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HKaKL. ORORQK WILLIAM FRKDF.RICK. 



I,, OKORQE WILLIAM FR1CDKRICK. 



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of the work, which is confined to the phenomena of mind as displayed 

 in tbe flraxoU of iU immediate existence, that in, in experience. It 

 trans the eoune of mind up to the- point where it recognises the 

 identity nf thought and substance, of reuon and reality, and where 

 the opposition of scfenre and reality ceases. Heuoeforward mind 

 develop* it* If ai para thought or simple science, and the wveral 

 form* it sucorMirely assumes, which differ only in their subject- 

 matter or content*, are Hie ol jecb of logic, or ' dialectic,' 



During his retirrment at Bamberg, Hegel comluctod the political 

 journal of that town with great ability, and with an honcaty and 

 randour rare in tho journaU of that period, until be was called in 1808 

 to pre*ide orer the gymnasium of Nurnberg. The duties of thin 

 situation he discharged with as much energy as skill, and he effected 

 sereral valuable rrform both in the discipline and the studies of the 

 school. In 1812 he published his ' Logic,' which wu designed, with 

 the ' Phenomenology,' to complete the whole body of science. Hegel 

 employs the term logic in a very extended cense. He does not confine 

 it, as is usually the case, to the account of the abstract forms of thought 

 and the laws of tho enchainment and development of idea*, but under- 

 stands thereby the science of tbe self-sufficient aud self-determining 

 idea the science of truth and of reality. From his fundamental 

 principle, that thought and substance are one and identical, it followed 

 that whatever is true of the former is true also of the latter, and 

 consequently the laws of logic become ontological. From this point 

 of view Hegel describes in this work the progress of reason ; how, by 

 virtue of a peculiar and inherent impulse, it passes constantly onwards, 

 until at last it returns into itself. The general merits of this work 

 were at once admitted, and the high powers of philosophical reflection 

 which it evinced were acknowledged by the offer of a professorship at 

 Heidelberg. His first course of lectures was attended by a numerous 

 and distinguished class, attracted by the profoundness and originality 

 of his views, notwithstanding the great obscurity of his style. By the 

 publication of the ' Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences,' in 1817, 

 his reputation ta a philosopher was established, and Hegel was invited 

 by the Prussian government to fill the chair at Berlin, which had 

 remained vacant since tho death of Fichte in 1814. This work, being 

 designed as a manual for his class, takes a general view of his whole 

 system, and exhibits hi the clearest manner the ultimate tendency of 

 hi* views. Considering logic as the base of all ontology, and starting 

 from the idea in itself or potentially, he considers it as the essence and 

 primary substance. He then examines thought as at first existing in 

 itself, then in other or in nature ; next in the mind of the individual, 

 in a purely subjective point of view; and then objectively, in its 

 outward realisation ; and la-tly, as he terms it, absolutely, that is, as 

 manifesting itself in art, religion, and philosophy. From 1817 until 

 death terminated his career there is nothing to relate in the life of 

 Hegel beyond the constantly-increasing celebrity of his lectures and 

 the publication of several works. He successively published the 

 'Philosophy of Jurisprudence,' two new editions of the ' Encyclopaedia,' 

 the first volume of the second edition of his ' Logic," and several articles 

 in the ' Annals of Scientific Criticism,' which he had established as an 

 organ of his system, and of its application to every branch of art and 

 science. He fell a victim on tie 14th of November to the cholera 

 which ravaged Berlin in 1831, and was, in compliance with his express 

 desire, buried by the side of Fichte. 



The history of philosophy from its earliest origin to its latest 

 development forms so perfect and compact a whole, that no single 

 part can be separately considered without losing something of its value 

 and significancy. This difficulty is greatly increased in the case of a 

 philosophy which gives itself out not only as the completion of its 

 immediate forerunner, but as the sum and result of all anterior systems. 

 Accordingly our general view of the Hegelian system will be unintel- 

 ligible unleu preceded by a rapid sketch of tbe states of philosophy 

 out of which it grew. The transcendental idealism of Kant formed 

 the transition from tbe empiricum of the 18th century, and effected, 

 as it were, a compromise between the ancient realism and the scepticism 

 of Hume. To the system of Kant succeeded the pure and absolute 

 idealism of Fichte, destined to be displaced in its turn by Schilling's 

 system of absolute identity and intellectual intuition, which was itself 

 to be further modified and developed by the dialectical momentum of 

 Hgel. Essentially the systems of Hegel and Schelling are both 

 founded on tbe same principle, namely, the absolute ideality of 

 thought and being ; for there is evidently but little difference between 

 tbe doctrine of Schelling, which supposed that tho human mind con- 

 tains within it the fullness of reality and truth, the consciousness of 

 which it may attain to simply by contemplating its own nature, and 

 that of Hegel, according to whom the concrete notion, or the reason, 

 comprise, within itself nil verity, and that in order to arrive at the 

 dance thereof it is only neocuary to employ logical thought, or 

 dialectic. The difference is purely a difference of method. For the 

 cold and narrow abstractions, the rigorous formalism, of Fichte 

 .Scliellinjf had substituted a sort of poetical enthusiasm, and banishing 

 from philosophy the scientific form it had received from Wolff, had 

 introduced into it the rapturous mysticism of the intellectual intuition. 

