CHAMBERS'S INFORMATION FOR THE PEOPLE. 



antecedent of an utterance, each sound heard 

 being associated with a distinct movement of the 

 chest and larynx, under the proper attitudes of the 

 mouth. It is not uncommonly supposed that 

 imitation, both of actions and sounds, is instinc- 

 tive ; but we believe the supposition is incorrect. 

 5//j, Under volition we understand the power of 

 moving our organs merely on the wish to see 

 them moved ; as when I look at my hand, and 

 will to raise it. Here a connection is formed 

 between the sensible appearance, and its being 

 moved. Lastly, we can make a movement on 

 being directed to do so by naming the part 

 up head, down hands, &c. This is a further 

 association, formed between certain names or 

 sounds, and a particular class of movements. All 

 these various actions are employed in the most 

 elementary efforts of the will to control the 

 body. Others could be named that transcend 

 their range of influence as, for example, the con- 

 trol of the passions and the command of the 

 thoughts. 



Desire. 



This is a form or aspect of the will. There is 

 implied in it some pleasure already experienced 

 and remembered ; and the imperfect idea or recol- 

 lection stimulates us to labour for the full reality. 

 Having enjoyed a piece of music, there remains a 

 certain feeling of delight in the retrospect, accom- 

 panied with a sense of this being much short of 

 the actual experience, and this prompts our ener- 

 gies to secure the repetition of the performance. 

 In most cases of desire, there is no means of 

 immediate gratification ; hence, the state is a kind 

 of suspended volition, there being the urgency of 

 the craving, while the active organs are restrained 

 from operating. Desire is thus a modified voli- 

 tion ; and because many of our acts of will are 

 preceded by the state of suspended action under 

 a real craving, we are apt to suppose that it is in 

 the nature of the will to have in all cases an ante- 

 cedent desire. But where action is possible at 

 once, as in drawing up to the fire to get warmth, 

 or in retracting the hand from a painful scald, we 

 have a pure volition, with nothing intermediate 

 between the pleasure or pain and the action cor- 

 responding. 



Every pleasure that can be retained as a recol- 

 lection may be an object of desire. Everything 

 that pleases us in life is desired by us, provided 

 some trace of the gratification abides in the mind. 

 On the other hand, the remembered pleasure may 

 be so vivid and satisfactory as to satisfy the mind, 

 and then the recurrence to the reality is super- 

 fluous. This is not a very common case, although 

 examples of it are sometimes to be met with. 

 There are cases of overpowering strength of actual 

 sensation, where the recollection is preferable to 

 the original ; as when a susceptible mind has 

 undergone a protracted time of gaiety. It is 

 between those two extremes the entire forgetful- 

 ness of a pleasure once passed, and the retentive- 

 ness approaching the full reality that the state of 

 desire is manifested. 



The approaching fruition of a thing craved for, 

 which we call Hope, is a grateful condition of 

 mind ; while the opposite state is one of the com- 

 mon miseries of human life. 



352 



Belief. 



The import of Belief cannot be correctly stated 

 without reference to some action near or remote. 

 No mere intellectual association amounts to what 

 is included in this state. When we are said to 

 believe an affirmation, as that bread is nourish- 

 ing, we mean that we are prepared to proceed 

 upon it in practice, or to take the bread when we 

 want the nourishment. It is true that we believe 

 many things that are never brought to a practical 

 test, and some that never can be brought to such 

 a test ; but then, what is implied is, that we take 

 the same attitude of mind regarding those things 

 as we do with such as we are accustomed to act 

 upon. Thus, we can never perform any action 

 having reference to our belief of the historic reality 

 of Julius Caesar; still, having gone through a 

 course of sifting evidence in regard to this fact, 

 exactly the same as for any fact of our own time 

 that we are prepared to act upon, we regard the 

 existence of Caesar as a matter of belief. We may 

 credit things without sufficient evidence, but if we 

 are disposed to act up to what we credit, we are 

 under a genuine belief. So strong is the connec- 

 tion between acting and believing, that when the 

 one arises of its own accord, the other is apt to be 

 produced. The mind, animated with a rush of 

 energy, can with difficulty be made to believe in 

 any harm to accrue from giving full vent to its 

 impulses. 



Liberty and Necessity. 



A controversy has raged for many centuries on 

 the question whether the human will is free. 

 Undoubtedly there is a great distinction between 

 acting from external compulsion and acting from 

 one's own inward feelings. But some have gone 

 so far as to suppose that human liberty is infringed 

 upon by any supposition implying that we do- 

 act uniformly as our feelings instigate. A little 

 reflection ought to convince us that this is absurd. 

 Because we are constantly prompted to eat when 

 we are hungry, to repose when fatigued, to follow 

 our tastes whenever we have an opportunity, to 

 do good to those we love, to keep out of the way 

 of certain mischief it does not follow that we are 

 under any degrading compulsion or slavish neces- 

 sity. The misfortune would be if we were consti- 

 tuted otherwise. It is a fact that in proportion as 

 we know a person, we can calculate and predict his 

 actions. We know that one man is rigorously 

 and uniformly just ; that another is courageous ; 

 that a third loves sport ; and a fourth is fond of 

 admiration ; and on our knowledge of those points, 

 we can proceed with all the certainty that belongs 

 to the sequences of human nature, which are apt 

 to be varied through the number of susceptibilities 

 that come into play. No greater freedom can 

 belong to any being than for the active impulses 

 to follow the dictates of feeling, or of pain and 

 pleasure. Any deviation from this would be 

 insanity, and not liberty. When a man, to shew 

 his moral freedom, resists the prompting of a 

 natural impulse or desire, he merely follows a new 

 prompting namely, pride, or the sentiment of 

 power. 



