1.3;; 



D R E A M S. 



up dt' die waking man's idea.*, though for the 

 BMMt put oddly MttOndMr." And again, ' Dreaming 

 itself, is the having ideas (whilst the outward tenfei 

 re siopt. - that they receive not outward object* itli 

 their usual quickness,) in the mind, not BggMtad by 

 any external objects or known occasion, nor under any 

 choice or conduct of the understanding." (Book ii. ch. 

 i. 17. and ch. xix. I.) 



Opinion of 7. The theory of Bonnet is similar to that of Sir Hen* 

 Bonnct - ry Wotton ; but as the character of the I'onner writer 

 stands hi^h tor physical and metaphysical knowledge, 

 it may In- proper to state and examine it more fully than 

 we did wlu-n we noticed it In-fore. Bonnet inquires 

 how it happens, tliat the perceptions of the soul during 

 sleep are so vivid ? To this he replies, that we can dis- 

 cover the cause only in the silence of the senses. While 

 we are awake, the senses mix in a certain degree with 

 all the operations of the soul ; but when we go to sleep, 

 the perceptions from without grow feeble, and the per- 

 ceptions from within become more strong and vivid ; 

 and as soon as the .senses are lulled into profound sleep, 

 then the soul is perfectly awake and busy, and renders 

 us conscious of its operations in what we call dreams. 

 Besides this general theory to account for dreams, Bon- 

 Det endeavours to explain the singularities and incon- 

 sistencies which take place in them. Notwithstand- 

 ing the dormancy of the senses, and the unfettered vi- 

 gilance of the soul, it sometimes happens that external 

 sensations, though feeble, mix even in profound sleep, 

 with the more vivid operations of the soul, and hence 

 all the inconsistencies and vagaries of our dreams. The 

 following remark, though rather fanciful, deserves quo- 

 tation : " Since then our dreams, in general, are only 

 the representation of objects, which have interested or 

 occupied us while awake, let us endeavour so to re- 

 gulate our imagination, that we may only have rational 

 dreams ; thus shall we be enabled to prolong the dura- 

 tion of our intellectual existence, (de nut re clrr pcnsn ;;/.)" 

 (Contemplation de la Nature, chap, vii.) It is unplea- 

 sant to deal hardly with a theory supported by such a 

 man as Bonnet, in whom amiahlenrss of disposition, 

 fervency and at the same time rationality of piety, and 

 a very minute and extensive knowledge of nature, al- 

 ways brought forward for the most devout and sublime 

 purposes, were united in an uncommon degree ; but 

 Ilia theory of dreams dees more credit to his imagina- 

 tion than to his philosophy. 



6f Hrt!ey. 8. Hartley endeavours to explain the principal phe- 

 nomena of dreaming, by his peculiar theory of vibra- 

 tions. That the scenes in them art mistaken for real, 

 is owing, according to him, to the exclusion of real im- 

 pressions with which they may be compared, and to 

 the increased vividness in the trains of visible ideas. 

 Dreams are wild and inconsistent, because the brain is in 

 a very different state from that of vigilance, and the vi- 

 brations of the stomach being propagated to the brail), 

 produce a succession of ideas w hich depend indeed upon 

 association, but are very different from those which 

 Would take place m a state of vigilance. We are not 

 offended at inconsistencies, because those associations 

 which should lead us to notice them are as it were 

 asleep ; but if the state of the brain be such a.- to favour 

 the production of ideas of anxiety and perplexity, ap- 

 parent inconsistencies give us great uneasiness. When 

 pei.-ons walk and talk in their sleep, the vibrations dc- 

 tcc'id into the motory muscles, at the same time the 

 brain is oppressed, and they have no memory. Dreams 

 are soon forgotten, on account of their incoherence, and 

 of the cluuigc v, hich takes place iu the brain in passing 



from sleep to vigilance. From thu specimen of tli, 



mode in which Hartley attempts to account for the ' . 



phenomena of dreaming, it is evident, that what he. 



deems explanation*, are either mere enunciations of r 



facts to be explained in different words, ur completely 



gratuitous and unphilosophical. (Hartley on Man, 1'art 



i. ch. 3. 5.) 



<L l)r Darwin has directed his attention rather to the Of Drwis. 

 State nt' the mental faculties in sleep and dr ains, than 

 to their cause. He is of opinion that volition is MK- 

 pended, and that sensation continues. We sh.il! briefly 

 notice some of the principal facts and arguments by 

 which he endeavours to support this doctiine, and th".- 

 very acute and forcible objections which have been m.' 

 to it by Dr Thomas Brown, piofessor of moral phil<> 

 phy in the university of Edinburgh, in his ( (bservatii 

 on Zoonomia. To the general doctrine of Darwin, that 

 the power of volition is totally suspended, 1 >r Brown 

 objects, that as the trains of ideas which constitute our 

 dreams were originally associated when we were ser 

 ble of external objects, ;md consequently when voli- 

 tions formed part of the train, if the laws of' association 

 continue during our dreams, (which Dr Darwin does 

 not deny.) volitions should be induced, whenever the 

 preceding motion of the train exists. If \ olition were 

 suspended, our dreams could only occupy a few minutes 

 of our sleep, since our associations would be suddenly 

 broken off' at that part of the train which was original- 

 ly succeeded by volition; for the motion consequent on 

 volition could not be produced, according to the known 

 laws of association, unless volition existed. Dr Darwin 

 says, that " during the suspension of volition, we can- 

 not compare our other ideas with those of the parts of 

 time in which they exist ; that is, we cannot compare 

 the imaginary scene which is before us, with those 

 changes of it which precede or follow it, because this 

 act of comparing requires recollection or voluntary ex- 

 ertion ; but we evidently have the idea of time in our 

 dreams, and as we reason in them, or, in other words, 

 perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas, n col- 

 lection or voluntary exertion cannot 1 < suspended. The 

 instances which he adduces of motions of the larger 

 muscles, the indistinct sentences which are some; 

 uttered, and the confused barking of sleeping dogs, it is 

 well remarked by Dr Brown, prove that the suspension 

 of the voluntary power is not necessary to sleep. In- 

 deed, besides those operations of tile body or mind of 

 which we dream, and which imply volition, we are 

 frequently directly conscious of exerting it in our 

 dreams, especially when they are unpleasant. That 

 this exertion of volition is not followed during sleep by 

 the same cliects as it produces when we are awake, is 

 no proof that it does not take place, ('/.oonomia, vol. i. 

 18. Brown's Obfi-rvtitiiii'x on /.nonimtiti, xi.) 



10. Professor Dugald Stewart has considered dreams Of Stewart* 

 in a more cautious and philosophical manner than any 

 other writer on the subject. He is of opinion, that 

 " the power of volition is not suspended, but that the 

 will loses its influence o\er those faculties of the mind, 

 and those members of the body, which during our 

 waking hours are subjected to its authority " In sup- 

 port of the latter part of this doctrine, he argues, that 

 if the influence of the will be suspended during sleep, 

 all our voluntary operations mu-t .iKo In impended, 

 such as recollection, reasoning, \c. Tli.it our recollec- 

 tion i suspended, is evident from our dreaming of see- 

 ing persons who are absent or dead. ;:n<l from our con- 

 founding times anil places To the objection that we 

 reason in ouv dreams, he replies, that these reasoning* 

 4 





