amieeprinayel 1018, nesriy. Gaara hchovot ‘the con- 
urope was subservient to the will, and con- 
ducive to the interests of Bonaparte. In the Peninsu-) 
la, indeed, he had not been equally successful ; but, at 
this period, it seemed as if it were only necessary for 
him to pour into it all his force, in order to reduce it 
to reluctant and restless submission, and to compel 
Prom the Emperor of Austra, after the humili 
i submitted in the marriage of his 
, though no cordial and zealous 
co-operation beh 
1 peut ee 2 
nr en ee ached om ae rH mM 
naparte ; and though, at is period, ———— 
to struggle to regain his liberty, aan 
Of these dissimilar materials he was the animating spi- 
rit ; and from the success which had hitherto 
his arms, there was great reason to dread that the em- 
ire of Russia would henceforth be obli to contri- 
ochecstheran veiles'et teen aniees ——. 
two 
her plunderers over the conti- 
the seat of a war, in which ~ 
conquered,—her capital at the mercy 
and indebted for her independence, and 
Causes of 
the downfall more deeply to interest the mind, than the contrast 
of Bona- which these events afford: Were the intervening period 
parte, not specified, we should be apt to conclude, that such 
an essential and wonderful of affairs, could not 
have been wrought out, but after the of many 
years. The causes which produced this unparalleled 
change, in such a short period of time, are natu- 
for ; ule fortunately for the gratification. 
of curiosity, as well as for the more im 
ses of history, considered as philosop 
rpo~ 
g by 
pu 
teachin 
te explained. 
great reverses. In him existed not mere- 
ly that restless and insatiable ambition, which he 
sessed in common with most conquerors ; but an i 
nacy so blind and c ing, as to convert even his 
great military talents into the causes of his ruin. It is 
blasted the of the conqueror of Europe so utter- 
| Iy'and ‘hopeleadly, as his own fool-hardiness and obsti- 
} did in the short space of afew months, during his 
1X, PART It. 
FRANCE. 
665 
campaign of Russia. When we say utterly and hope- History. 
lessly, we mean in reference to his character; for, 
could experience have taught him wisdom and modera- 
tion, not even his losses in Russia could have driven 
him from the throne of France. But in the campaign 
of 1813, he — created unto himself great reverses ; 
— ambitious, and domineering, when partial 
temporary success attended his arms ; faithless and 
unprincipled during the negociations into which the al- 
lies entered with him, and obstinate when he met with 
defeat.. By advancing to Moscow at the commence- 
ment of a Russian winter, and continuing in that city 
so long, he destroyed nearly the whole of his army. 
By obstinately clinging to Dresden, till the allies had 
actually cut him off from France, he brought on the 
battle of Leipsic, which completed the destruction of a 
second army. The same scenes were repeated during 
the short campaign of 1814, when his means were few- 
er, his opponents more numerous, and his ruin near- 
er at : still he might have been saved,—the al« 
lies would have left him on the throne of France: te 
their terms he listened when unsuccessful ; but no 
sooner had he gained even a doubtful and hard bought 
victory, but he most foolishly and fatally for himself, 
but most fortunately for E , allowed his ambitious 
faithlessness to become so apparent, that the allies were 
convinced - that his eeeaearh iene was absolutely neces- 
to the repose and inde ence of Europe. 
ut though Bonaparte ria the principal cause of his 
own destruction, yet there were other causes co-opera- 
ting, which would indeed have been ineffectual of 
themselves, but which, aided by the man against whom 
were directed, became formidable and successful. 
t the commencement of the French Revolution, the The sound- 
sovereigns of E , for a short time, united against & Policy of 
it; but narrow and blind self-interest ; mutual jealouiny iat 
and ion ; and an imperfect knowledge of the 
evils with which it was fraught, dissolved the confe- 
deracy. Afterwards they were stimulated or goaded by 
England to an unwilling and unequal contest. At 
length fatal and dearly ht experience convinced 
them, that the only means of preserving even the name 
of ind ence, and the remnant of power that France 
had left them, was by cordially and zealously uniting 
inst her. This union, however, could not have been 
effected during the plenitude of Bonaparte’s power ; 
but after that power was reduced by the obstinacy of 
the possessor, their union became essentially conducive 
to the restoration of European independence. ; 
At the commencement of the French: Revolution, The hatred 
the sovereigns of Europe regarded their subjects with excited’by 
a suspicious and apprehensive eye, as much more likely Ep eny 
to assist than to repel the French; and instead of en- poo, 
deavouring to bring them over to: form a common 
cause with themselves, still farther irritated and aliena- 
ted them by their conduct. Besides, the people were 
too eager to receive the soldiers of a nation, which had 
solemnly declared, that they made war only on thé pa- 
lace, but brought peace and liberty to the cottage. A 
very shortexperience convinced the sovereigns, thattheir 
surest defence against France was in the confidence and 
loyalty of their people ; while the people fatally expe- 
rienced, that, by being liberated from the dominion of 
their native princes, and placed under the government 
of France, they only exchanged one tyranny for another, 
—a y to which they had been long accustomed, 
and which was relieved by. many acts of protection and 
kindness, for one which was novel,—which broke in 
upon those comforts that the former tyranny had left 
efi and which, as being inflicted by strangers, and 
Pp 
