CHURCHILL. 



463 



Churchill, name of his Memoirs, published in 1809, and which, 

 John. whether proceeding from his pen or not, is evidently the 



'""""Y"*"' work of a mind intimately conversant with the history 

 of the war. The error, however, appears to have con- 

 sisted, not so much in the determination to attack, as in 

 the unfortunate delay in carrying it into effect. The al- 

 lies had made a rapid and well-concerted movement fir 

 the investment of Mmis, and Villas, commanding an equal 

 force, set himself down in a position too near to allow of 

 the siege being conveniently prosecuted. The movement 

 of Villars took place on the 9th September, on which day, 

 or on the next, it is generally thought the allies ought to 

 have attacked him. But a reinforcement of 12,000 men 

 being on the march, the battle was deferred till the 

 morning of the llth, without considering to what ac- 

 count the French were likely to turn so precious an in- 

 terval. Marshal Boufflers had been sent from Paris to 

 serve along with Villars, and though a senior officer, had 

 no objection at thi, critical epoch of placing himself un- 

 der his orders. In the course of the action, Villars was 

 wounded and carried off the field, a circumstance to 

 which he did not fail to ascribe the loss of the day. 

 Next year, 1710, the French, taught by past disasters, 

 kept on the defensive, though superior in number. 

 Marlborough and Eugene held the joint command, and 

 took the towns of Douay, Bethune, Aine, and St Venaut. 

 In 1711, Eugene commanding on the Rhine, Marlbo- 

 rough acted alone. Villars wa* at the head of a very nu- 

 merous army, and had carried his defensive labours, in 

 the way of lines and trenches, to an extraordinary length. 

 This, which was the last campaign of the Duke of Marl- 

 borough, though not distinguished by any battle, is pro- 

 bably that which a tactician would mark as the most bril- 

 liant zra in his career. By a series of feints and manoeu- 

 vres, which it would greatly exceed our limits to recapi- 

 tulate, he succeeded in deceiving Villars, active and expe- 

 rienced as he was, and in entering, without the loss of a 

 man, those lines which the Marshal had boasted would 

 prove his ne plus ultra. This signal exploit was followed 

 by the siege of B juchain, a place of great strength, and 

 surrounded by inundations. Villars considered his re- 

 putation at stake, and repeatedly asserted that he would 

 Force the Duke to raise the siege. He durst not, how- 

 ever meet the Duke in a general action, and every other 

 effort of relief was baffled by the Duke's vigilance and 

 activity. Bouchain fell, and with its capture closed 

 Marlborough's military career. 



We are now to qujt the scene of active operations, and 

 take a retrospect of a less flattering nature. The 

 Duchess of Marlborough having long considered herself 

 the directress of the queen, forgot in her husband's pros- 

 perity, the moderation incumbent on a subject. She ne- 

 glected a due attention to her sovereign, and opened the 

 way for others to undermine her in the royal favour. 

 The two principal agents of the political revolution 

 which ensued, were Mrs Hill, afterwards Mrs Masham, 

 and Harley, afterwards Earl of Oxford. The queen 

 was earnestly desirous to be relieved from the domineer- 

 ing interference of the Duchess, but was very unwilling 

 tolose theDuke's services. Hence, at one time, she found 

 herself obliged to dismiss Harley, greatly against her 

 will. But the humbled state of France, and the offers 

 made by Louis for peace in 1709, joined to the enormous 

 expenditure of war, gave weight 10 Marlborough's po- 

 litical opponents, and enabled the queen goon after to 

 accomplish a change of ministry. Her husband's death, 

 her own infirm health, compunction for her conduct in 

 early life toward;, her father, and an aversion to bloud- 

 ihed, all concurred to make her desire to close her reign 



in peace. She regarded, and with reason, Marlborough's ChurchiH, 

 conduct in the late negociations, as one of the principal John. ^ 

 obstacles to a termination of hostility. The public re- "*"V~^ 

 lieved from apprehension, and seeing no British interest 

 at stake, was no longer solicitous to prolong a contest by 

 which Austria was to be a chief gainer. The Dutch 

 were actuated by similar feelings, but their leading men 

 continued to be influenced by Marlborough. The latter 

 went every advisable length in opposition to the change 

 of ministry, and finding, at last, that he could not pre- 

 vent it, made, like a true politician, a merit of necessity, 

 and declared that he would henceforth interfere no more 

 in her majesty's civil affairs, but confine his services to 

 his profession. The weight of his reputation obliged the 

 new ministry to keep him in the command more than a 

 twelvemonth after the fall of his political adherents ; 

 and it was not until the end of 1711, that they ventured 

 to deprive him of his employments. This took place af- 

 ter bringing forward certain charges of appropriating to 

 his own use, funds belonging, as they said, to the public. 

 The specific charge consisted in the acceptance, on the 

 part of the duke, of L. 5000 sterling a year, from the 

 contractor for army bread. The duke explained that 

 this and other payments formed a regular allowance to 

 the commander in chief, who, in return, took on himself 

 the whole expence of the secret service. King William, 

 he added, had received in great part those allowances 

 for which he was now censured. Though the Duke's 

 defence is, according to our present notion of a general's 

 honour, unsatisfactory, the wonder is that, with such op- 

 portunity as he possessed, and such a fondness for mo- 

 ney as has been imputed to him, his enemies should not 

 have discovered much weightier charges against him. 



The accusation, such as it was, having produced con- 

 siderable effect on the public mind, ministers ventured to 

 transfer the command of the forces to a different gene- 

 ral. It was in vain that the allies ii, treated them to let 

 the Duke keep his command, and that Prince Eugene 

 came over to London to endeavour to recall the queen 

 to cordiality in the war. All would not do, and the 

 prince had no other satisfaction than that of shewing, 

 that change of fortune made no alteration in his beha- 

 viour towards his illustrious associate in arms. Policy, 

 it is said, in his Memoirs, would have dictated a different 

 course the way to succeed with the queen and her new 

 ministers, would have been to shun and decry Marlbo- 

 rough; but " 1 threw myself," says the prince, " with 

 rapture into his arms, and the English nation, nay Marl- 

 borough's own enemies, must have esteemed me the 

 more for it." The campaign of 1712 soon shewed what 

 the allied cause had lost by the change of a general. 

 The Duke of Ormond was no Marlborough, and he 

 was, moreover, restricted from co operating offensively 

 with the allies. This, and the too hazardous conduct of 

 Prince Eugene, led to the check at Denain, which fur- 

 nished matter of great exaltation to Villars, and led to a 

 turn of the war in favour of the French. It is needless 

 to add how mist rably our affairs were managed at the 

 treaty of Utrecht. 



During the year 1712, the Duke of Marlborough re- 

 mained as a private individual in England. Towards 

 the end of the year -he took the determination to go 

 abroad. His course was by Ostend and Antwerp to 

 Aix-la-Chapelle, at each of which places he was recei- 

 ved with distinguished honour. He thence proceeded 

 to visit the estate in Suabia, given him by the emperor of 

 Germany, and afterwards passed some time at Hanover. 

 His return to Lngiand happened to take place in 1714- 

 at the time of the queen's death. On the accession of 



