History. 
—_—\ 
A. D. 1812, 
Bonaparte 
rvtiers Wil- 
na 
Rattles at 
Witepsk. 
654 
was necessary the inhabitants and soldiers of the 
par der en at pea as the Russiahs were, 
both of them incapable of being seduced by the arts of 
the French,—even deaf to the promises of mips 
when that blessing was to come froman enemy. In 
short, the attachment, both of the Russian peasantry 
and the Russian army, to their and their coun- 
try is so strong, that no temptation, no difficulty, can 
possibly shake it. But the plan of the Russians 
was to draw Bonaparte into the interior of their vast, 
desolate, and barbarous empire, yet they at the same 
time determined to oppose him wherever they could 
do — advantage, and thus weaken him as he ad- 
vanced, 
Such was the plan of the Russians, and they acted 
up to it with a patriotic perseverance which does them 
infinite honour. Bona , indeed, was successful, in 
so far as driving back the Russians and advancing con- 
stituted success: he even succeeded in dividing one of 
the Russian corps from the main army. But as he ad- 
vanced, he found no signs of intimidation on the part 
ef the Em 3 no ‘proof of attachment or submis- 
sion from the people ; and he must have been sensible 
that he was leaving his resources far behind, while he 
could not hope for regular and sufficient supply from a 
country never well cultivated or fertile, now laid 
waste and deserted by the inhabitants as he 
Those disco ing circumstances, however, did not 
appear so ifestly while he was in Poland and Li- 
thuania, as the inhabitants of these districts, not at- 
tached to Russia, and mo ee Bonaparte’as their li- 
berator, received him wi stinde and joy. On the 
28th of June, he entered W. which he did not leave 
till the 17th of July. His transactions during this stay 
are not clearly known ; but though he was stationary, 
the different divisions of his army were on the advance. 
His plan now began to unfold itself, and he seemed to 
be aiming at once on the destruction of the main Rus- 
sian army, and. the occupation of Petersburg. On 
the latter enterprize, a corps under the command of 
Marshal Macdonald was sent. The rest of his army 
followed the line of the retreat of the Russians. 
a At es the Dees had an eee 
ut as the corps which Bonaparte had succeeded in se- 
parating bad not yet come up, this was abandoned, 
and a position at Witepsk occupied. On the 24th of 
July, they arrived here, one of their corps having been 
pocvioney dispatched to the north to cover Peters- 
urg. On the 25th, 26th, and 27th, three battles 
took place; the Russians fi t obstinately ; and hav- 
ing succeeded in weakeni e French, again retreat- 
ed. In the mean time, Marshal Davoust, who had 
been sent after the Russian corps which was ted 
from the main army, came up with it, and brought it 
to action: but the result was not favourable to him, 
and he found himself so weakened that he was not able 
to prevent its rejunction. The French army which had 
marched on the route to Petersburg, was equally un- 
fortunate. The plan of its was to cross the 
Dwina, come round upon Riga, and thus cut off the 
communication with the odpitale. But in consequence 
of his losses on the 30th and 81st of July, in two very 
severe actions, he was obliged to.recross that river, and 
the communication between Petersburg and the main 
Russian arm 
on leaving Witepsk, retreated on Smolensk, 
~~ eee: but on account of the nature 
country, e extreme difficulty of procuring 
provisions, he was obliged to disperse hie different corps 
FRANCE. 
was thus rendered secure. This:army, 
gu ; 
this of the Russian empire, there were no maps 
sufficiently accurate and minute for his purpose, and 
the fied at his approach. He thus advanced, 
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till the middle of August. From this place he 
ee ae he at length thes 
the Russians to a cape p hare 9 
had acted on 
ght the F 
great 
retreated. Soon afterwards, the command of 
monereupen sha tie ot eee 
improve upon the , 
se Tolly,be. dliieions a poeanapenty apt persevering re- — 
sistance to the enemy, but still retreating, even after 
success. On the 18th of August, the French having 
thrown a bridge over the Borysthenes, crossed that ri- 
ver; and.as it was now evident that the Russians meant 
to retreat in the direction of Moscow, Bonaparte en. 
deavoured to cut them off from that place. In thisvat- 
tempt, however, he did not succeed at this time ; and 
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natures with the French. aang ney 
ee d have reached Moscow. without. 
ing, preferred attacking Kutusoff, The force on each Battle of 
side was nearly equal, amounting to about 120,000 Berodina 
men; Son tiated the French, by the obstinacy of Rus- 
sian defence, the incursions of the Cossacks, who con- 
tinually harassed their march, and. the losses occasion 
tillery and infantry, for the purpose of supporting their 
centre. At six o'clock in the morning 
September, commenced the attack, by 
tempting to carry the Russian line by main force. 
contest was murderous, but the issue unfav 
) ing confusion, , disorder, and dismay, 
testa heeeragee peerage 
tack should be made-on the heights ; ra 
most sanguinary contest, was partially rogoenatel ee 
these ions were going on in one part army 
i va the Fae were: the assailants, and 
drove back the French. Thus the conti- 
nued with varying success, till night ; and.though the 
French were undoubtedly masters. of one.part of the 
field of battle ; yet, insother parts, they were so much 
beaten, that Bonaparte judged it. prudent to draw off 
his forces. 
3 
boy gem gioel 
