History. 
atti Siteal 
Consequen- 
ces of it. 
.- now dark, but the French were pursued ; and. 
FRANCE. | 
an amicable adjustment, Bonaparte prepared for war, by _ History. 
ily shared the same fate, but it was reinforced by 
troops that fled from the left, and held out till it 
was attacked in front, when it also gave way. 2 was 
, during 
the battle and pursuit, suffered so severely, that only a 
few | to Valladolid. Marmont himself was 
Joneph Bonaparte bad left Madrid with the army of 
<—y 
the centre, in the hope of being able to join Marmont 
before his engagement with Lord Wellington ; but, on 
learning the issue of the battle of Salamanca, he retreat- 
ed in such a manner, as he trusted would draw off his 
ip from the it of the defeated army. In 
this also he was inted, and Madrid was now 
abandoned to its fate. Nor was this the only result of 
’ the battle: Soult withdrew from the South of Spain ; 
aud the siege of Cadiz, which the French had continued 
so long, was raised. The object of this general, 
wradhes Marmont, was now to com roe tata 
en un- 
he would 
vin ined J 
drid to its fate. 
able to protect it ; but Soult ha- 
Bonaparte, th ish general 
the scuachy st bandeaing tas 
The commander, full 
and that, till it was reduced, 
i could not safely advance against Mar- 
it with gveat-ohill aid bravery. Little 
pression had been made on it, when his Lord- 
ship learnt that Souham, who had succeeded Marmont, 
Hil hee the foes of Mad her athoageand 
; , was close! 
‘It. This intelli {induced his Lordshi peach 
don the siege; and, in his retreat, he was y fol- 
Souham ; and General Hill retreating in such 
‘direction as to join his Lordship, and being followed 
It, in a short time the two British and the two 
armies were united. As, however, the latter 
: 
mn 
653 
retaining possession of the Prussian fortresses in the 
north of Germany, and sending large bodies of troops 
lities ; but finding that i icable, he used his ut- 
most endeavours to render the resources of his vast em- 
pire available, in the event of a war with France, and he 
courted the friendship of Britain. The organization of 
the army was also improved. By these measures the 
Emperor Alexander saw himself, at the end of 1811, 
possessed of forces amounting to nearly 400,000 men, 
300,000 of which he could bring against the French. 
When the dispute between France and Russia began, 
the forces which Bonaparte could have spared, in the 
event of an immediate war, were comparatively few ;_ 
he therefore protracted the negociation, till he had as- 
sembled a more numerous, and, in every respect, a bet- 
ter mee army, than he had ever before led into the 
field. The contingent of the confederation of the 
Rhine was augmented. The King of Saxony was call- 
ed upon to join in the war, on the ground that Russia 
threatened the Polish possessions, which Bonaparte had 
iven him. From the southern extremity of Europe, 
urat marched his Italian troops. The King‘of Prus« 
sia reluctantly contributed nearly all ‘his army ; and 
Austria was called u to fulfil her engagements, by 
“which, in the event of a war, she was to awe France. 
e Peninsula, 
All the best trvops that Bonaparte had in 
In short, all 
were marched to the north of Germany. 
Europe, from the to the Baltic on its western 
side, and from the extremity of Italy to the same sea 
on its eastern side, and from the Atlantic Ocean to the 
confines of Poland, was leagued, under Bonaparte, 
against Russia. For such an immense army, about to 
invade a country nearly barbarous and desolate, it was 
necessary to provide enormous stores of provision, am- 
munition, &c. These were all brought up to the north 
of Germany, and such arrangements {or their convey- 
ance made, as Bonaparte expected would furnish him 
with a regular and full supply, till the Emperor Alex- 
ander was intimidated into submission. For there can 
be no doubt, that he expected, by the formidable na- 
ture of his preparations, or, at most, by the decisive 
blow which he firmly, believed he should soon be able 
to strike, that Alexander would sue for peace, on such 
Russia pre- 
there. Nor was the Emperor Alexander idle ; he en- pare for 
deavoured, indeed, to prevent the recurrence of hosti- war. 
4 
a 
conditions as he chose to give. 
On the 9th of May, Bonaparte having collected an Campaign 
much more numerous than the former, they obli- 
army of at least 400,000 men, set out from St Cloud, of 1812. 
Lord Wellington to continue his retreat to the con- 
n 
of Portugal. On the 6th of June he crossed the Vistula. On the Bonaparte 
State of the At the close of the campaign, the French armies, ex- 22d of that month, he formally declared war against crosses the 
hostile ar-  ¢lusively of ‘those which were wholly occupied by the Russia ; and two days afterwards, he crossed the Nie~ Niemen. 
mies. desultory warfare of the Spaniards, consisted of about men, and entered the Russian territories. 
104,000 men ; of these, 72,000 infantry, and 2000 ea- Hitherto the Russians had made little or no resist« 
valry were under the command of Soult, who directed 
the armies formerly under the command of Joseph Bo- 
naparte, and Souham. Suchet, in the south of Spain, 
had with him 18,000 infantry, and 4,000 cavalry, to op- 
ance ; but as they had marked out the first line of de~ 
fence poe banks of the Dwina, it was supposed that 
there would seriously oppose their invaders. ‘The 
plan on which they had resolved to act was, however, ~naahog 
pose the Spaniards there, and an Anglo-Sicilian force, 
which lately landed. to the French ar- 
mies, were about 70,000 Bri Germans, and Portu- 
guese. But of the French, a proportion consisted 
We have already mentioned the causes of the dispute 
between the ‘or Alexander and Bonaparte. As 
the esac snage pall place in 1811, did not promise 
different. Knowing the impetuous activity of Bona- 
parte, and that he had been accustomed to astonish - 
and intimidate by the rapidity of his movements, and 
by advancing into the very heart of the country which 
he invaded, they h to draw him on into the inte- 
rior-of Russia, far from his resources, and to places 
where he could not support his army by plunder and 
contributions. They-also. anticipated the effects of a 
Russian winter, if he should be mad enough to con- 
tinue in it till this season. In order that this plan should 
be carried into complete and successful execution, it 
