146 



PREJUDICES. 



Prejudices, difference between the two is, that joy is more com- 

 T" ' mon, as it is more directly and steadily the object of 

 our wishes and pursuit. And in proportion as any 

 narrative, or the relation of any event, makes a deep im- 

 pression on our mind, either of a sorrowful or joyful 

 description, our sensibility in the same degree increases 

 our belief; and whatever raises emotions in us, assumes 

 at once, in our view, the appearance of probability or 

 of truth. 



It is, however, not only in grief or in joy that sen- 

 sibility is called forth ; it appears also in love and in 

 hatred. Our self-love is higher when we feel ourselves 

 to be influenced and actuated by strong emotions which 

 we delight to cherish ; and we have much greater sa- 

 tisfaction to have our conduct regulated by sympathy 

 or antipathy than by reason and judgment. 



It is the province of sensibility to direct our estimate 

 of the various individuals with whom we may be con- 

 nected, to form those ties which sweeten existence, to 

 choose our friends, and to render us worthy of a return 

 of their affection. This is indeed the proper depart- 

 ment of sensibility ; but we extend it still farther. In 

 appreciating things, and in forming our principles of 

 action, we are, in no inconsiderable degree, deter- 

 mined by it ; we make morals not unfrequently an 

 affair of sympathy or antipathy ; and we prohibit the 

 examination of what we have thus approved or con- 

 demned, as emphatically as if the decisions of sensibility 

 were infallible, or as if there was no appeal to a higher 

 or more unerring standard. 



While we assert this, however, we do not deny the 

 existence of what has been denominated the moral 

 sense or moral faculty ; that state of the mind which, 

 (though it is much modified by education, or the cir- 

 cumstances in which we are placed,) gives us an intui- 

 tive perception of good and evil, of virtue and vice. 

 It is not necessary, nor have we time at present, to 

 enter upon an analysis of the nature and functions of 

 this faculty. We shall not endeavour to ascertain 

 whether it is an instantaneous exercise of ratiocination, 

 so rapid that the several steps of the process escape 

 pur observation, or whether it is the result of early as- 

 sociations, and an impress of public opinion made on 

 our minds, without our being in the least conscious of 

 it ; or whether the ideas which the moral faculty ex- 

 cites in us are really intuitive and innate, imprinted by 

 God himself on the human heart, and ought to be acted 

 upon and appealed to in every case of doubt and per- 

 plexity. It may be remarked, howevei', that those 

 who have espoused this last opinion, have been forced 

 to allow that the two others have also a powerful ten- 

 dency to produce similar emotions ; and that the line 

 which separates the three opinions in question cannot 

 be easily traced or defined. Besides, every innate per- 

 ception should correspond with the decisions of reason ; 

 and as the suggestions of the moral sense, taken ac- 

 cording to the first two definitions of it, do often and 

 may always correspond with the decisions of reason, 

 the real origin of this faculty may at any time be made 

 the object of discussion, and will never, it is probable, 

 be entirely ascertained and established. As the origin 

 of this faculty, therefore, cannot be indisputably settled, 

 it is impossible to point out the exaet degree of confi- 

 dence which in every case should be given to it. It 

 may, however, be regarded as the safest rule, that while 

 we pay the greatest deference to its suggestions, we 

 ought also to subject them to a strict scrutiny and exa- 



mination. As in the opinions we form of external ob- Prejudi 

 jects, we rectify one of our senses by the other ; as, for """ "v~ 

 example, we consult the sense of touch when we sus- 

 pect an error in that of sight, and when we find a con- 

 tradiction between them, are assured that one or other 

 of them has deceived us ; so as often as the moral sense 

 awakens in us emotions, whether of sympathy or of 

 antipathy, which reason and investigation do not con- 

 firm, we may conclude that error exists somewhere ; 

 and we ought, therefore, to draw no inferences till we 

 have brought the subject under review to a new and a 

 more strict examination. In making this examination, 

 we shall find either that we have made a mistake in our 

 reasoning, or that we have implicitly adopted opinions 

 on the authority of others, or that our moral sense is 

 clouded and distorted by the previous circumstances of 

 our life, or by those in which we are at present placed. 

 We may thus arrive at the truth with as much certain- 

 ty, as in the case of external objects alluded to above, 

 we confirm or disprove the decisions of one sense by 

 the successive exercise of the others. 



Sympathy, when applied to persons and not to 

 things, or not to the principles of moral conduct, is the 

 source of the most amiable of our prejudices. It is 

 sympathy that prompts us to undertake the defence 

 and espouse the cause of whoever is in distress, or is 

 unfortunate, or oppressed. Sympathy, too, promotes 

 our own happiness in proportion as it. contributes to 

 the happiness and welfare of others. This feeling, 

 however, though enlightened and apparently well di- 

 rected, often misleads our judgment, and inspires us 

 with prepossessions in favour of individuals, which 

 investigation and experience do not justify ; but it is 

 better and more pleasant to be deceived, than to have 

 doubted and mistrusted. 



But antipathy, or the prejudice of hatred, exercises 

 the most fatal influence on the human mind. The 

 activity of our sensibility seems not to be satisfied if 

 we sacrifice to it those only whom we have good rea- 

 son to hate. It requires hecatombs. It embraces whole 

 tribes and nations. Any external difference, a differ- 

 ence of name, of colour, of language, is sufficient, we 

 think, to prevent us from being candid or just ; and 

 we applaud ourselves for the energy of our hatred to- 

 wards persons in such circumstances, though probably 

 not one of them is known to us. The fault, real or 

 supposed, of a single individual, We extend to his fa- 

 mily, to his sect, to his countrymen ; that of one age is 

 attributed also to the succeeding ages. By such illi- 

 beral judgments we flatter ourselves we are showing 

 our horror at vice ; and we even sometimes go so far 

 as to regard the sentiments in question the best proof 

 of the soundness of our religious principles. In an 

 Egyptian convent, where an English traveller lodged, 

 the monks described to him the vexations they expe-. 

 rienced on the part of the Turks. In these masters, 

 who are often so oppressively cruel, every thing was a 

 cause of offence ; their opinions, their manners, their 

 habits, their language. " Do you not hate the Turks ?" 

 said one of the monks at length to their guest. " I 

 fear the wicked," replied he, " but I hate nobody." 

 " You hate nobody!" exclaimed they, " then you can- 

 not be a friend to our order." 



The prejudices of hatred undoubtedly have their ori- 

 gin in the human heart ; but they are rendered a thou- 

 sand times more inveterate and strong by those who 

 govern us, and who have an interest in cherishing and 



