i> 
FRANCE 
History. ‘ence of that Revolution ; knowing, that if they did not 
=~" succeed; they would be reduced to their former state 
of jon and misery. - . 
_ In the third place, it was of the ay essence of - 
Revolution, to create, or, more properly 
nourish and bring forth to notice, and beesicvn ind 
of every description ; and these talents were directed 
with single and undeviating energy and perseverance 
toone end. The military ardour, which was at first 
excited by the love of glory, and the wish to be instru- 
mental in rendering France mistress of the world, and 
by the determination not to permit foreign nations to 
destroy her national independence, or the effects of the 
Revolution, was cherished and strengthened by the 
conviction that: the path to the highest commands-was 
open to talents and'merit. Thus her armies were filled 
with soldiers, who despised death, and who fought with 
that enthusiasm which such passions and hopes natu- 
rh et while they were led by officers, se- 
solely on account of. their merit and fitness, for 
the command to which they were’ appointed. _ At the 
head of the. ’ t also, there were, at almost 
every period of the Revolution, men admirably caleu- 
lated tb direct the efforts of the great machine which 
the Revolution had put in motion. . Even the despotic 
and arbitrary nature of this government, such as it ex- 
isted in the time of Roberspierre, contributed to the 
success of their arms ; for it was the and secre- 
Ne eee 
goes national independence. fl 
When we reflect therefore on the operation of all 
. these ‘causes ; that nearly the whole powers, both men- 
tal and , of a lous nation, were directed 
to one object, in the attainment of which all were con- 
vinced they had the highest interest, and that all class- 
es were further stimulated to exertion and perseverance, 
by the knowledge, that, while they were securing the 
—— interest, and the apes which nr one 
tion had brought them, were treadi e 
which would certainly conduct them to sitet teak 
and influence in the state than they previously pos- 
sessed, we shall not be astonished at their military suc- 
cesses. But, in order more y to develope the 
causes of these successes, we reflect on the ene- 
mies they had to contend with. In the first the 
people of most of the countries which they invaded 
Saereen to receive ean eee from a belief 
t: came to destroy ressions under 
which they suffered. In the second lads the councils 
and armies of their its were directed by much 
inferior talents, and by men who, besides their inferio- 
’ vity invtalents, did not feel the operation of the same 
powerful motives for exertion and perseverance. There 
me a8 nernen see ear that: many of them pro- 
ved ‘to their country, and fell before the influ- 
ence of French gold, not less than by the superiority of 
the French arms. Lastly, France was a single power 
against'a combination of powers ; the pressure of e 
defeat, brought into more closeand compact union 
the members that formed her oe we while 
success, speaking rerfully to their love of national 
_ glory, eq 7 ‘prodaced the same effect. On the con- 
trary, the combined powers had within them the ele- 
ments of discordance and disunion ; they were jealous 
‘ef each other, and strongly disposed to separate, either 
_ danger to whi ey were all exposed from the:French 
Revolution; was not sufficiently strong, or so continual- 
/ 
645 
ly present to their apprehensions, as to banish their 
mutual jealousy ; w fi " 
proved, that if they succeeded in putting down the 
Revolution, they would not fail to quarrel among them- 
selves about the spoil. Such to usto have been 
the principal causes which produced the military suc- 
cesses of the French, On their side, great enthusiasm, 
great talents, great exertion and perseverence, the strong 
motives of panne a and the love of naan! 
and in ndence, all operating to one single ob- 
4 On rr of the allies, talents neglected, and 
prejudices hurtful to their cause persevered in; no com- 
mon bond of union; mutual suspicion and jealousy ; 
an inadequate sense of their own danger ; and treach~- 
and disaffection among their subjects. 
their: selfish views too plainly ~~ 
History. 
III. With respect. to the change of the French go- Causes of 
vernment, froma democratic form at least to a military the esta- 
despotism, it will be found, on examination, not to have Dlishment 
been 
ly to 
simple and natural causes. 
In the first place; the real change was not great ; for 
it would be difficult to point out any period of the Re- 
volution, in which the people were not, subjected to a 
most arbitrary government—a government which well 
fitted them even. for a military despotism. We shall 
not examine whether the state of France, threatened 
by numerous foes from without, and convulsed with 
intestine divisions, did not require and justify the ar- 
bitrary and. severe government which was exercised 
oyer it ; the cause or justification of this government is 
not now the object of inquiry. The fact is indisputable, 
and it accounts, in our opinion, for the ease with which 
the French passed from the forms of a democratic go- 
vernment, toa military despotism. Besides, we should 
always recollect, that the French: people had no con- 
ception of political liberty ; and if some idea and love of © 
it sprung up, at the commencement of the Revolution, 
it was whethanad by the tyranny and oppression. which 
soon succeeded. 
In the second place, the real change which took place 
from the form, of democracy. to military despotism, may 
be traced to obvious and satisfactory causes. The na- 
tional love of glory disposes all Frenchmen to a military 
life ; and throws round the military character a splen- 
dour which conceals its tyrannical and. oppressive na- 
ture. This splendour round the character of Bona- 
_ was, to the eyes of Frenchmen, of the most bril- 
iant and dazzli kind : he had gone further towards 
the realization of their fond hope; that France would 
attain universal empire, than any of their monarchs, 
and ae they not only submitted, but were fa- 
vourably disposed, to the military government of aman 
who had ave so much, and hon date their actual 
sovereign, they hoped would. perfect the great under 
taking which They had so near their hearts.. A people 
whose fondest wishes were centered in national glory 
and universal empire, could not but be at Ltoa 
military government, as the best suited to the accom- 
plishment of those wishes, and toa man. who they knew 
would conduct that military government with the great- 
est skill and» success. Even those who were not in- 
fected with this national and characteristic passion, hail. 
ed Bonaparte as the man who had put an end to the 
convulsions that had so 1] ‘agitated France; and 
though they still apprehended that his character, and 
the character of the people at large, would keep France 
in almost continual war, yet they at the same time 
at in reality, and that the change which actual- & ™it1y 
place was produced by the operation of very jn France. 
Asm 
