MTXTTET. 



MIRV 



700 



OM-ielgns and half-sovereigni in a year and a half, and more powerful 

 machinery has since been sent out. In California there is a mint 

 with great producing power, which hat undergone gradual enlarge- 

 ment to adapt it to the wants of the gold-diggers and dealers of 

 that country. The United States government line had expcriiiiciit.il 

 piece* minted in a mixed metal of copper and nickel; but they 

 are very inferior in appearance to bronze. In France, the coinage is 

 not managed by -the government, but by a peculiar company, who 

 are paid by the state at the rate of 1 J francs for coining 1 kilogramme 

 of silver money, and 6 francs for 1 kilogramme of gold, the proportion 

 between the number of large coins and that of small being matter of 

 stipulation. In 1857 the French withdrew their copper coins,' and 

 replaced them with lighter and better stamped coins in bron/.e. 

 realising a very considerable profit by the change, on account of the 

 much smaller quantity and value of metal in the new coins than the old. 



MlMIET(BKnrf, Fr.), a graceful slow dance, which, according to 

 Brossard, had its origin in Poitou, and, we conjecture, first made its 

 appearance either in the middle or towards the end of the 17th century,' 

 for the term is not found in Mersenne, but is met with in the 

 operas of Lully. Menage derives the word from menu, " little," the 

 paces of the minuet being small. 



The minuet, as a dance, consists of two strains or parts, of eight bars 

 each, in three-crotchet time, and both are repeated ; but as it seems to 

 have been introduced together with hoops and hair-powder, so it passed 

 away with them, and has not revived with their revival : except now 

 and then on the stage, it is only seen in dancing schools. As an 

 exclusively musical movement, in symphonies, quartets, Ac., each 

 strain of the minuet generally comprises sixteen bars, both strains 

 being repeated ; and it is followed by a second, .called the trio ; 

 after which the minuet is played once more, straight through. But 

 composers are not very strict as to its length, or to that of its supple- 

 ment the trio. For the latter kind of minuet we are indebted to 

 (iermany : ita time is always quick alleyro; and when repeated 

 after the trio, tin- movement is rather accelerated. 



MINUTK. |Ax.:i.i:: SEXAGESIMALS ; TlMl.] 



MIRACLES. A man may acquire his knowledge of any event in 

 either of two ways ; by his own observation, or by information from 

 others. The knowledge of an event which a man obtains from his 

 own observation is generally, to him, the highest degree of evidence 

 and the surest ground of belief ; but not therefore the surest ground 

 of a true opinion. The knowledge of an event which a man derives by 

 information from others is not, to him, so high a degree of evid, 

 that which he obtains from his own observation ; but it does not there- 

 fore follow that it is not so sure a ground of true opinion. All the 

 knowledge which a man derives from his own observation may be called 

 experience : all that he derives from the observation of others may, for 

 the sake of distinction, be called evidence ; it is the experience of 

 others communicated to him, either orally or by writing. 



Every event which lias taken place, or is said to have taken place, 

 may be the subject of evidence. A man who has witnessed on event 

 himself entertains no doubt of its reality, unless he has some suspicion 

 that a fraud was practised, or that for some reason or other the event 

 of which he was a witness was not such an event as it appeared to him 

 to be. An eye-witness therefore of an event has nothing to guard 

 against, so far as concerns his own conviction, but deception by others, 

 or mistake or misapprehension on his own part When a man derives 

 his knowledge of an event from the information of others, there is, in 

 addition to the causes of error which may exist where he is an eye- 

 witness, the further cause of error which may arise from the witness 

 whose evidence he receives being interested in deceiving him, or being, 

 from whatever cause, disposed to deceive him. There is no supposable 

 event which may not be the subject of evidence ; and when all reason 

 for supposing deception, mistake, or intention on the part of the 

 witness to deceive, is removed, there is no event which, when wit- 

 nessed, does not thereby acquire some degree of probability. It 

 must be admitted that the ascertaining that there is neither deception, 

 mistake, nor intention to deceive, is generally the main matter in esti- 

 mating the value of evidence ; but the estimating the value of the 

 evidence in any given case is a different thing from determining what 

 may be the subject of evidence, which is the matter that we are here 

 , i it .-. 



