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C A N N 



Cannae. , I on this occasion, to have converted his deficiency 

 v - of strength into the cause of victory. Well aware 

 that his barbarous auxiliaries, arranged in a thin line, 

 could not long withstand a regular shock of heavy - 

 armcd infantry, his intention was most clearly, from 

 the beginning, to encourage the Romans to break 

 through his centre, and thus expose themselves on 

 their flanks. Accordingly, after the advanced Gauls 

 and Spaniards had fougnt most desperately for some 

 time, they began at last to give way ; and this body, 

 which originally presented a convex line to the ene- 

 mv, was now bent in the contrary direction, and em- 

 braced the advancing Romans in the form of a half 

 moon. These thinking to overwhelm Hannibal at 

 once, pushed on with irresistible fury, and drove him 

 before them with shouts of victory. Varro and 

 ^milius appear to have been carried along with the 

 soldiery by the blindest presumption ; for instead of 

 securing their flanks, and overturning the Africans 

 in their course, they seem to have concentrated their 

 troops, for the purpose of entirely breaking through 

 the enemy, and attacking him in the rear. This 

 movement proved fatal to the Romans. The Afri- 

 cans, who had hitherto stood still, were now clo- 

 sing on the Roman flank, while Hasdrubal and his 

 victorious cavalry was ready to fall upon their rear. 

 Vigorously attacked on both sides, the consuls made 

 their men face different ways ; but the contest was 

 no longer equal, the Africans were quite fresh and in 

 order, the Romans, already exhausted with fatigue, 

 were also in the utmost confusion. The return of 

 Hannibal with his Gauls and Spaniards, whom he 

 had soon rallied, made it no longer a battle but a 

 carnage. Fighting hitherto with the greatest bra- 

 very, and performing all that could be expected from 

 high spirited men, the Romans were now at length ut- 

 terly broken and routed. The Carthaginian cavalry, in 

 which arm Hannibal was stronger, acting on a plain, 

 and in the midst of a disorderly crowd of flying ene- 

 mies, allowed few to escape ; while the infantry, in 

 like manner, exasperated by their fatigues and their 

 habitual enmity, revelled with savage eagerness in 

 the work of destruction. Hannibal himself was at 

 last so much touched with compassion at the fate of 

 the Romans, that he cried out several times during the 

 slaughter, "Hold, soldiers! spare the vanquished !" 

 The fate of the consul, Paulus ^milius, as de- 

 scribed by the ancient writers, is truly affecting. 

 This brave captain had been severely wounded early 

 in the day ; but his zeal would not suffer him to quit 

 the field till most of his troops were cut to pieces. 

 At this last extremity, in the hopes of retarding the 

 pursuit, he ordered the few cavalry who still kept 

 by him to dismount, and engage the enemy on foot. 

 This slender band, however, was soon overwhelmed 

 by the impetuous enemy, and every man who was 

 able mounted his horse, and fled. During this me- 

 lancholy exigency, Cneus Lentulus, a legionary tri- 

 bune, happening to ride that way in his retreat, 

 espied the consul sittiug on a stone, and covered all 

 over v/ith wounds and blood. The generous tri- 

 bune immediately offered him his horse, observing 

 that he could help him to mount, and protect him. 

 Bur vEmiiius, with an air of grandeur, declining his 

 offer, advised him to make use of his small time for 



escaping, expressing, for his own part, his fixed re- 

 solution to expire on those heaps of his dead soldiers, 

 by whom he was surrounded. He, at the same time, 

 enjoined the tribune to advise the senate to fortify 

 Rome with ail speed, and to assure Fab ; us that he 

 had lived, and was now dying, impressed with the 

 wisdom of his counsels. Before Lentulus had gone 

 far, he observed, with the keenest anguish, the no- 

 ble consul surrounded, and still feebly fighting in 

 the midst of the enemy, who were not then aware 

 of his quality. The other consul, Varro, escaped to 

 Venujsia, attended only by seventy horse. 



This was perhaps the greatest defeat that the Ro- 

 mans ever experienced, not excepting that from the 

 Gauls. Of an army of near 90,000 men, no' more 

 than 4-000 escaped directly from the battle : some 

 thousands more of those who had guarded or reach- 

 ed the camps, availed themselves of the darkness and 

 confusion ot the following night, to reach Canusmm, 

 a strong fortress in the neighbourhood. Besides the 

 consul ./Emilius, two quasstors ? and one-and twenty 

 legionary tribunes ; there fell, on this fatal day, Ser- 

 vilius, the third in command, Mmucius, consul and 

 general of the horse under Fabius, fourscore sena- 

 tors, who had volunteered their services, and such a 

 prodigious number of knights, that of the rings which 

 they wore as the badge of their order, three bushels 

 were sent to Carthage. Polybius makes the general 

 loss amount to 70,000, though Livy reduces it to 

 50,000. The loss of Hannibal was comparatively 

 trifling, consisting only of 4000 Gauls, 1500 Spa- 

 niards and Africans, and 200 horses. 



Having allowed his troops the whole of that night 

 for the purpose of repose, he employed the next 

 morning in going over the field of battle, and ga- 

 thering the spoils. The scene was horrible beyond 

 description, even to the Carthaginians themselves. 

 In the course of the day, he besieged the two camps, 

 which were still defended by about 10,000 men, 

 chiefly wounded, who almost immediately surren- 

 dered by capitulation. It is difficult to assign the 

 true reason, which had deterred this matchless gene- 

 ral from making an attempt on Rome immediately 

 after his tremendous victory. But having consumed 

 some days in the neighbourhood of Cannas, the fa- 

 vourable opportunity was lost for ever. The consul 

 Varro was already posted at Canusium, with the 

 wreck of his army, now accumulated to 10,000 men ; 

 the senate and people of Rome, after the first tran- 

 sports of terror were over, now spoke more loftily 

 than ever ; the city was put in a formidable state of 

 defence, and assistance hastening from all quarters ; 

 and with a force of less than 30,000 infantry, desti- 

 tute of magazines, machines, and other necessaries 

 of war, Hannibal could not pretend to besiege a city 

 in form, which still contained more soldiers than he 

 had under his command. His subsequent feeble at- 

 tempts on some small towns., demonstrate incontro- 

 vertibly the insufficiency of his means for underta- 

 king the siege of Rome at this period. The battle 

 of Cannee, however, though not involving iu its con- 

 sequences the immediate destruction of Rome, was 

 notwithstanding highly beneficial to the Carthagi- 

 nian cause. He, who before that great event was i 

 mere fugitive in an enemy's country, having neither 



