CHAMBERS'S INFORMATION FOR THE PEOPLE. 



from external experience, will have their force 

 greatly augmented if, from within, our minds, from 

 data of their own, urge us to the same conclu- 

 sion. It may be useful to close this section with 

 a quotation from Kant's preface to the second 

 edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, which shews 

 very fairly his relation to the whole question. 

 After stating that his method will ' confer an in- 

 estimable benefit on morality and religion, by 

 shewing that all the objections urged against them 

 may be silenced for ever by the Socratic method 

 that is to say, by proving the ignorance of the 

 objector' he goes on to say that 'the loss of 

 certain fancied possessions, to which, on his 

 method, speculative reason must submit, does 

 not prove in any way detrimental to the general 

 interests of humanity. The loss falls, in its whole 

 extent, on the monopoly of the schools, but does not 

 in the slightest degree touch the interests of man- 

 kind. I appeal to the most obstinate dogmatist, 

 whether the proof of the continued existence of 

 the soul after death, derived from the simplicity 

 of its substance ; of the freedom of the will, in 

 opposition to the general mechanism of nature, 

 drawn from the subtle but impotent distinction 

 of subjective and objective practical necessity ; 

 or of the existence of God, deduced from the 

 conception of an ens realissimum the contin- 

 gency of the changeable, and the necessity of a 

 prime mover, has ever been able to pass beyond 

 the limits of the schools, to penetrate the public 

 mind, or to exercise the slightest influence on its 

 convictions. It must be admitted that this has 

 not been the case, and that, owing to the unfit- 

 ness of the common understanding for such 

 subtle speculations, it can never be expected to 

 take place. On the contrary, it is plain that the 

 hope of a future life arises from the feeling, which 

 exists in the breast of every man, that the tem- 

 poral is inadequate to meet and satisfy the 

 demands of his nature. In like manner, it can- 

 not be doubted that the clear exhibition of duties 

 in opposition to all the claims of inclination, gives 

 rise to the consciousness of freedom, and that the 

 glorious order, beauty, and providential care 

 everywhere displayed in nature, give rise to the 

 belief in a wise and great Author of the universe. 

 Such is the genesis of these general convictions 

 of mankind, so far as they depend on rational 

 grounds ; and this public property not only 

 remains undisturbed, but is even raised to greater 

 importance, by the doctrine that the schools have 

 no right to arrogate to themselves a more pro- 

 found insight into a matter of general human con- 

 cernment, than that to which the great mass of 

 men, ever held by us in the highest estimation, 

 can without difficulty attain, and that the schools 

 should therefore confine themselves to the elabora- 

 tion of these universally comprehensible, and, from 

 a moral point of view, amply satisfactory proofs. 

 The change, therefore, affects only the arrogant 

 pretensions of the schools, which would gladly 

 retain, in their own exclusive possession, the key 

 to the truths which they impart to the public.' 



4. The Moral Argument 



Here we take the word moral, not only in its 

 strict sense of ethical, but further, in that loose 

 sense in which it is often employed to denote 

 merely the opposite of physical. Starting from 

 the facts of consciousness, it is argued that we 



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; have experience of various states of mind which 

 reveal or postulate a Supreme Being, who is also 

 a moral Being. Among these states of mind the 

 chief are, the sense of dependence, the sense of 

 responsibility, and the sense of imperfection. It 

 is argued, that when we abstract our minds from 

 perceptible things, and fix our attention entirely 

 upon ourselves and our position in the universe, 

 we are impressed with the feeling of dependence, 

 of being in the hands of a power which we cannot 

 resist, which is equal to maintaining us in such 

 position and faculty as we possess. We know 

 that we did not bring ourselves into the world ; 

 we were not consulted in the matter ; in a few 

 years, we must disappear from the scene, however 

 anxious to stay. In this experience, it is said, we 

 do not so much infer, as directly feel, the grasp 

 of a power which, as directing and sustaining us, 

 must be capable, in some sense, of understanding 

 us. Recognising ourselves as derived beings, we 

 become aware of our vicinity to the source of our 

 existence, which, we consider, must contain the 

 constituent essence of such a being as we know 

 ourselves to possess. 



Still more important and significant is the sense 

 of obligation and responsibility. Conscience is 

 the greatest fact in human nature. We have a 

 power of distinguishing between what we call 

 'right' and what we call 'wrong,' and we are 

 capable of a unique act of consciousness, in which 

 we feel that we ' ought ' to do the right, and are 

 answerable for the wrong. The argument drawn 

 from this experience is not affected by any theory 

 as to the criterion of virtue, as to what makes an 

 action right or wrong. The intuitional or the 

 utilitarian theory of ethics may be the true one ; 

 certain actions may be right in themselves, abso- 

 lutely, and without reference to their effects ; or 

 they may be right simply because they promote 

 human happiness. Such considerations do not 

 affect the element of consciousness which is ex- 

 pressed by the word 'ought.' Why 'ought' we 

 to promote happiness? If it be said that our 

 own best happiness is involved in doing what we 

 ' ought,' the remark may be admitted without in 

 the least degree altering the fact, that the sense of 

 'ought' remains. There is only one way of getting 

 rid of the premises of the argument with which we 

 are dealing here, and that is by declaring that the 

 words ' ought ' and ' duty ' represent illusions im- 

 posed by the mind upon itself, that they really 

 mean nothing more than the strong desire to be 

 happy in the most effectual way. This, of course, 

 is a matter on which there may be diversity of 

 opinion. But where it is conceded, that, without 

 denying the fact and the legitimacy of the desire 

 of happiness playing a determining part in human 

 action, the feeling of obligation represented by the 

 words ' ought ' and ' duty,' and a sense of respon- 

 sibility in connection with such obligation, form 

 an irremovable element in consciousness, natural 

 theologians contend that the inference to a supreme 

 lawgiver and judge is inevitable. 'Ought' means 

 that something is ' owed,' and ' duty ' means ' what 

 is due.' To whom do we ' owe,' to whom is it ' due,' 

 that we should act in such and such a manner ? 

 Not to ourselves ; for we cannot be said in any 

 proper sense to owe, or be in debt, or be responsible 

 to ourselves. Not to others ; for often the things 

 which are felt most obligatory by the most con- 

 scientious men, are things which they cannot be 



