384 



CHRISTIANITY. 



neaer of the human mind on subject on which it it 

 much exercised, and which l*t completely within the 

 range of itt observation. 



. We cannot say so much, however, for the other 

 specie* of intenul evidence, that which it founded upon 

 ou.>nablene of the doctrines, or the agreement 

 which i conceived to subsist betwixt the nature of the 

 Chrt*t:>n rrlijpon and the cha'ictcr of the Supreme Be- 

 \\ hare experience of man, but we have no expe- 

 rience of God. We can reason upon the procedure of 

 man in f .ven circumstance*, because this is an accessible 

 subject, and come* under the cognizance of observa- 

 tion; bot w cannot reason on the procedure of the Al- 

 tfiven circumstances. This is an inaccessible 

 subject, and comes not within the limits of direct and 

 personal obsrrvation. The one, like the scale, and com- 

 pa, and measurements of Sir Isaac Newton, will lead 

 you on safe and firm footing to the true economy of 

 the heavens ; the other, like the ether and whirlpools, 

 and unfounded imaginations of Des Canes, will not on- 

 ly lead yon to misconceive that economy, but to main- 

 tain a stubborn opposition to the only competent evi- 

 dence that can be offered upon the subject. 



150. The writer of the present article feels, that in thus 

 disclaiming all support from what is commonly under- 

 stood by the internal evidence, he does not follow the 

 general example of those who have written on the De- 

 mini controversy. Take up Lcland's performance, 

 and it will be found, that one half of hra discussion is 

 expended upon the reasonableness of the doctrines, and 

 in a. sorting the validity of the argument which is found- 

 ed upon that reasonableness. It would save a vast deal 

 of controversy, if it could be proved that all this is su 

 perfluons and uncalled for ; that upon the authority of 

 the proofs already insisted on, the New Testament must 

 be received as a revelation from heaven ; and that, in- 

 stead of sitting in judgment over it, nothing remains on 

 our part, but an act at unreserved submission to all the 

 doctrine and information which it offers to us. 't is 

 conceived, that in this way the general argument might 

 be made to assume a more powerful and impressive as 

 pect ; and it is hoped, that the reader will not I ok up- 

 on the article as prolonged to an unnecessary length, if, 

 by unfolding the speculation, the defence ot Christianity 

 can be more accommodated to the spirit and philosophy 

 of the time*. 



151. Sincethe spirit of Lord Bacon's philosophy began 

 to be rightly understood, the science of external nature-has 

 advanced with a rapidity unexampled in the history of 

 all former ages. The great axiom of his philosophy is 

 to simple in its nature, and so undeniable in its evidence, 

 that it is astonishing how philosophers were so late in 

 ack- owledging it, or in being directed by its authority. 

 It is more than two thousand years since the phenomena 

 of cxtt-mal nature were objects of liberal curiosity to 

 speculative and intelligent men. Yet two centuries have 

 scarcely elapsed since the true path of investigation has 

 been rightly pursued, and steadily persevered in. Since 

 the evidence of experience has been received as para- 

 mount to every other evidence, or, in other words, since 

 philosophers have agreed that the only way to learn the 

 magnitude of an object is to measure it, the only way to 

 learn its tangible properties is to touch it, and the only 

 way to learn its visible properties is to look at it. 



152. Nothing can be more safe or more infallible than 

 the procedure of the inductive philosophy as applied to the 

 phenomena of external nature. It is the eye, or the ear- 

 witnets of every thing which it records. It is at liberty 

 to classify appearance*, but then in the work of classi- 



fying, it must be directed only by observation. It may Chritiniv 

 groupe phenomena acccordiiig to their resemblance*. It 'T' 

 may express these resemblances in words, and announce """"" """"' 

 them to the world in the form of general laws. Yet 

 such is the hardihood of the inductive philosophy, that 

 though a single well-attested fact should overturn a 

 whole system, that fact must be admitted. A single 

 experiment i often made to cut nhort the finest proces* 

 of general ration, however painful and humiliating the 

 sacrifices, and though a th> cry, the most simple and mag- 

 nificent that ever charmed the eye of an enthusiast, was 

 on the eve of emerging from it. 



153. In submitting, then, to the rules of the indui-tive 

 philosophy, we do uot deny that certain sacrifices must 

 be made, and some of the most urgent propensities of 

 the mind, put under severe restraint and regulation. The 

 human mind feels restless and dissatisfied under the anxie- 

 ties of ignorance. It longs for rhe repose of convic- 

 tion ; and to gain this repose, it will often rather preci- 

 pitate its conclusions, than wait for the tardy lights of 

 observation and experiment. There is such a thing, too, 

 as the love of symplicity and system a prejudice of the 

 understanding, which disposes it to include all the phe- 

 nomena of nature under a few sweeping generalities an 

 indolence, which loves to repose on the beauties of a 

 theory, rather than encounter the fatiguing detail of 

 its evidence a painful reluctance to the admission of 

 facts, which, however true, break in upon the majestic 

 simplicity that we would fain ascribe to the laws and 

 operations of the universe. 



154. Now, it ii the glory of Lord Bacon's philosophy, 

 to have achieved a victory over all these delusions to have 

 disciplined the minds of its votaries into an entire sub- 

 mission to evidence to have trained them up in a kind 

 of steady coldness to all the splendour and magnificence of 

 theory, and taught them to follow, with an unfaultering 

 step, wherever the sure though humbler path of experi- 

 ment may lead them. 



155. To justify the cautious procedure of the inductive 

 philosophy, nothing more is necessary than to take a view 

 of the actual powers and circumstances of humanity ; of 

 the entire ignorance of man, when he comes into the 

 world, and of the steps by which that ignorance is e- 

 lightened ; of the numerous errors into which he is mis- 

 led, the moment he ceases to observe, and begins to pre- 

 sume or to excogitate ; of the actual history of sciencc| 

 its miserable progress, so long as categories and principles 

 retained their ascendency in the schools; and the splen- 

 dour and rapidity of its triumphs, so soon as man under- 

 stood, that he was nothing more than the discipi' of 

 Nature, and must take his lesion as Nature offers it ts> 

 him. 



156. What is true of the science of external nature 

 holds equally true of the science and phenomena of mind. 

 On this subject, too, the presumptuous ambition of ma 

 carried him far from the sober path of experimental in- 

 quiry. He conceived that his business was not t- ob- 

 serve, but to speculate ; to construct systems rather 

 than consult his own <-xpericnce, and the experience of 

 others ; to collect the materials of his theory, not irom 

 the history of observed facts, but from a set of assumed 

 and excogitated principles. Now the same observations 

 apply to this department of inquiry. We must admit 

 to be trtu- not what we presume, but what we find to 

 be so. We must restrain the enterprises of fancy. A 

 law ot tli human mind must be only a series of well 

 authenticated facts, reduced to one general description, 

 or grouped together under some general point* ot re- 

 semblance. The business of the m^ral as well as of the 



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