PREJUDICES. 



149 



. not ignorant of a better order of things, we? are tempted 

 to ask them, it the hell of Dance would not . 

 preferable in their eyes to what they prop<> 

 they would possess a more certain guarantee* of its im- 

 mutability. 



1 1 is not among the Indians only, where social and 

 political institutions are stationary. All the eastern 

 nations reject, with an almost equal degree of horror, 

 every idea of change, though the actual order under 

 which they live is for them a state of suffering, of 

 oppression, and of ruin. With the people of Europe, 

 even where the subjects of legislation have been com- 

 paratively open to discussion, the two terms, innova- 

 tion and danger, seem almost synonymous ; and one 

 class of men are always ready to resist a change with- 

 out examination, merely because it is a change. The 

 most serious inconveniences would undoubtedly result 

 from a continual volatility in political measures. But 

 there is no danger against which the universal charac- 

 ter of man provides so completely ; for there are no 

 prejudices so strong as those which support the esta- 

 blished order of things. 



We have thus, as it were, made the tour of a human 



', to endeavour to ascertain his opinions and their 

 OTHn, and to establish some classification in t! 

 finite variety of thoughts, of errors, and of prejudice*, 

 by which he is flittinguiihcd. We have endeavoured 

 to discover tl and nature of his ideas. We 



are aware, however, that this classification is, in a 

 great degree, arbitrary; that our different qualit 

 are connected with and diverge into each other, and 

 that very often the same errors may proceed from two 

 or more of the sources which we have treated as se- 

 parate. Some advantages, however, we believe, will 

 re-nlt from thus subjecting the natural tendency of 

 our thoughts to the examination of reason, and from 

 foreseeing, as it were, our errors before they really ex- 

 ist. In referring our opinions to this classification, 

 arbitrary as it may seem to be, and in inquiring how 

 much they may be influenced by memory, imagina- 

 tion, sensibility, and mental indolence, we free them 

 successively of all their accessaries; we deliver them 

 over to an impartial examination ; and if they stand 

 the test of this analysis, we will be enriched by a new 

 truth ; if they are found to have their origin in preju- 

 dice, we will at least be delivered from an error. 



ANALYSIS OF THE FOREGOING TREATISE. 





Prejudice is an opinion formed be- 

 tore .reason has discussed the 

 soundness and propriety of it, 

 page 139 



Man, in the first stages of his 

 life, necessarily resigns him. 

 self to prejudice, 140 



He cannot at once emancipate 

 himself from its influence, and 

 substitute reason in its stead, 

 140 



When doubt is entertained on 

 the subjects of our belief, we 

 subject them to a careful in- 

 vestigation, which leads to con- 

 viction and certainty, 140 



Even to the end of life, men of 

 the most philosophical minds 

 have occasion to resist and 

 guard against a great number 

 of prejudices, 140 

 Relation and difference between 

 prejudice and presumption, 

 110 



Prejudice has its origin in the 

 dispositions of our mind, pre- 

 sumption in the circumstances 

 of any subject submitted to our 

 judgment, 140 



We transform into prejudice the 

 presumptions which have been 

 communicated to us by others, 

 140 



The following division includes 

 the chief sources of prejudice, 

 namely, memory, imagination, 

 sensibility, and mental indo- 

 lence, 141 



I. Prejudice! of Memory. 

 The veneration we pay to the 



remembrances of our child, 

 hood, 141 



We delight to recal that period 

 when our pleasures and our 

 hopes were so lively and fesci- 

 nating, 141 



The love which people bear to- 

 wards their kings would be al- 

 most inexplicable, if the king 

 was not, in their associations, 

 the representative of the times 

 that are past, 142 



The respect for ancient families, 

 ancient governments, and an- 

 cient laws, has its origin in the 

 same feeling, 1 42 



The slow and difficult conversion 

 of those, in any religion, who 

 have been long distinguished 

 by incredulity or a worldly 

 life, 142 



This conversion, when it does 

 take place, is always in favour 

 of that theological system 

 which we were taught to be- 

 lieve and reverence in early 

 life, 142 



When we become the victims of 

 doubt, we regret the faith we 

 abandon as we regret the days 

 of our youth, 112 



The remembrances of youth give 

 duration and stability to social 

 institutions, 142 



lint these remembrances have a 

 contrary effect, if the establish- 

 ed order of things is new, and 

 if we can recollect an order 

 which it has superseded, 1 1-3 



The illusions of memory Cause 

 that unsettled and precarious 



state of affairs which follow . 

 political or religious revolu- 

 tions, 143 



II. Prejudices of Imagination. 



Constant effort of the imagina- 

 tion to substitute whatever is 

 wonderful in place of what is 

 real, 143 



The wonderful, presented to us 

 in works of poetry and ro- 

 mance, as a j lay of the ima- 

 gination, pleases us in propor- 

 tion as it deceives us, 143 



There is a universal tendency in 

 the human race to believe po- 

 pular traditions and supersti- 

 tions, 143 



The wonderful is not unknown 

 in real life, as, for example, 

 the interest so invariably taken 

 in unfortunate kings, 1 1 1 



Of all human events, war is most 

 nearly allied to this feeling, 

 144 



The marvellous in religious be- 

 lief ; mystery is a great source 

 of the marvellous, 1 44 



The protestant churches by de- 

 grees renounced that examina- 

 tion of their faith by which 

 thev were at first distinguish- 

 ed," 144 



History of heresies ; the most 

 difficult of their opinions is 

 always preferred, 144 



The love of die marvellous af- 

 fects every kind of testimony, 

 145 



We may suspect the truth of 

 opinions thai partake of the 



wonderful, though we can 

 place the utmost confidence in 

 the persons who entertain 

 them, as they may involunta. 

 rily be the victims of preju- 

 dice, 145 



III. Prejudice* of ScnribUUy. 



The absence of emotions, 143 



False opinions have not always 

 their origin in our faculties, 

 but our faculties transform 

 them into prejudices, No 



Analysis of mournful emotions ; 

 we easily imbibe a prejudice 

 in favour of what excites our 

 pity, 143 



Analysis of pleasurable emotions ; 

 prejudice in favour of what 

 excites them, 145 



Inquiry into the sentiments of 

 love and hatred, 146 



We extend sympathy and anti- 

 pathy from persons to things. 

 146 



This sympathy or internal moral 

 sense ought always to be in- 

 fluenced and regulated by the 

 suggestions of reason, nce 

 the one rectifies and conSims 

 the other, 146 



Truth being one and the same 

 under all circumstances, the 

 moral sense and enlightened 

 reason ought always to agree 

 and be reciprocal, 146 



Sympathy, applied to persons, is 

 the most amiable of our preju- 

 dices, 1VC 



Antipathy is the most odious, 

 though it has often been re- 



