History. 
—_—\o 
A. D. 1814. 
‘The war in 
the Penin- 
sula. 
State of 
France 
when Louis 
ascended 
the throne. 
Of the mili- 
tary. 
666 
with all the insolence and poatigccnite which unparal- 
leled success had given rise, was infinitely more oppres- 
sive and int . Thus suffering under a common 
evil, the sovereigns and people of Europe were made sen, 
Sai) nevviond imagined donee Ft 
viously |, and were 
— no geune pean ee area nd 
independence. An cppeetanitg ly was wanting 
for the spirit of hatred an acm against France 
to burst forth into action ; and this 9; nity was af- 
it was chiefly 
forded by the man himself, against w 
to be directed. 
The events of the peninsular war may justly be.re-, 
garded as forming another subordinate cause of the de~ 
struction of Bonaparte. This war most decidedly proved 
that the French soldiers were not invincible; that even 
when opposed by an inferior force, they might be con- 
quered ; while the genius and the successes of Welling- 
ton imed to Europe, that the most celebrated of 
the French Marshals had at length met with their mas- 
ter in all the art of war. Thus, even before the Russian 
cannpalers the charm of French invincibility was bro- 
ken, But the war in the Peninsula gave another cheer- 
ing lesson to the continent of Europe ; for it taught it 
be could be effected by a people resolved not to sub- 
mit to their invaders, though that people struggled un- 
der the disadvantages of a vernment, and re« 
ceived little assistance even from their own regular army. 
Such appear to have been the principal causes which 
led to the liberation of Europe. ‘ 
The condition and character of the French nation, at 
the period when Louis XVIII. ascended the throne, is 
an object of investigation, not less interesting or impor- 
tant than that which we have just been examini 
It was supposed by many, that the reverses of 
parte in Russia, and the dreadful misery which, by his 
ambition and obstinacy during that campaign, he had 
inflicted on his surviving soldiers, would have com- 
letely rooted out their confidence and attachment to 
Bim. So far, however, was this from being the case, 
that even the additional proofs of his falling fame and 
fortune, and the additional experience of misery, near- 
ly equal to that of the Russian campaign, supplied by 
the cami of 1813 and 1814, neither deprived him 
of the attachment and confidence of his soldiers, nor 
FRANCE, 
perdi eS a 
Frow tn could the Mara, the acre or the sols YEE 
be friendly to the reign of Louis 
Bonaparte ? ; 
‘The mass of the French nation were. weary of the Of 
with satisfaction and plosaurié ;dneh tron aiyp ecddinaey?! 
been 
siante the Revolution, Louis was preferred by them, 
to Bonaparte, because under the former anticipated: 
the annihilation of the conscription, the restoration of 
peace, and the enjoyment of some portion of civil and: 
palicical liberty. But it. is Scnpentile that: they 
ve freed their minds from all apprehension, 
ong with the restoration of the. Bourbons, property» 
might be rendered insecure; feudal privileges and tythes: 
might be revived; and those re-established: 
which, in some measure, had driven that family from: 
the throne. By the mass of the French nation, there« 
fore, by all the landed proprietors, by the farmers; and: 
by the, , all the measures of Louis's. govern« 
ment would be watched with suspicion and anxiety. 
The. mani ing and commercial classes 
bation, and with confidence unweakened by doubt. 
suspicion ; for the Revolution had brought to them no 
peculiar privileges, had freed them from no. iculai 
grievances ; on the vontrary, it had been a constant 
source of calamity. They therefore hailed the accession: 
of Louis as the commencement of an era most favourable 
to their interests ; and perhaps, less than any other class 
of the. French nation, felt di io teaabde in 
which he had been seated on the throne of his ancestors, 
the absolute triumph of the peinginies of pure monarehy ; 
the enjoyment of the King’s confidence, and an ample. 
portant and efficient part of the population. They had reward for their long suffering loyalty. With senti~ 
been so long accustomed to themselves as superior ments and hopes similar to. these, many.of the emi- 
to their countrymen, and grants must have returned to: France ; fully persuaded 
of the esprit de ng and such facilities of arting in con- 
on 
terly impossible that they could Ba gate Louis with an 
other feelings but those of mingl contempt and in 
tred:—of contempt, because his Sonstitetional indolence, 
increased by the inactivity of age and infirmity, and 
by the habits of a lite ife, rendered him disinclined 
and unfit for a mili ife ;—of hatred, because, had 
he been inclined and fit for such a life, the very char- 
ter by which he held his throne from theallies, and the 
mass of the French people, absolutely forbade him to 
follow the career of that man, under whom they had 
been bred. In short, the military were attached to a 
life of what they called glory, that is, to a life of con- 
quest and plunder,—their thoughts, feelings, and habits, 
Tite. But the 
that, as the allies had conquered that country and ex 
pelled Bonaparte, there could be no obstacle to the 
completion of spe hop the {> 
Such is a brief sk of the condition and character 
of the different classes of the French people at the pe- 
riod when Louis ascended the throne ; and this sketch 
is sufficient to shew the nature, the extent, and the im-' 
minence of the dangers and difficulties with which he 
was encompassed, The manner, too, in which he came 
to the throne, by the assistance of the enemies of France. 
2 
of those enemies over most of whom she had formerly 
triumphed, but who now beheld her prostrate at their 
feet, could not fail to create something like aversion to 
Louis, even in the breasts of those who,, from loyalty, 
from interest, or from purer motives, rejoiced at his ace 
cession, as consummating the overthrow. of Poniperiea 
for the love of national glory is so strong in the breast 
r : ‘viewed. Of the ma- 
the restored dynasty with less mixed a TT nt cane” 
un 
were all moulded in conformity to such a 
allies had invaded. France, had dethroned Bonaparte, 
and bad seated Louis in his stead, for the express pur« 
of a Frenchman, as not uently to overcome ev: . 
other principle, sentiment, ling. = os poor 
Louis was by no means equal to the embarrassing si- of Louis 