 Hegel however, insisting that the scientific system is the only form 

 under which truth can exut, re-established the rights and utility of 

 method by bis doctrine of the dialectical momentum, or development 

 of the idea. Indeed with Hegel the method of philosophy is philosophy 



itwlt This he defines to be the knowledge of the erolutin of the 

 concrete. The concrete is tbe idea, which, as a unity, is diversely 

 determined, and has in it-df the principle of its activity. The origin 

 of tho activity, tho action itself, and the result, are one, and constitute 

 the concrete. Its movement is tbe development by which that which 

 exists merely potentially is realised. Tbe concrete in itself, or 

 virtually, must become actual ; it is simple, yet different. This 

 inherent contradiction of the concrete is the spring of its development. 

 Hence arise differences, which however ultimately vanish into unity. 

 There is both movement, and repose in the movement The differenre 

 scarcely becomes apparent before it disappears, whereupon there issues 

 from it a full and concrete unity. Of this he gives the following 

 illustration : the flower, notwithstanding its many qualities, is one ; 

 no single quality that belongs to it is wanting in the smallest of its 

 leaves, and every portion of the leaf possesses the same properties as 

 the entire leaf. He then observes, that although this union of qualities 

 in sensible objects is readily admitted, it is denied in immaterial objects, 

 and held to be irreconcilable. Thus it is said that man possesses 

 liberty; but that freedom and necesuity are mutually opposed; that 

 the one excluding the other, they con never be united so ai to become 

 concrete. But according to Hegel, the mind is in reality concrete, 

 and its qualities are liberty and necessity. It is by necessity that 

 man is free, and it is only in necessity that be experiences liberty. 

 The objects of nature are, it is true, subject exclusively to necessity ; 

 but liberty without necessity U an arbitrary abstraction, a purely 

 formal liberty. 



This concrete idea develops itself in obedience to certain laws which 

 it determines of itself. Among these Hesel distinguishes three species 

 of thought, or three productions of thought in general 1 , the thought, 

 which he calls formal, as considered independent of its subject-matter, 

 or, in the Hegelian terminology, of all its contents ; 2, the notion, 

 which is thought more closely determined ; and, 3, the idea, or thought 

 in its totality aud fully determined. The truth, determined in itself, 

 experiences a want of development. Tbe idea, concrete and self- 

 developing, is an organical system, a totality comprising in itself vast 

 treasures of degrees and momenta, or germs of further development. 

 Now philosophy is nothing else than the knowledge of this develop- 

 ment, and, in so far as it is methodical and self-conscious thought, it 

 is the development itself. With the progress of this evolution, philo- 

 sophy advances towards perfection. The more the idea develops itself 

 the more precise and limited does it become, the wider its expansion 

 and the deeper its intensity. All the partial results it gives rise to, 

 as well as their systematisation, proceed from the one identical 

 Particular systems are but so many diversified forms of the same life ; 

 they have no reality but in this unity, and their differences and thi-ir 

 specific determinations taken collectively are but the expression of tho 

 forms contained in the idea. Tbe idea is at once the centre and the 

 circumference the source of light, which iu all its expansions does 

 not pass out of itself; it is both the system of necessity and its own 

 necessity, and yet nevertheless liberty. 



In the history of philosophy we have, under the form of accidental 

 succession, the actual development of philosophy itself. In the dif- 

 ferent systems which the history records there is one and the same 

 philosophy at different degrees of its development, and the dill', rout 

 principles which have been employed to support these systems are 

 but branches of a single unity aud of one whole. Tho philosophy 

 therefore which is the last in time is the result of all preceding 

 systems, and consequently must comprise the principles of all, nnd 

 therefore it is the most perfectly developed, the richest, nnd the 

 most ' concrete.' The more concrete the idea becomes, the moro 

 widely extended is the domain of science. It reconciles the apparent 

 inconsistencies of appearance and reason, and a true philosophy 

 removes the contradiction in which the ancient philosophy was 

 involved with the natural and historical development of the human 

 mind. Starting from and nourished by experience, the thought rises 

 to the idea of the general and the absolute, and, being allowed its free 

 course, passes beyond the moment of doubt and difficulty, to repro- 

 duce all that it has conceived in a rational order, and to impress upon 

 it the stamp of a logical necessity. For all verity is virtually con- 

 tained iu thought, from which, being made fruitful by experience, it 

 is tbe duty of philosophy to draw it, and to deduce tho actual con- 

 sciousness. Accordingly it is the high pretension of the Hegelian 

 philosophy to reconcile philosophy with reflection, and positive reli- 

 gion with the state and with every political aud religious establish- 

 ment. It is, he observes, an evil prejudice to suppose that true 

 philosophy is opposed to tbe sober results of experience, and to 

 the rational enactments of actual laws. 



Hegel divides philosophy into three parts : 1, Logic, or the science 

 of the idea in and by itst-lf, or in tho abstract element of pure thought ; 

 2, Philosophy of nature, or tbe science of the idea out of itself or in 

 nature, or as nature ; 3, Philosophy of mind, or tbe science of the idea 

 in its return into itself. Into the details of thin division it would be 

 idle to enter, as it would only lead to a dry aud barren nomenclature. 

 Each part is again divided into three parts ; for this holy number 

 determines throughout the divisions and subdivisions of the system. 

 In this respect, as well as for his obscurity and neologism, Hegel well 

 deserves the reproach of WoltTiouism, which his master SchelUng has 

 urged against him, Schelling indeed disavowed him as his disciple, 



