NATURAL THEOLOGY. 



said to 'owe' to others, or to be responsible to 

 them for performing. What our sense of obliga- 

 tion and responsibility, therefore, means, is, that 

 there is beyond us, and not resident in human 

 society alone, an authority, entering into the 

 scheme of things of which we form a part, requir- 

 ing us to do what is right, and having the power 

 and the resolution to enforce its law with needful 

 sanctions. There is a difference among natural 

 theologians as to the manner in which this con- 

 clusion is to be arrived at, some reaching it in- 

 ferentially, others directly. Chalmers and Butler 

 speak of conscience as the 'judge within the 

 breast,' the 'monitor within,' as though it were 

 a power or presence in us, different from ourselves, 

 and located there by another. They then infer from 

 the existence of this moral formation, the existence 

 of a creative Being of corresponding moral nature, 

 according to the principles of reasoning already 

 familiar in the Teleological and Cosmological 

 arguments. To some, and apparently with reason, 

 this view of the case seems to confound figure 

 with fact. To speak of conscience as a 'judge,' or 

 a 'monitor,' or a 'delegated power,' or a 'faculty,' 

 is to use the language of metaphor. My conscience 

 is simply myself in a peculiar phase of experience, 

 in a state of moral sensation or consciousness, 

 acknowledging that a certain thing ought to be 

 do.ie, or confessing that a certain other thing 

 ought not to have been done ; elated by the sense 

 of rectitude, or dejected by the feeling of ill-desert. 

 In this state of consciousness, it is said, we have 

 the virtual revelation of a moral governor, we feel 

 that we stand immediately related to One who is 

 master of our wills, whose dictates are imperative, 

 and before whose displeasure we tremble. If this 

 be correct, the idea of God as a moral supremacy 

 which we derive from conscience, is not inferential, 

 but direct. 



A third aspect of the Moral argument is that 

 which is taken from a sense of imperfection, whose 

 presence is assumed in the mind. It is argued, 

 that we have capacities of mental development, 

 susceptibilities to happiness, aspirations after sym- 

 pathy, longings to adore, which are not provided 

 by anything within the range of our sensible ex- 

 perience. But all else that we know around us 

 has the idea of its being fulfilled. As a rule, it 

 achieves and receives all that it was fitted for. Is 

 man to be exceptional? Must we not conclude 

 that there exists some correlative Being capable of 

 giving him the opportunities of thought, the range 

 of happiness, the fulness of sympathy, the object 

 of worship for which his nature hungers, for which 

 it seems waiting ? 



This reasoning from the imperfection of the 

 present, lies, in its general reference, at the founda- 

 tion of Kant's Moral argument for the being of 

 God, to which he allows validity in its own sphere, 

 while denying the sufficiency of the Ontological 

 and other speculative arguments. Kant holds 

 that the facts of the moral universe necessitate 

 recourse to the ideas of immortality and God. We 

 are compelled to acknowledge the authority of a 

 moral law, which demands nothing short of perfect 

 holiness or conformity to itself. This conformity 

 is not attained in this present life ; and as we can- 

 not assume the law to be meaningless, we are con- 

 strained to postulate the perpetuation of human 

 life beyond the present, to afford scope for the 

 gradual approach of human nature to its ideal 



perfection. In this way the belief of immortality is 

 forced upon the mind through the operation of 

 its own constitution. In the same manner, the 

 idea of God becomes a necessity. We are com- 

 pelled to acknowledge the obligatoriness of a con- 

 nection between holiness and happiness. The 

 good man, and no other, ought to be the happy 

 man. But this connection is not seen realised in 

 nature. Yet nothing else can be acquiesced in by 

 the mind. We are therefore compelled to assume 

 somewhere a Cause, superior to nature, that shall 

 aid man in fully adjusting happiness to virtue. 

 Such a Cause must have the capacity of distribut- 

 ing its action in conformity with the principles of 

 justice. That is to say, it must be a moral Being, 

 the ethical legislator himself. Thus the idea of 

 God also is irresistibly pressed upon the moral 

 sense. 



The cumulative result of all the arguments that 

 have now been reviewed is held by natural theo- 

 logians to form a demonstration of the existence 

 of a Supreme Being, Intelligent and Moral, Crea- 

 tor and Controller of all else that is. If it has not 

 been shewn that such a Being is an object of 

 direct knowledge, and therefore as fairly within 

 the range of experience as any of the objects of 

 sense, it is maintained that, at all events, a neces- 

 sity of believing in Him is so forcibly brought home 

 to the mind, that we are not only justified, but 

 required to act as though He were certainly known 

 to exist. According to the obvious practical prin- 

 ciple emphasised by Butler, we are bound to 

 take action upon a probability as much as upon 

 a certainty. Moreover, if we are constrained by the 

 constitution of our minds to adopt such and such 

 beliefs, we must obey them, we must be true to 

 ourselves, we must satisfy our consciences. If, 

 therefore, natural theology has done no more than 

 shew the existence of God to be probably true, or, 

 at all events, an unavoidable credendum for the 

 human mind, it has still established a right to 

 summon men to the life of practical religion and 

 virtue. What this life is to be, must be deter- 

 mined by a consideration of the character and 

 attributes of God, in reference to which our 

 careers as religious beings have to be regulated. 

 Hence, having discussed the Being of God, natu- 

 ral theology has to investigate 



II. THE NATURE OF GOD. 



The question raised here is, What character- 

 istics, qualities, or attributes are we to ascribe to 

 the Supreme Being whose existence is thus pre- 

 sumed to have been demonstrated, or shewn to be 

 an unavoidable datum of human thought? In the 

 course of this demonstration, several attributes are 

 supposed to have been collaterally proved, such 

 as Omnipotence, Intelligence, Moral Intention. In 

 proving God to be a cognisable Being at all, we 

 must prove him to be some kind of Being, and 

 therefore the proof of attributes and the proof of 

 existence are to a certain degree inseparable. 

 Under the present head, therefore, the work 

 principally demanding to be done would at first 

 sight seem to be, analysing, in the light of the 

 evidence furnished by nature and consciousness, 

 the complement of attributes comprised under 

 the general categories of Omnipotence, Intelli- 

 gence, and Moral Intention, assumed as already 

 ascertained. But before doing this work, which 



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