed. Special 

 and local acts are unaffected by general acts incon- 

 sistent with them, being regarded as not in the 

 contemplation of the legislature when making the 

 general act. 



Another and most important axiom is that no 

 change of the law is intended beyond the specific 



object immediately in view. Words and phrases, 

 therefore, however comprehensive literally, are 

 so restricted as not to affect any general prin- 

 ciples of law. An act, for example, which em- 

 powered ' any ' justice to try a case would not in- 

 clude a justice who was incapacitated by interest 

 or otherwise from trying it. To confine an act 

 to its immediate object, it is often construed as 

 operative only between certain persons, or under 

 certain circumstances, or for certain purposes only. 

 Thus, an act which made a bill for money lost at 

 play ' void to all intents and purposes ' would not 

 affect the validity of the bill in the hands of an 

 innocent indorsee for value, but would apply to 

 it only when in the hands of the drawer or of 

 others with no better title. 



It follows that incidents are sometimes found 

 imported into an act which give it an operation 

 different from its strictly grammatical meaning. 

 Thus, where a power is conferred, everything in 

 the way both of right and obligation which is 

 indispensable to its due exercise is tacitly included 

 by law. When, therefore, a statute enacts that a. 

 public officer ' may ' do some act of a judicial or 

 public nature, it also by implication directs that he 

 ' must ' exercise the power whenever the occasion 

 arises ; and if its exercise may prejudice a person, 

 it involves the further duty of first giving the latter 

 an opportunity of being heard against it. 



When a statute grants a right subject to certain 

 formalities, compliance with such prescriptions is 

 essential on pain of invalidation. But when the 

 prescriptions relate to a public duty, and invalida- 

 tion for neglect would be unjust to persons who 

 have no control over the defaulting official, without 

 promoting the object of the act, non-compliance 

 does not invalidate. In the former case the act is 

 imperative, in the latter directory only. A penalty 

 for doing something implies a prohibition ; this 

 makes the prohibited act unlawful ; and all con- 

 tracts connected with illegal acts are void. 



There are some minor rules of interpretation 

 which hardly call for notice here. Some will be 

 found in the Act 52 and 53 Viet. chap. 63. But it 

 may be mentioned, in conclusion, that usage, or & 

 long and general public or professional practice, 

 sometimes impresses on an enactment a meaning 

 not in accord with the natural sense of the words, 

 but which is nevertheless accepted as conclusive. 



Stanbbach, FALL OF. See LAUTERBRUNNEN. 



Stilllllloil. capital of Augusta county, Vir- 

 ginia, in the Shenandoah valley, 136 miles by rail 

 WNW. of Richmond. It is the site of the state 

 lunatic and deaf and dumb and blind asylums, and 

 contains several women's schools, large ironworks, 

 and flour and planing mills. Pop. ( 1890 ) 6975. 



SI million. HOWARD, chess-player and Shake- 

 spearian scholar, was born in 1810, studied at Ox- 

 ford, early settled down to journalism in London, 

 and died June 22, 1874. His victory in 1843 over M. 

 St Amand made him the champion chess-player of 

 his day. To this subject he contributed the follow- 

 ing works: The Chess-player's Handbook (1847), 

 Chess-player's Companion (1849), Chess-tourna- 

 ment (1851), Chess Praxis (1860). His edition of 

 Shakespeare appeared in six volumes (1858-60), 

 with a number of textual emendations so excellent 

 as to give him rank among the best contemporary 

 critics. Another edition (3 vols. 1858-60) was en- 

 riched by 824 illustrations by Sir John Gilbert. 

 Staunton also published in 1866 a careful photo- 

 lithographic fac-simile of the first folio text of 

 Shakespeare. Another useful work was The Great 

 Schools of England (1865). 



Staiirolitc (Gr. stauros, 'a cross;' lithos, 'a 

 stone'), a silicate of alumina with ferrous oxide, 

 magnesia, and water, crystallises in trimetric forms, 



