ROMAN EMPIRE. 



401 



Roman 



{.injure. 



O-ar offers 

 to make 

 peace. 



fice which he immediately accepted. During the 

 eleven days which lie held that office, I .< ao|Hin-<l !>y 

 his moderation the alli-clion of all classes. lie i 

 rd those who were banished, and conferred tin- rights 

 of Uuman citizens on all the Gauls beyond tin \'. 

 As dictator he presided at the election of the con- 

 suls, and resigning that office, he and Servilius Isau- 

 ricus, one of MM best friends, were elected consuls for 

 the next year. 



Determined to carry 1m arms into the east, he sent 

 twelve legions to Brundusium. In the beginning of 

 the year he arrived with five legions and (>0() horse, in 

 Chaonia in Epirus, and sent back two ships to bring 

 over the rest of his army. Pompey was equally active 

 in marshalling his forces ; and had received reinforce- 

 ments of extraordinary magnitude both from Europe 

 and from Asia. He had obtained one legion from Si- 

 cily, one from Crete, and two from Syria. The princes 

 in alliance with Home raised three thousand arch- 

 ers, six cohorts of slingers, and seven thousand horse. 

 The free Asiatic cities joined him with their best 

 troops ; and he is said to have received succours from 

 Arabia and Ethiopia, and even from the Indus and the 

 Ganges. His own army comprehended almost all the 

 Roman knights, and the flower of the young nobility ; 

 and his soldiers were principally veterans, accustomed 

 to all the dangers and privations of war. His fleet 

 consisted of about 500 ships, and his army was ac- 

 companied by the two consuls of the last year, and 

 about 200 Roman senators. The cause of Pompey 

 was therefore everywhere considered as the cause of 

 the Roman commonwealth. Those who had hither- 

 to remained neutral flocked to his standard ; and all 

 who were distinguished by their patriotism and their 

 virtues had taken refuge in his camp. When Caesar 

 had landed in Epirus, he tookOricum and Cephalonia; 

 and he was on the eve of marching to Dyrrhachium, 

 which contained Pompey 's magazines, when he heard 

 that thirty of the ships which he had sent back to 

 Brundusium had been taken by Bibulus, one of Pom- 

 pey 's admirals, and that his troops at Brundusium were 

 likely to fall into the hands of the enemy, who pos- 

 sessed all the harbours between Salonium and Oricum. 

 Under these circumstances, Caesar offered to make peace 

 with Pompey, on the conditions thtt the armies of 

 both should be disbanded in three days ; that their for- 

 mer friendship should be solemnly renewed, and that 

 they should return together into Italy. These terms 

 were twice sent to Pompey, who refused to enter into 

 any accommodation. Caesar therefore advanced to- 

 wards Dyrrhachium ; but Pompey having entrenched 

 himself in its immediate neighbourhood, he was dis- 

 appointed in his expectations of taking it by sur- 

 prise. The two hostile armies were unwilling to en- 

 gage ; and Caesar, who was sensible of his great in- 

 feriority in numbers, sent the most urgent dispatches 

 to Mark Antony to hasten to his assistance. Having 

 received no reply to these demands, he disguised him- 

 self in the habit of a slave, and resolved, in the frail 

 bark of a fisherman, to cross over to Brunei u si un, 

 through the enemy's fleet ; but the boat being driven 

 back by contrary winds, he dispatched Posthumius 

 with the most urgent orders to Mark Antony to bring 

 over the troops at every hazard. These succours at 

 last arrived under Mark Antony and Calenus, who 

 landed them safely at Nyphceum. Pompey attempted 

 in vain to prevent their junction with the main army, 

 and no sooner had Caesar collected his forces than 

 he offered Pompey battle, and drew up hi* army in his 



VOL. XVII. PART II. 



r de- 



sight. Pompey, however, declined the engagement, 

 nnd encamping <HI a hill c.ilh-d lYtra, which cum mand- 

 ril the sea, he expected to be supplied with provision* 

 from Greece and A->ia, while his rival would b re- 

 duced to the necessity of procuring them from Epirus 

 by a dangerous and expensive route. 



Caesar, who faw his design, conceived the bold plan 

 of besieging Pompey in his camp. He drew round 

 it a line of circumvallation, and hemmed in Pompey 

 so completely, that his hortes died for want of forage, 

 though his troops were liberally provided for by sea. 

 Caesar's army suffered great distress for want of corn, 

 but those of his men who had been in Sardinia made 

 bread from an herb called clcera, which they steeped 

 in milk. The diseases which broke out in Pompey 's 

 camp, and the want of forage, forced him to break 

 through the line of the enemy. Embarking his archer*, 

 slingers, and light infantry, he marched at the head 

 of sixty cohorts to attack the part of Caesar's lines next 

 the sea that were incomplete. The seventh legion who 

 defended them gave way ; and notwithstanding the 

 succours that were sent by Marcellinus, Pompey was 

 successful till a powerful body of troops under Mark 

 Antony compelled him to retire. Caesar now attempt- 

 ed to seize a post occupied by a legion of Pompey'a 

 troops. He accordingly attacked it with thirty-three 

 cohorts, and in spite of the most powerful resistance, 

 penetrated to the second entrenchment. Caesar's right J/ 

 wing, however, mistook the entrance into the camp, ' 

 and having separated from the left wing, were thrown 

 into great disorder, which Pompey no sooner perceiv- 

 ed, than he attacked them with his cavalry and com- 

 pleted the defeat. Caesar attempted in vain to rally 

 his routed soldiers, who left thirty-two Roman eagles 

 in the hands of the enemy. 



Mortified, but not disheartened by this severe de- 

 feat, Caesar addressed his army with the most soothing 

 eloquence, and retired to Apollonia. He thence march- 

 ed to Macedon,with the view either of drawing Pompey 

 into a general engagement, or of cutting off Scipio 

 Metellus, Pompey 's father-in-law. The news of his 

 late defeat threw immense obstructions in his way ; 

 but having marched into Thes^aly, the principal towns 

 opened their gates to him. 



The dilatory conduct of Pompey, though no doubt 

 founded on true wisdom, and on a thorough knowledge 

 of the talents and situation of Caesar, began to give 

 umbrage to his own officers; and under the influ- 

 ence of these feelings, which had extended themselves 

 even to the common soldiers, he resolved upon risk- 

 ing a general battle. U ith that view, he occupied 

 the wide plain of Pharsalia between Pharsalus and 

 l : hilippi, where he was joined by his father-in-law 

 Metellus. 



Pompey pitched his camp on the declivity of a moun- Pomper re- 

 tain which was entirely inaccessible ; but he was deep- ioke to 

 ly impressed with the propriety of destroying his enemy gw battle 

 by the slow weapons of fatigue and hunger, rather to 

 than staking his whole fortune on the issue of an en- 

 gagement with a brave and almost desperate army. 

 He therefore availed himself of various pretences to 

 evade an action, till he was compelled to it by the un- 

 animous decision of a council of war, which his officers 

 had almost forced him to assemble. Having deter- 

 mined to offer Pompey battle, Caesar led out his anny ; Battle of 

 but Pompey still kept his advantageous |x>*ition under Phanalia. 

 the cover of his trenches at the foot of the hill. Un- 

 willing to attack his enemy in such a position, Caesar 

 resolved to decamp next day and had just struck his 



3 K 



