CHAMBERS'S INFORMATION FOR THE PEOPLE. 



peculiar excitement felt while we are on the way, 

 which swells into a very important element of 

 human interest. The gradual nearing of anything 

 that we are in pursuit of, puts our attention on the 

 stretch, and suspends the regards to everything 

 else until the termination is reached. The state 

 of suspense is still more strongly manifested when 

 uncertainty attends the occasion. All our occu- 

 pations are rendered more interesting from this 

 cause; and many of our amusements, such as 

 field-sports, games, contests, stirring narratives, 

 are largely based on this circumstance. 



Emotions of Intellect. 



As our active powers generate sentiments pecu- 

 liar to themselves, so the exercise of our intellec- 

 tual powers yields varieties of pain and pleasure 

 of a distinct kind. The flash of a new discovery 

 of identification gives a shock of pleasurable sur- 

 prise, and by simplifying the objects of our con- 

 sideration, has further the cheering effect of light- 

 ening our intellectual labour. The characteristic 

 pain of the Intellect is the pain of inconsistency, 

 which is felt more and more as this region of our 

 nature is highly developed, and makes us dislike 

 unveracity or falsehood. 



Emotions of Fine Art. 



This is a wide and various group of feelings, 

 principally characterised by being of an unex- 

 clusive nature, or such as can be enjoyed without 

 being consumed. Sensual pleasures, wealth and 

 power, please only their possessor : the sunshine, 

 the landscape, a beautiful human form, or a fine 

 poem, can be enjoyed by any number of persons, 

 and derive an elevation of character from the cir- 

 cumstance. 



The sensations of the two higher senses, Hear- 

 ing and Sight, and the simple emotions above 

 recited, enter into fine-art compositions ; while 

 there are a few additional sources of interest which 

 we can do little more than name. 



Harmony in sounds, in colours, in movements, 

 in forms, and in operations generally, is a peculiar 

 source of Artistic charm. In the peculiar case of 

 pressure and support, lies the main beauty of 

 Architecture, and much of the gracefulness of 

 living forms. Symmetry concurs in the same way. 

 Fitness is the beauty of utility. The Sublime 

 grows out of manifested power on a great scale. 

 The term Beauty is not applicable to any one 

 quality in particular, but to a successful effect of 

 Art from any cause. (See Dugald Stewart's 

 Essays on the Sublime and Beautiful?) 



The Ludicrous grows out of incongruity in the 

 matter of dignity and meanness. It is a rebound 

 from the grave and serious aspect of things to the 

 mean, vulgar, or common, and is the sudden let- 

 ting down of the system from the effort or tension 

 which serious objects entail, to the abandon of 

 ease and looseness. A burst of hilarity is apt to 

 come along with this relief, especially if in any 

 way sudden or unexpected. 



The Moral Sense. 



This is the sentiment under which we perform 

 our various duties. The origin and character of 

 the feeling is the disputed question of Morals. 



350 



The feelings that over-ride our selfishness, ar 

 dispose us to act fairly and beneficently to others, 

 are principally the Tender Emotion, which makes 

 our fellows the objects of affection, and Sympathy, 

 or the disposition to make the pains and pleasures 

 of other sentient beings our own, and work for 

 them as for ourselves. 



The peculiar character of the Moral Sentimer 

 is a certain sense of authority belonging to what 

 is prescribed as duty, and much difference of 

 opinion prevails as to the mode in which this is 

 generated. Some call it an instinct, others attempt 

 to explain it. One view that may be taken is the 

 following : We are educated under a system of 

 government, first parental, and afterwards social, 

 legal, and political. This gives us our first notions 

 of authority, and of punishment or sanctions, and 

 is with most minds the principal basis of the idea 

 all through life. But we may, in the exercise of 

 our own private judgment, and on considerations 

 purely personal to ourselves, assimilate certain 

 points not commanded with others that are so, 

 and thus transfer the notion of authority to these 

 adopted points. Thus, the law forbids stealing ; 

 a high-minded person considers that the inward 

 inclination to appropriate other men's goods is 

 really of the same nature as the act, and in conse- 

 quence feels an authoritative sentiment urging 

 him to go beyond the law. The original type of 

 authority is still the external ; but when moulded 

 into this ideal form, it becomes Conscience, or 

 the sentiment of moral disapprobation felt by the 

 mind itself. 



THE WILL, OR VOLITION. 



These names express the whole compass of 

 human action in so far as that is governed by 

 ends, purposes, or motives operating on the mind 

 of the individual. The ends of voluntary action 

 are identical with our various emotions, or more 

 strictly with our pains and pleasures. Every 

 species of pain is a motive to acts of avoidance ; 

 and every pleasure prompts the will for its in- 

 crease or continuance. We have, on the one 

 hand, the sentient or susceptible part of the con- 

 stitution ; and on the other, an active machinery 

 lending itself to the suppression of the painful, 

 and the promotion of the agreeable sensations 

 and emotions. It is this active machinery that 

 has to be considered under the present head ; and 

 we have to examine the foundations of that con- 

 nection established between it and our various 

 susceptibilities, leading to the effects now men- 

 tioned. It is one thing for an animal to feel 

 hunger and cold, and quite another thing to go 

 through a variety of active operations for pro- 

 curing food and shelter. The explanation of this 

 link that unites our feelings to our activities is 

 perhaps the most difficult part of mental philos- 

 ophy. We shall here indicate shortly the pre- 

 cise state of the problem. 



Dr Reid has no hesitation in classing the volun- 

 tary command of our organs, that is, the sequence 

 of feeling and action implied in all acts of will, 

 among instincts. (See his chapter on Instincts, 

 Essays on the Active Powers.} The power of 

 lifting a morsel of food to the mouth is, according 

 to him, an instinctive or pre-established conjunc- 

 tion of the wish and the deed ; that is to say, the 

 emotional state of hunger, coupled with the sight 



