A.D. 181 
1 
FRANCE | : 655 
The Russian general, having thus succeeded in the ceed: this Murat, who commanded the cavalry, attempt- _ Histor. 
~ great object of the campaign, which was to weaken Bo- ed; but he was defeated with dreadful loss. In conse- 3 ene 
~ na as much as possible, and at the same time to quence of this defeat, Bonaparte was compelled to aban- 4 gt ek 
draw him farther into the country, resolved to abandon don his intention of retreating by the route of Kalouga; )..¢2 Mos. 
Moscow to its fate; and this he was the more disposed but-in order to deceive Kutusoff, he began his march coy, 
to do,-as the French army after the ‘battle had been in that direction, and afterwards turned off on the road 
reinforced by a corps under Marshal Victor. Bona- to Smolensk. He himself marched with the van of 
parte now saw the capital of Russia within his reach: his army, surrounded by the Imperial guards: the 
and though, by the persevering refusal of the Emperor Viceroy of Italy brought up the rear. 
Alexander to treat, he could hardly expect that the | As soon as Kutusoff was informed of the route which 
ion of it would bring him to terms, yet he look- the French army had taken, he began his march in a 
ed forward to it as a place of refuge against the seve- parallel line, leaving it to the other divisions of the 
rity of the Russian winter, and as the probable depo- army, and especially the Cossacks, to hang on the rear 
sitory of those articles of provision po refreshment, and the flanks of the enemy. No words can paint the Their dis- 
¢ French Which his army so much wanted. How great then misery and sufferings of the French during this retreat. 4sttous re- 
nter Mos- must have been his mortification and disappointment, ‘ Scarcely had they, worn out by a day’s march, along “°** 
. when, just as he was entering Moscow, he beheld the brokenand deep roads, during which they were constant- 
flames ing it! The patriotic governor, and no _ly obliged to be either on the alert, or actually fighting, 
less patriotic inhabitants, nobly sacrificing their vene- lain down on the wet and cold ground, to obtain a little 
rated city,—their own homes and property,—rather than rest or sleep, when the Cossacks rushed into their camps, 
that the French should derive any advantage from and before the men could prepare themselves for re- 
them. 3 « sistance or defence, many were killed—all were thrown 
Theirdread- Of the hopelessness of the situation of into confusion and dismay, and their artillery and stores 
fal situa- and his army, at this time, it is searcely possible to carried off.” While they were thus exposed to the 
~ form an idea: he had indeed conquered Russia, if that sudden and irregular attacks of the Cossacks, Kutusoff 
could be called ar which consisted in advancing \seized every opportunity of bringing them to battle. 
into the interior of a country; after most severe and On the 24th of’ October, he attacked them most vigo- 
obstinate fighting, where no provisions were to be had, rously ; the French fought with desperation, but their 
where all fled from his approach, and in reaching the ee was at length worn out, and they were com- 
pell 
— sage of that country, only to behold it in flames. to retreat with the loss of 16 pieces of cannon. 
winter was approaching,—a Russian winter,—he After this defeat, Bonaparte pushed forward before his 
was at the distance of 500 or 600 miles from a hospi- army towards Smolensko, the Imperial guard alone ac- 
table climate, and from his resources; on all sides of companying him in his rapid and disgraceful flighty 
him were an peasantry, and an army accus- _It is impossible to describe the losses and sufferings ,,,, Rus 
tomed to the climate, acquainted with the country, and of the French till they arrived at this place. About the ;., “eh 
constantly increasing ; whereas his army could receive beginning of November, the Russian winter set’in with ter sets in. 
no increase ; nor even continue at its present force, di- - more than usual severity, and on the first day of the 
minished as it must daily be, by fatigue, want of pro- frost nearly 30,000 horses perished. ' «All possibility 
visions, and the severity of the climate. In this dread- of ing forward their artillery was now at an end: 
ful crisis, Bonaparte continued his usual and favourite the spirits of the soldiers completely deserted them ; 
system of deception, His bulletins, calculated to de- they crawled on, exposed to the most dreadful cold, 
ceive his subjects, meee the climate of Russia as exhausted with fatigue and hunger, emaciated and al- 
mild, the stores of Moscow as amply sufficient for all most naked. The road was literally blocked up with 
the wants of the army, and the peasantry as rejoicing the dead and the dying ; they had no power to defend 
in the presence of their invader. Notwithstanding the themselves against the C s, who constantly hover- 
approach of winter, he lingered in Moscow, inthe vain ed round them: they had no inclination to do it : death 
hope that the Emperor Alexander would agree to peace; to them would have been a blessing: at the sight of 
but he knew too well that the possessor of the an- the Cossacks they hoped their miseries would soon be 
cient capital of Russia was in fact at his mercy; and terminated ; but their enemies were not so merciful 
ely refused to negotiate. * as to put them to death ; piercing them with wounds, | 
. At length, the proud and obstinate spirit of Bona- stripping off the little covering they had, they left them 
parte gave way, and he resolved to retreat ; but even in the snow, there bleeding and naked, to the rigours - - 
this was represented in his bulletins, as only a lateral of a Russian winter. Whenever the French’ entered 
movement on . His resolution, however, any village, where there was the least chance of repose 
was formed too late: he left Moscew, as soon as or food, they exerted their little remaining poten 
ever his army was refreshed and prepared for retreat, and crawled on their hands and feet to seek it. Fre- 
and before the of winter was so near, he might quently, just as they had stretched out their hands to 
have unparalleled disasters which befel seize a little food, or vont, the threshold of a wretch- 
him ; but by delaying it till the middle of October, he ed hut, under which they Tooked for shelter from the 
rendered it im for him to far, before weather, perhaps for a few minutes sleep, the remnant, 
the severity of a Russian winter would attack his troops, of their strength failed them, and they expired.” 
v he vetime for the enemy to complete their opera- It may well be conceived, how little able such an 
tions for har them. These preparations, indeed, army was to resist the regular Russian en 3 yet oc- 
were extensive. On every side the Russians were col- casionally despair lent them strength, and they fought 
lected ; and especially immense numbers of Cossacks, obstinately, but never successfully, In addition to their 
calculated for this mode of warfare. —. miseries, they lost all confidence in Bonaparte, and in 
Before Bonaparte could leave Moscow, it was ne- fact could no longer be said to compose an army; ig- 
to drive back the grand Russian army, which norant of the roads, and s‘raid to meet with the Cos- 
-occupied the Kalouga , by which he meant*to pro-| sacks, they wandered in all directions, or actually laid 
