POLITICAL ECONOMY. 



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l',,l u i c f) that its profits, far from being an increase of the 

 "<ny. national wealth, were a displacement ol' it. The raw 

 materials on which the arts operate, are nil, or nearly 

 all, produced by agriculture, or nt least rrawn from 

 the ground; hence they form part of the proprietor's or 

 the cultivator's wealth. If some advantage did not 

 arise from exporting them, nobody would think of 

 forbidding them to be exported. Thu prohibition 

 indicates sufficiently, that the persons who product <1 

 them were better paid, or gained more by selling them 

 to strangers; and the law restricts their market, in 

 opposition to the principle which we b.ivi- pointed out 

 above, as the foundation of commercial interest ; the 

 principle of obtaining for each article of produce the 

 highest possible price. From such prohibitions to ex- 

 port, there must result, first, a diminution in the price of 

 the raw material, for its price is no longer kept up by 

 free trade; secondly, a diminution in the quantity 

 produced, because it is regulated by the interior de- 

 mand ; and, lastly, a deterioration of its quality, for a 

 calling which is ill rewarded is likewise ill attended 

 to. This, therefore, is one of the most injudicious 

 means of favouring trade; and at the same time, it 

 sacrifices the income of all those who contribute to 

 produce the raw material. Whatever trade gains from 

 them, cannot be considered as adding aught to the 

 national revenue. 



To fix the interest of money, or to suppress it al- 

 together, as some legislators have attempted, has 

 generally been the consequence of religious preju- 

 dices and of mad attempts to adapt the Jewish le- 

 gislation to modern Europe. The effect of these laws, 

 so opposite to the general interest, has always been 

 either to force contractors to envelop themselves in a 

 secrecy which they must require payment for, and 

 may use as a snare for the unsuspiciousness of others; 

 or else to force capitalists to employ, in other coun- 

 tries, that capital which they could not lend rn their 

 own neighbourhood, with the same safety and ad- 

 vantage. But the very end which legislators pro- 

 posed was bad ; a diminution in the rent of the na- 

 tional capital, is a national evil ; it is a loss of part of 

 the revenue. Most frequently, indeed, this evil is the 

 sign of an advantage greatly superior to it, namely, 

 the increase of capitals themselves ; but, in forcibly 

 producing the sign, we cannot at all forcibly produce 

 the thing, any more than by turning round the point- 

 ers of a watch we can alter the flight of time. 



Attempts on the part of government to fix the rate 

 of wages, to make workmen labour at a lower price, are 

 ever the most impolitic and the most unjust of these par- 

 tial laws. If government should propose, as an object, 

 the advantage of any one class in the nation at the ex pence 

 of the rest, this class ought to be precisely the class of 

 day-labourers. They are more numerous than any 

 other; and to secure their happiness is to make the 

 greatest portion of the nation happy. They have fewer 

 enjoyments than any other ; they obtain less, advan- 

 tage than any other from the constitution of society ; 

 they produce wealth, and themselves obtain scarcely 

 any share of it. Obliged to struggle for subsistence 

 with their employers, they are not a match for them 

 in strength. Masters and workmen are indeed mutu- 

 ally necessary to each other; but the necessity weighs 

 daily on the workman ; it allows respite to his master. 

 The first must work that he may live, the second may 

 wait and live for a time without employing workmen. 

 Hence in the riots and combinations of workmen tor 

 obtaining an increase of wages, their conduct is often 

 VOL. xvu. PART j. 



violent and tumultuous, and often merits the chastise- Political 

 ment which it never fails to receive ; but scarcely an in- Hcoawsir* 

 stance exists, where justice has not been upon their tide. ^^Y"*' 



The expedients invented by governments to assist 

 their merchants in selling dear, are numerous. Some 

 tend to diminish the number of producers in a market 

 of given extent, and therefore to force buyers to raise 

 their price ; such are apprenticeships, corporations, mo- 

 nopolies granted to companies, prohibitions to import, 

 exclusive governments of colonies, and favours obtained 

 by treaties of commerce ; others, such as bounties and 

 drawbacks, are destined really to extend the market; 

 though by securing to the manufacturers a profit at the 

 government's expence, not the consumer's. 



The regulations of apprenticeships and the statutes 

 of corporations, were destined, it is said, to hinder igno- 

 rant workmen from following any trade which they did 

 not yet understand ; they were forced to devote a de- 

 terminate number of years to learn it, and afterwards 

 to gain admission into a body which always made ob- 

 stacles to the entrance of new comers, and limited 

 their number. The pretence of thus watching over the 

 training of artisans cannot be made good. It has 

 often been proved, that rivalship alone gives that train- 

 ing, whilst a long apprenticeship blunts the mind and 

 discourages industry ; but the true, though secret ob- 

 ject, to diminish the number of those exercising a 

 trade, was attained. The corporate body exercised a 

 kind of monopoly against the consumer ; it took care 

 at all times to keep the supply below the demand. The 

 merchant doubtless gained more; but he gained on a 

 smaller production. There was less work done, less 

 increase of capital, less population supported ; and as 

 to the merchant's extraordinary profit, it was compen- 

 sated by an equal loss to the consumer, who was 

 obliged to pay, not according to his own advantage or 

 convenience, but according to the arbitrary caprice of 

 a corporation which gave laws to him. 



In all trading countries, a more or less exclusive 

 monopoly has been granted, on certain occasions, to 

 some associations of merchants, under the name of 

 Trading Companies. The avowed motive for sacrificing 

 the whole class to this privileged number was the par- 

 ticular nature of the trade thus subjected to a mono- 

 poly, which trade it was said could not be supported 

 except by very extensive funds; but governments had 

 often a secret motive besides; and this was, the sum of 

 money for which the merchants bought their privilege. 

 A company 's monopoly has never failed to heighten the 

 price for the consumer, to diminish production and con- 

 sumption, to give the national capital a false direction ; 

 sometimes by attracting it prematurely to a branch 

 of trade which was not yet suitable, sometimes by re- 

 pelling it when fruitlessly seeking an employment. 

 But although companies obtained the desired privilege 

 of buying cheap and selling dear, by nature they are 

 so ill suited for economy and trading speculations, that 

 although amazingly rich, and sometimes sovereigns of 

 countries, these companies, their administrator* having 

 no immediate interest in the prosperity of their trust, 

 have almost all been robbed, and very few of them 

 have not ended in bankruptcy. 



These different expedients for the protection of 

 commerce, are now generally decried, though almost 

 all governments yet agree in repelling from their states 

 the produce of foreign manufactories, or at least in 

 loading it with heavy duties, to give the national pro. 

 duce an advantage. The prohibitive system of custom- 

 house duties plainly gives to a growing manufactory 



