ETHICS. 



end of morality, a set of rules or directions how 

 to act, so as to secure the above conditions, 

 would form part at least of a system of moral 

 duties. 



That this is the real nature of the generally 

 received moral duties 'the cardinal virtues,' as 

 they are called will appear on examination. 

 They are generally brought under the heads of j 

 Order, Truth, Justice, Benevolence, and Temper- 

 ance. 



Order, The duty of order rests on the fact 

 that man is a social being. It is only in associa- 

 tion with his fellows that the individual human 

 being can rightly protect his life and secure what 

 is necessary for his bodily wants and comforts. 

 And what is more, it is only in society that he 

 finds scope for the exercise of all his higher and 

 distinctive faculties and feelings ; nay, the very 

 presence of his fellow-men is of itself a source 

 of gratification to him. This association implies 

 organisation the assignment of various functions 

 to the several members, with subordination, and 

 an acknowledged authority or head to direct the 

 general purposes of the body. Whoever seeks 

 to impair this organisation, or deserts the post 

 assigned him, is universally felt to be endangering 

 the very existence of the whole structure, and with 

 it, endangering all the security, quiet, and happi- 

 ness bound up in it. It is this strong feeling, this 

 primary social instinct, that leads men to do what 

 is otherwise a very distasteful thing namely, to 

 restrain their individual wills and impulses, where 

 these interfere with the right working of the social 

 organism. The very mutineers that have murdered 

 one captain, proceed immediately to elect another, 

 and bind themselves to obey him so strongly is 

 the necessity felt of submitting to the restraints of 

 authority, if we would enjoy the benefits of asso- 

 ciation. 



Truth. Next to order, comes the duty of truth, 

 as an essential condition of the well-being of man. 

 If no faith could be placed in promises or con- 

 tracts, society would be impossible ; the human 

 race would be reduced to the condition of the 

 wild beasts, where each one trusts only itself. 

 There is an all-pervading conviction that no form 

 of association can exist without truth among the 

 members, towards one another at least ; hence 

 the world-old proverb, that ' there is honour even 

 among thieves.' Not only is truth essential in 

 matters of importance ; hardly any case of integ- 

 rity is indifferent, because of the tendency of the 

 smallest unveracity to excite distrust in greater 

 matters. To depart from strict truth on trifling 

 occasions has this further evil consequence, that 

 it makes it more difficult for the individual to 

 adhere to truth on great occasions ; for the strength 

 of a man's character depends upon his having 

 formed firm habits of acting upon general rules or j 

 principles. This consideration is applicable to 

 most, if not all cases, where what is acknowledged | 

 to be a virtuous action has yet no apparent direct j 

 utility. That the obligation to speak truth does 

 ultimately rest on its utility, is conclusively shewn 

 by the fact, that where utility ceases, and positive 

 harmfulness sets in, all men unite in disowning i 

 the obligation. Thus, no one thinks it unjustifi- j 

 able to deceive a madman, or an enemy in war, j 

 or to practise reserve in the statement of opinions, i 



This power in circumstances to determine the j 

 moral quality of an action is not confined to the 



case of truth ; it holds good of all duties. Even 

 the most sacred of all obligations, that of not 

 taking away life, ceases when the continuance of 

 an individual life is inconsistent with the safety of 

 society. 



Justice, another of the cardinal virtues, is na 

 less founded on its necessity to the very existence 

 of society a necessity which we might illustrate 

 in a similar manner, did our space permit. 



Benevolence or humanity, at least to the extent 

 of being ready to rescue a fellow-man from perish- 

 ing, and to alleviate the cases of distress that come 

 under one's eye, is also a necessary condition of 

 men living in society. So liable is human life to 

 accidents and calamities, that, were these calls 

 not responded to, society, if it did not absolutely 

 dissolve, would lose at least half the advantages 

 it really offers. Hence a man without ordinary 

 humanity is felt to be a monster, and unfit to be a 

 member of a community. We are not consider- 

 ing at present the feeling of sympathy from which 

 benevolent actions spring, and which, in a well- 

 constituted mind, is its own motive and reward, 

 leaving little for the sense of duty to do, and find- 

 ing its own pleasure in a thousand kind actions, 

 the omission of which no one could have blamed. 

 The moral element in such actions we will con- 

 sider presently, and from another aspect of the 

 subject. The question is now of that sense of 

 obligation on the one hand, and of rightful claim 

 on the other, that attends some of the calls of 

 humanity; and the position we would maintain 

 is, that the obligation and the right rest on the 

 conviction, grown in the course of ages into a 

 strong public sentiment, that if the calls were 

 generally disregarded, life would lose half its 

 value. 



Temperance. This virtue has reference chiefly 

 to the mode of gratifying the bodily appetites and 

 propensities ; and embraces all those rules and 

 regulations necessary for maintaining the system 

 in health and enjoyment. How essential such 

 regulations are for the preservation and well-being 

 of men, would be among the earliest discoveries 

 made, and on their necessity rests the obligation 

 to attend to them. The consequences of neglect- 

 ing those rules, although ultimately they affect 

 society at large, so that every one has an interest 

 in his neighbour's temperance, yet fall directly 

 and chiefly on the individual himself. Hence 

 duties of this kind are often called personal duties ; 

 while order, truth, justice, and benevolence, arising 

 directly out of our relations to other men, are 

 social duties. The duties that we owe directly to 

 ourselves are also spoken of as duties of prudence, 

 in contradistinction to moral duties, as if the term 

 moral applied only to actions between man and 

 man. This appears, however, to be an unneces- 

 sary narrowing of the meaning of the word ' moral/ 

 At all events, duty to self and duty to others have 

 a fundamental element in common, as we shall 

 try presently to shew. 



The duties already spoken of are essential to 

 the preservation of the individual and the con- 

 tinued existence of society, and have therefore the 

 highest degree of obligation. They constitute 

 what is called primary morality. Society exacts 

 them of all its members, and so far as they can 

 be exactly defined, they are embodied in express 

 laws, and the violation of them is visited with 



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