670 
History. and Belgians: Those under Blucher, of Prussians and 
Saxons ; but, in consequence of the mutinous spirit of 
A. D, 1815 the latter, most of them were sent back into Germany. 
The preparations of Bonaparte were by no means 
<glienthethe to those of the allies, nor hi Ae to the 
means which France afforded; for aT ie by the 
exposé, that, on the Ist of May 1814, land forces 
of France amounted to more 520,000 men of all 
descriptions, besides 122,597 on half pay, and.160,000 
ptisoners. By the treaty of Paris, all the prisoners 
were to be restored; and, before the return of Bona- 
, they all had returned to France, except a few 
Russia. Hence it would appear, that there must 
have been at least half a million of soldiers in France. 
Bonaparte’s How it happened that Bonaparte could avail himself 
inadequate 
forces. 
Assembly of 
of the services of so few of these, does not clearly appear. 
oe tempt ae + ioaepr ae rance 
not uipment and su a large ar- 
my ; and it is eee that the sepcthioan were 
very unwilling to place a numerous army under his con- 
troul. To this party, he found himself obliged more and 
more tosuccumb. When he first reached Paris, his mi- 
nisters were Gaudin, Maret, Fouche, Davoust, Savary, 
and Bertrand. Anxious to confirm the idea that he had 
abandoned his love of conquest, and his ic ha- 
bits, Carnot was taken into the ministry, Lucien 
Bonaparte was persuaded to leave Italy and come to 
Paris. But all these pledges of a reformed character, 
—his declaration, that he would not com- 
mence hostilities,;—and even the new constitution, and 
the assembly of the Champ de Mai, failed to stop the 
of the royalists, or to rouse the mass of the 
le in his behalf. 
he manner in which the members of the assembly 
the Champ of the Champ de Mai were chosen, the character of 
de Mai. 
Bold pro- 
ceedings of 
the cham- 
bers. 
those members, and their number, cannot accurately 
be ascertained: From the known policy and practice 
of the French government at all times, as well as from 
the peculiar necessity which at this period existed, of 
imposing upon the French nation and the allies, by the 
appearance of a zealous devotion to , there 
can be little doubt, that the Assembly of the Champ de 
Maiwas in a great ayia 2 up (to use a technical 
but expressive phrase) for effect. At the same time, it 
must be acknowledged, that in many parts of France 
very liberal, or perhaps licentious, notions respecting li- 
again began to prevail; and that from these 
parts, it is probable, deputies, freely chosen, and anxious 
to discharge their duty, were sent. 
On the 7th of June, a few days after the assembly of 
the Chamn de,Mai, Bonaparte went in state to the pa- 
lace of repyesentatives, to open the session of the cham- 
bers. The oath of fidelity to the Emperor and the 
constitution having been taken, he uncovered himself 
for a momen ards covered himself—and then 
addressed them in a speech, of which the most important 
topics were, the free constitution which France had just 
received,—the formidable coalition against the indepen~ 
dence of the country,—the actual commencement of 
hostilities, in the capture of a French frigate by an Eng- 
lish man of war,—and the assemb) that had been 
formed, and the communications which were carried on, 
with Louis at Ghent, in the same manner as with. the 
emigrants at Coblentz in 1792. He concluded, by al- 
lading to the probability, that the first. duty of prin- 
ces might soon call him to Re Soe. ae ORY. 3, that 
the army and himself would ge their duty, while 
he trusted that the peers and representatives would 
give to the nation an example of confidence, energy, 
and jotism, and, like the Roman senate, swear to 
die rather than survive the dishonour of France. On 
FRANCE. 
rupted by calls for the order of the day, 
Ga at Leet bguact hick coumoetacpiarenaen t 5 ‘ 
and on another member moving, that the army had 
on the ex ground, that, till the soldiers had benefit- 7 
ed ah em they ought not to receive its thanks and q 
gratitude. i 
Bonaparte still Teapewed in the capital, notwithstand- Probable 
ingen was actu commenced, and it seemed his {i030 
policy to attack the h and Prussians, before the quitting - 
rest of the allies them, or invaded France in Paris. ; 
a 
a quarters... The cause of his delay is not known; 
ut it 
his troops would figh ie ntadiedine teenie , a4 
wo t most : 
; but there were other cir- 
of his to be trusted. Among the fo were | 
Berthier his most intimate and lobes tried friend : 
and com 
Ms 
is most 
ployed: and even Soult. had no 
mand assigned him. The force which t 
collected for the defence of the immense frontier of 
France does not appear to have exceeded 250,000 men ; 
| 
Bh ge IN His force in 
under Rapp near Strasburg, and under Suchet, on the lands. 
borders of Switzerland and Italy. Of Be alls meee “my 
were yet come up, except the English, na utch, | 
Moder th Waloune. ea 
and i 
un- : 
spreedied SOOO, the for . 
citer 
at present in hostilities agai | the 
of inia, &c. were to invade 
ue 
of the Kin, 
ing ag and on the next day, at four. I> 
ing, he left Paris, having nominated Generals Sebas- June 14. 
capital, dere POF=, 
tion and.nature would allow. On the 14th, he atrived 
at Avesnes, where he issued an order of the day, res 
