C H A 



736 



C H A 



Chancery, ly redress the injury, and refers that conscientious 

 * "V^ task to the chancellor, the keeper of his conscience. 

 In this ordinary court," continues the same writer, 

 " is kept the qfficina justifies, from which issue all 

 original writs that pass the great seal, all commissions 

 of charitable uses, sewers, bankruptcy, idiotcy, luna- 

 cy, and the like ; and for which it is always open to 

 the subject, who may there at any time demand and 

 have, ex debitojustitice, any writ that his occasions 

 may call for." The extraordinary court, on the 

 other hand, proceeding by the rules of equity, softens 

 the rigour, but by no means opposes the spirit, of 

 the common law, in those cases where, by reason of 

 the unavoidable generality of that law, manifest in- 

 justice would result by its undistinguished applica- 

 tion. Accordingly, this court interposes in all cases 

 of frauds, deceitful or rash engagements, &c. which 

 admit not of remedy at common law. It gives relief 

 in the case of minors, against as well as for them ; of 

 married women pending their coverture, and in cer- 

 tain suits at their instance against their husbands ; of 

 breach of trust ; loss of titles to lands, &c. 



Without, however, attempting to elucidate further 

 the nature of the jurisdiction of this high court, or to 

 enumerate the variety of pleas to which it is compe- 

 tent, (a task which has puzzled the ablest writers, 

 even when free to investigate the subject in the fullest 

 manner,) we shall content ourselves with one or two 

 general observations on this and other courts of equi- 

 ty, taken from a modern treatise of respectable cha- 

 racter. " Early in the history of our jurisprudence," 

 says Mr Mitford in his work on the Pleadings in 

 Chancery, " the administration of justice by the or- 

 dinary courts appears to have been incomplete. To 

 supply the defect, the courts of equity have gained an 

 establishment j assuming the power of enforcing the 



principles upon which the ordinary courts also decide, Chancery. 

 when the powers of those courts, or their modes of **~~Y*** 

 proceeding, are insufficient for the purpose ; of pre- 

 venting those principles, when enforced by the ordi- 

 nary courts, from becoming, contrary to the purpose 

 of their original establishment, instruments of injus- 

 tice ; and of deciding on principles of universal jus- 

 tice, where the interference of a court of judicature 

 is necessary to prevent a wrong, and the positive law 

 is silent. The courts of equity also administer to the 

 ends of justice, by removing impediments to the fair 

 decision of a question in other courts ; by provi- 

 ding for the safety of property in dispute, pending a 

 litigation ; by restraining the assertion of doubtful 

 rights, in a manner productive of irreparable damage ; 

 by preventing injury to a third person from the 

 doubtful title of others ; and by putting a bound to 

 vexatious and oppressive litigations, and preventing 

 unnecessary multiplicity of suits ; and, without pro- 

 nouncing any judgment on the subject, by compel- 

 ling a discovery which may enable other courts to 

 give their judgment ; and by preserving testimony, 

 when in danger of being lost, before the matter to 

 which it relates can be made the subject of judi- 

 cial investigation. This establishment has obtained 

 throughout the whole system of our judicial policy ; 

 most of the inferior branches of that system having 

 their peculiar courts of equity, (e. g. the court of ex- 

 chequer, courts of Wales,the counties palatine, cinque 

 ports, Sec.) and the court of chancery assuming a ge- 

 neral jurisdiction in cases which are not within the 

 bounds, or which are beyond the powers of other ju- 

 risdictions." See Tomlin's Jacob's Law Dictionary 5 

 Blackstone's Comm. ; and Mitford's Treatise on 

 Pleadings in Chancery, &c. (j. B.) 



CHANCES. 



Chances. 1. THE doctrine of chances, considered as a mathe- 

 """V" 1 * 1 "'' matical theory, treats of the probability of the hap- 

 pening of such events as cannot be accurately pre- 

 dicted, either on account of our being ignorant of 

 their precise causes, or else because the number of cir- 

 cumstances to be taken into account, in estimating 

 the effects of those causes, is too great to be fully com- 

 prehended by the human mind. 



This theory treats particularly of the chances of 

 play, in such games as depend on circumstances be- 

 yond the controul of the players. Of this nature 

 are lotteries, and all games depending on the throw- 

 ing of dice, or shuffling of cards. It is also applica- 

 ble to certain moral and political events ; such as the 

 credibility of human testimony, and the decision of 

 questions by a majority of votes ; but one of its most 

 valuable applications is to. the resolution of questions 

 depending on the probability of the duration of hu- 

 man life ; a subject which is become of the highest 

 importance to individuals, as. well as to communities, 

 on account of the great number of life insurances, an- 

 nuities depending on lives, benefit societies, &c. which 

 are now so common. 



2. This branch of the mathematics is entirely mo- 

 dern, it having been first cultivated by Pascal and 

 Fermat about the middle of the 17th century. The 



1 



following problem was one of the earliest that enga- Chances, 

 ged Pascal's attention, and was proposed by him to I ^Y~^* 

 Fermat : " Two persons sit down to play for a cer- 

 tain sum of money, and agree, that he who first gets 

 three games shall be the winner. One of them has 

 got two games and the other one, but being unwil- 

 fing to continue their play, they resolve to divide the 

 stake : how much should each receive ?" Fermat 

 resolved the problem by the method of combinations, 

 but Pascal had previously found out its solution by 

 a different method. 



3. The researches of these mathematicians on this 

 subject remained for many years among their papers; 

 and in that interval Huygens, having heard proba- 

 bly of what had passed between them, turned his at- 

 tention to the subject, and composed his work, De 

 ratiociniis in Ludo alece, which Schooten published 

 for the tirst time in 1658, at the end of his Exercita~ 

 tiones Mathematics. The rudiments of the theory 

 were here demonstrated for the first time ; and this 

 was nearly all that was done previous to the middle 

 of the 17th century ; hardly any thing having been 

 added during the remainder of it, if we except a short > 

 paper by Saveur on the game of Bassette, inserted in 

 the Journal des Savans (1679), a letter on the game> 

 of Tennis by an anonymous writer, and another small 



