CHAMBERS'S INFORMATION FOR THE PEOPLE. 



other forces, we recognise what we call causality. 

 Changes obtrude themselves upon our notice : we 

 call them effects, and say that they are produced 

 by adequate causes. What do we exactly and 

 fully mean by such phraseology? According to 

 the experiential school of Hume, we mean by a 

 cause nothing more than an antecedent We first 

 observe one thing happen, and then we observe 

 another thing happen, and that is all we are 

 entitled to say about the matter. It is simply a 

 case of No. i, 2, 3, and so on ; we must not say 

 that No. i leads to No. 2, and No. 2 to No. 3, 

 except in the sense of numerical arrangement. 

 The cannon-ball crashes through the target the 

 true history of the transaction is, not to say that 

 the ball did it, but simply that the opening up of 

 the target occurred subsequently to the approach 

 of the ball. The natural theologian, on the other 

 hand, contends that this account of the matter is 

 seriously defective ; that in its conception of a 

 cause, the mind is irresistibly compelled to unite 

 with the relation of antecedency the idea of effi- 

 ciency, which again involves the notion of volition. 

 It is affirmed that we cannot conceive of effects 

 and changes, physical or otherwise, apart from 

 force, and that what we mean in the ultimate 

 analysis by force is an expression of will. Our 

 earliest conceptions of the possibility and nature 

 of physical change, it is said, are associated with 

 acts of will on our part. We find that by a simple 

 effort of determination, we can alter the relations 

 of the parts of our bodily frames, and through 

 them produce alterations in nature around us. 

 That we have, within a limited range, this com- 

 mand over matter, is unquestionable. How we 

 have it, we may not be able to explain, but of the 

 fact that we have it, there cannot be a doubt. 

 This datum of our own experience not only 

 enables us to conceive the subjection of the whole 

 material universe to an infinite Will, but further, 

 as is maintained, compels us to associate voli- 

 tional efficiency with the conception of cause and 

 force. Our first impressions of physical change 

 having been associated with a conscious forth- 

 putting of will, we irresistibly explain other phys- 

 ical changes, not springing from our wills, as 

 immediately or ultimately due to a will external 

 to our own. Hence to the natural theologians of 

 primitive times the world swarmed with animated 

 fetiches, and still we personify the wind and the 

 lightning, and the more striking phenomena and 

 forces of nature ; we say that the steam is able to 

 drive the engine, and the powder to blast the rock ; j 

 a hasty man kicks the post against which he has 

 stumbled ; and we regard plants as more alive 

 than minerals, although in the true sense a tree 

 is as dead as a stone. 



But besides causation, ultimately explicable as 

 will, the natural theologian finds in nature art and 

 contrivance, revealing intelligence. To the illus- 

 tration of this idea the largest part of many of the 

 leading treatises on natural theology is devoted. 

 Design is sought to be shewn in the individual 

 organs of animated structures, in the relations 

 of different organs to each other, in the adjust- 

 ment of the world's constitution to the wants 

 and instincts of animated creatures, as well as 

 to the moral , and intellectual history of man, 

 and in those cosmical arrangements whose con- 

 templation leads us forth into the infinitudes of 

 space. The whole argument turns here upon 



370 



the question, whether these arrangements do 

 really constitute art and reveal contrivance, or 

 whether they are simply ' conditions of exist- 

 ence,' of which we can say no more than that 

 there they are, and such and such is their char- 

 acter. The whole question is sufficiently raised 

 by the difficulty stated by Hume. 'When two 

 species of objects,' he says, ' have always been 

 observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by 

 custom, the existence of one, whenever I see the 

 existence of the other, and this I call an argument 

 from experience. But how this argument can 

 have place, where the objects, as in the present 

 case, are single, individual, without parallel, or 

 specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. 

 And will any man tell me with a serious counten- 

 ance, that an orderly universe must arise from 

 some thought and art, like the human, because 

 we have experience of it? To ascertain this 

 reasoning, it were requisite that we had experi- 

 ence of the origin of worlds ; and it is not suffi- 

 cient surely that we have seen ships and cities 

 arise from human art and contrivance.' What 

 Hume asserts here is, that there is no specific or 

 generic resemblance between the works of nature 

 and those of art ; that nature, as he elsewhere 

 expresses it, is a 'singular effect;' and accord- 

 ingly, that although we may have the right, from 

 experience, to associate a constructive intelligence 

 with the works of art, it does not follow that we 

 have the right to associate such an intelligence 

 with the works of nature. The question, therefore, 

 comes to be : Is there a generic resemblance 

 between nature and art ? or must we place nature 

 in a totally distinct genus by itself? 



Natural theologians assert that there is no 

 generic distinction between art and nature, that 

 nature is essentially artistic, that both come under 

 the category of contrivance, that the human eye, 

 for example, is as much an invention to suit a 

 purpose as a watch is, and that the more closely 

 the works of nature are examined, the more forcibly 

 will this resemblance strike the mind. In the eye, 

 for instance, we have what is neither more nor less 

 than a highly ingenious optical invention, formed 

 in perfect harmony with those secret laws of light 

 which science is only now bringing to the surface. 

 First of all, we have the retina or nerve-expansion 

 to receive the impressions of light. An opening 

 exists in the ball to receive the rays. There is an 

 arrangement by which this opening contracts when 

 there is more light than is wanted for the purpose. 

 To project an image of the object on the retina, 

 lenses perfect in construction are interposed be- 

 tween it and the eye-ball, to produce the necessary 

 refraction of the rays. As a white lining of the 

 walls of the eye-chamber would have reflected the 

 light from all sides, and made vision impossible, 

 it is exceptionally painted black, to absorb the 

 useless rays. A system of muscular cords adjusts 

 the position of the eye according to the nearness 

 or distance of the object 



Can it be maintained, the natural theologian 

 argues, that there is any essential difference be- 

 tween such an instrument as this as a contrivance 

 for conveying visual images, and a watch as a con- 

 trivance for indicating the hour ? And if there is 

 no essential difference, how can we infer a watch- 

 maker from the watch, and refuse to infer an eye- 

 maker from the eye ? How is it that we conclude 

 that an intelligence like our own must have been 



