FRAN CE on 661 
follow him. Before, however, he did this, he made a 
bc saser ay movement to the north of Nogent, 
where he a a Russian corps, and took the whele 
of them prisoners. On the 14th of February, having 
joined Marmont, he advanced against Blucher, who 
ing inferior in numbers, and particularly in cavalry; 
formed his infantry into squares, and retreated. Bona- 
parte followed him, but nce series a attacks 
were almost incessant and very desperate, he made little 
or no impression, not one of the squares being broken. 
In order to intercept the retreat of Blucher, Bonaparte 
had ordered a corps*of cavalry to push forward and. get 
into his line fa Blucher forced his hx oer: by 
opening a fire of artillery and musketry.. At 
pi he reached Etoges, but rae was assailed by a 
of infantry, which had ap arge through bye 
caadecatihia flanks and rear ; was therefore again 
under the necessity of renewing the attack, and was 
again successful. In the mean time, the entrenched 
camp, which Bonaparte had formed for the protection 
of his army of reserve at Soissons, was assailed by Ge- 
neral Winzingerode with such impetuosity, that near] 
3000 men were taken, and the town itself was entered. 
While was pursuing Blucher, the grand 
army put itself in motion on the left. On the 11th of 
February, a division of it carried by assault the town 
of Sens, 82 miles south-east of Paris, and afterwards 
joined the Bavarians under General Wrede. Other di« 
visions of the allies advanced nearly in the same direc- 
tion; so that by the middle of Lebtumy; they had 
themselves about 40 miles along the course of 
e Seine. Marshals Victor and — to sere soe 
protection of this important river been entr i 
alarmed at the advance of such superior numbers, aban- 
doned the left bank, and destroyed the bridges ; these, 
however, being soon re-established, Prince Schwartzen- 
berg, the commander in chief of the allies, fixed his 
head quarters at Bray. The allies, however, had now 
baggy wrk"> so much, and thereby so — 
ir line, Bonaparte returning quick] m 
pursuit of Nam. YS some advantages owe part of 
the grand army, in uence of this the com- 
mander in chief united the whole of it behind the Seine. 
Part of it was posted near a bridge over this river ; this 
repeatedly attacked, but was repulsed three 
times with great py, dag As, grein it was “e the 
im ce for him to gain thi ition, he re- 
ered the attack the fourth time, and Caan ing pos- 
session of the bridge, passed over a considerable part of 
his army. 
Blucher, though he retreated before Bonaparte, no 
sooner found that his adv: was gone against ano- 
ther part of the allies, than he resulved again to ad- 
vance; his object evidently being to press on, if pos- 
sible, to Paris itself. After having prevented Oudinot 
from crossing the Seine, and _ obli Marmont to re- 
treat, even after his junction with Macdonald, he push- 
ed forward in such a manner as to render the allies 
masters of the whole line of the Marne for above 80 
aa. Seagate tg Heenan ca > comer ti eam 
sity of again turning his principal attention to Blucher; 
for it is observable, that whenever the French armies 
in this campaign were commanded by any of his mar- 
shals, they were unsuccessful. Bonaparte alone seémed 
to be able to procure them the chance of success. It 
was therefore absolutely necessary, that he should march 
' with the utmost rapidity alternately from the grand History. 
array of the allies to Blucher,. and from Blucher'to the 
grand army. At this time, his object was to prevent 
the junction of this general with Winzingerode ; but 
being foiled in his project, he could not retreat without 
a battle. Between the 4th and the 9th of March, va- 
rious skirmishes took place between his troops and 
those of Blucher ; on the latter day, the Prussian ge- 
neral determined to give battle at Laon ; he was, how- Battle of 
ever, anticipated by Bonaparte, who, taking advantage Laon. 
‘of a thick mist, attacked his right and centre, and obli- 
ged him to fall back to the very walls of Laon. ‘As 
soon, however, as the mist disappeared, Blucher’s army 
regained the nna which it had lost; and\a severe 
contest ensued on their right and centre. ‘The most 
important partvof the engagement, however, took place 
on the left of Blucher’s army, which the French attack- 
ed under 2 heavy cannonade. But Blucher immediate- 
ly reinforcing his left with two divisions, and ordering 
his whole army to advance, the French were not only 
repulsed, but actually borne down, and thrown into 
very great confusion, retreating towards Rheims. Jn. 
this engagement Bonaparte lost upwards of 70 pieces of 
cannon ; and the number of prisoners was immense. 
The negotiations at Chatillon were still going on, 
the allies, notwithstanding their successes, adhering to 
their former proposal to treat with Bonaparte as the 
Emperor of France. When he was unsuccessful, he di- 
rected Caulincourt to listen to their terms, but as soon 
as ever he gained the most trifling advantage, he dis- 
emp his characteristic haughtiness, and actually be- 
aved as if the allies were in his power. He seems, 
even at this time, to have calculated on the lukewarm- 
ness of Austria; and it is not unlikely that the nego- 
ciations were kept open longer than they would other- 
wise have been, and better terms were offered to him, 
in consequence of the connection between him and the 
Emperor of Austria.- He might be strengthened, too, in 
this belief, from. the circumstance that the Austrian 
army hitherto had done very little for the common 
cause, Blucher not having been sup , as he might, 
and ought to have been, by Prince Schwartzenberg. 
At length, however, even the Emperor of Austria 
t 
was convinced that no peace could be made with Bona- Rupture of 
e Negocia« 
parte ; accordingly, on the 18th of March, the final and {; 
complete ru e of the ope took place. Im- tillon. 
mediately this event, Bonaparte directed all his 
efforts in a most desperate manner against Blucher: for 
two days he poured his battalions against the immove- 
able army of that general; but finding that he could 
make no impression, he bent his efforts southwards 
against the grand army of the allies. On the 21st, the 
two armies were near, and opposite each other, ready 
for battle ; but Bonaparte, perceiving that he had not 
the smallest chance of success, moved off his columns 
on the road to Vitrey. At first he proceeded in’ a 
northern direction, but afterwards turned to the east 
on St Dizier, and thus found himself on the 24th of 
March exactly where he was on the 26th of January, 
when he opened the campaign. 
Let us now turn our attention to the movements and Operations 
operations of Lord Wellington. Though his army was * ” southy} + 
in the south of France, yet from the vicinity of its ° “™"°* 
situation to the foot of the Pyrenees, the weather was 
so very unfavourable, that he could not advance till the 
93d of February. His first movement was across the 
Adour and two other rivers: These were successful; and 
by the 27th of February, the whole army had taken up a 
—— 
A. D. 1814. 
on at Cha~ 
