NATURAL THEOLOGY. 



affirmation that the hypothesis is ' not even think- 

 able.' And here a distinction has to be made. 

 Mr Spencer does not appear to regard the idea 

 of a 'great artificer ' of the universe as unthinkable. 

 But he says that this idea brings us no further 

 than to the conception of the world's construction 

 out of pre-existent materials. It does not unable 

 us to conceive the creation of the pre-existent 

 material out of nothing ; and he adds, that ' unless 

 it helps us to understand that, it is worthless. 

 The production of matter out of nothing, is the 

 real mystery, which neither this simile nor any 

 other enables us to conceive ; and a simile which 

 does not enable us to conceive this, may just as 

 well be dispensed with.' This, however, is a point 

 which natural theologians dispute. They argue, 

 that if they have reason to believe themselves at 

 this moment in the hands of an intelligent moral 

 governor of the universe, they cannot afford to 

 * dispense with ' the idea, or disregard it as ' worth- 

 less.' They find it advisable to ' profess and act 

 it out.' They find it in the meantime a source of 

 happiness and an aid to duty, and unless it can 

 be shewn that they have no right in reason to its 

 possession, they maintain their claim to hold and 

 obey it Mr Spencer affirms that we cannot 

 think the universe either as eternally existent or 

 as being created. The answer of the natural 

 theologian is, that such a consideration does not 

 destroy the significance of his present conscious- 

 ness, which compels him to postulate an intelli- 

 gent will, manifestly able to dominate the existing 

 universe. If this is known, or if it can be shewn to 

 be a necessary belief of the human mind, it would 

 appear that the Agnostic theory breaks down. 

 Granted, it can shew that we are necessarily 

 ignorant, or not necessitated to any thought, of the 

 original or eternal relation of God to the uni- 

 verse, it does not follow that we are ignorant, or 

 not necessitated to some thought, of the present 

 relation of God to the universe. Because we do 

 not know everything, it does not follow that we 

 know nothing. 



The Agnostic doctrine is maintained from 

 another quarter. The teaching of Sir W. Hamil- 

 ton, and of his disciple, Mansel, is to the effect 

 not only that we cannot know God in his essence, 

 but that we cannot consistently hold any positive 

 ideas respecting his qualities, all our thinking of 

 Him being relegated to an attitude of mind which 

 they call faith. They affirm that if God is to be 

 thought of at all, it must be as the absolute, the 

 infinite, that which stands in no necessary relation 

 to anything else, that which includes within itself 

 all possible modes of being. But if we think of 

 God as an intelligence and will, shaping and ruling 

 the universe, we make Him a person, and so deny 

 Him as the infinite and absolute. This is repre- 

 sented as happening in various ways, of which one 

 or two only need be mentioned. When, for 

 instance, we think of Him as a will controlling the 

 universe, we personify Him, and limit his being. 

 We place Him here, and the universe over against 

 Him, and He is no longer the infinite ; his being 

 does not contain all being. Again, when we 

 ascribe to Him intelligence, He ceases to be the 

 absolute. Intelligence must necessarily have an 

 object Accordingly, in making God intelligent, 

 we bring Him into necessary relations to an object 

 of intelligence ; that is to say, He is no longer the 

 absolute. It is therefore impossible for us to 



ascribe any thinkable characteristics to God, since 

 this is inconsistent with thinking Him as the 

 absolute and infinite. But further, even when we 

 try to think Him as absolute and infinite, we 

 necessarily fail We cannot think the absolute 

 and infinite. In thinking any object, we must 

 think it as out of ourselves, and therefore related 

 to ourselves. We thus limit it, and make it related; 

 in other words, we do not and cannot think it as 

 the infinite and absolute. God, therefore, cannot 

 be thought at all. But by means of what is called 

 ' regulative knowledge,' it is sought to be shewn 

 that we must make Him an object of faith. It 

 becomes ' our duty to think of Him as personal.' 



To this criticism, natural theologians usually 

 reply, that if the absolute and infinite are unthink- 

 able, it is meaningless to say that God must be 

 thought under those characteristics ; and that, 

 therefore, in making such a statement, no valid 

 obstacle is placed in the way of our thinking God 

 as intelligence and will But even supposing the 

 absolute and infinite, in the sense under considera- 

 tion, were thinkable, where, it is asked, is the 

 proof that it is necessary so to think of God? 

 From data of experience, we feel ourselves con- 

 strained to infer the existence of an intelligent 

 moral ruler. Is there anything in these data, 

 or in the nature of the conception inferred 

 from them, compelling us to postulate that this 

 ruler must be capable of existing out of all 

 relations, and must include all being in himself? 

 If He has irresistible and discretionary power 

 over the universe, what more is wanted to 

 constitute a basis and a call for our adoration? 

 Granted, He is not infinite in the sense of includ- 

 ing all beings in himself, what does it matter if He 

 can control all beings as He pleases? Granted, 

 even, He is not absolute, in the sense of there being 

 some necessary principle of the universe co-eternal 

 with himself, still, if He is independent of this 

 principle to the extent of being absolutely able 

 to mould it at his pleasure, what more do we 

 require ? In short, the answer of natural theology 

 to the Agnostic doctrine is, that in the present 

 state of the world, experience presents to us evi- 

 dence which compels us to assume an intelligent 

 and moral ruler. When we try to go back to, 

 or before some supposed beginning of the world, 

 difficulties, and possibly inconceivabilities may 

 meet us, but these form no warrant for cancelling 

 the beliefs which are forced upon us by experience 

 within the world. We may not be able to form 

 any ideas as to the ultimate essence of this ruler 

 whom we call God, but we can reach some con- 

 ception of his powers and relations to us by what 

 we observe of his operations. We may not be 

 able to conceive all his relations to all that exists, 

 but we can conceive some of them. Partial 

 Agnosticism, therefore, is admitted. Absolute 

 Agnosticism is denied. Our ideas are not ade- 

 quate to the subject, but they cover a part of it, 

 and the fact that we do not possess perfect or 

 adequate ideas, is no reason for our throwing 

 aside those which we do possess. 



2. Is God Personal ? 



Besides the general Agnostic denials, a special 

 negative to this question is maintained by the 

 various schemes of Pantheism that have from 

 time to time appeared in the history of human 

 thought, the purpose of which is not to deny God, 