Man is so constituted, that any event alleged to have taken place is 

 at once placed by the mind either among events which are common or 

 among events which are uncommon. In the former case, before any 

 evidence is furnished as to the fact, there is a disposition to 

 that it is true ; and even the soundest judge of human events, though 

 he will 1 relieve no alleged event without mr l<-nce, readily 



acquiesces in the probability of an alleged event of a common kind 

 being a true event. In the case of an uncommon event, the matter is 

 different ; moot persons are indisposed to consider it probable that the 

 uncommon event has actually taken place, and many persons at once 

 assume it* impossibility, or at least assume that it has not taken place. 

 Bat there is no rational ground either foe admitting the truth of it 

 common event without sufficient evidence, or for refusing assent to an 

 uncommon event supported by sufficient evidence. An event the most 

 common in the course of Immvi life, an event the probabil 

 possibility of which no man will deny, requires as much evidence in 

 order to be proved as any event the most uncommon or any kind of 



thing or event that has never been heard of before. In both cases, the 

 testimony of one eye-witness at least is required ; and supposing the 

 absence of mendacity in the witness and of all reason for sii| ; 

 him to be deceived, the uncommon event is proved as much as the 

 common event. How much and what will be necessary in either case 

 to show the absence of mendacity or of deception, is a question that 

 concerns the estimation of the value of the evidence in any given owe, 

 and cannot be determined generally. 



Thus, it appears that an event alleged to have taken place may 

 be one of a kind that is consistent with a person's experience, or it 

 maybe consistent with it. But the evidence in tin > 

 of either description may be precisely the some in degree and kind : it 

 may be the evidence of persons of integrity unimpeaohed, of judg- 

 ment approved, and of observation and acuteness unquestioned. 



In the two cases supposed, the evidence is precisely the sani. 

 only difference is in the mental state of the person to \\hom it ia 

 addressed. All intention or disposition to deceive, on the part of the 

 witnesses, is by the supposition out of the way, and therefore the ease 

 ia reduced to that of the receiver of the evidence being an eye-witness, 

 and if he believes the witnesses to have as much penetration and judg- 

 ment as himself, their evidence is as good to him as his own experience 

 would have been ; and if he thinks the witnesses have more pent : 

 and judgment than himself, it is better. There is then no reason why 

 a man should not, under the circumstances supposed, believe an 

 which is inconsistent with his own experience, as well as one that is con- 

 sistent with it. 



The true cause of all the dispute about the reality of events called 

 miraculous is this : the estimation of the evidence in the pa*. 

 iustanceor instances, has been confounded with the question of evidence 

 generally. As a matter of evidence, any fact may be alleged as 1 1 

 to be proved, and the possibility of a proof equal in value to the proof 



le from a man's own ob mnot be denied, i'mtv. i 



any alleged fact La.s been proved or not, is quite* a dill'crcnt un- 

 it is not here naid that any supposable fact or event may, by } 

 lity, be supported by evidence as strong us that arising from a man 

 m eye-witness. 



The assertion that any alleged event is inconsistent will 

 may mean either the experience of the objector, or W 

 is, the experience) of others; or it may mean both. T 



Acceptation, the assertion cannot be properly made of any fact 

 or event alleged to have taken place ; for by the supi 

 is consistent with the experience of the person who bears cvid 

 it. If a fact or an event should be told to a person, of which t lien- 

 was no similar event on record, it might be said that experiei 

 not show any similar event ; but though this might be a very good 

 reason for examining the evidence most strictly, it is no reason 

 against evidence in support of it which is free from all the objections 

 above enumerated. 



But it may be said, what does this lead to ? It leads to this, to 

 the admission that any alleged fact or event is a possibility ; 

 leads to the proper examination of the evidence by which it i 

 ported. Suppose the event to be a shower of stones recorded in I. ivy. 

 The investigation is relieved of one difficulty by the fact of shov 

 stones being attested by evidence in modern time* much more satis- 

 factory than that of Livy. A man may therefore commence such 

 inquiry by admitting that the particular circumstance record. 

 Livy may have taken place ; though, if he had not satisfact 

 of such a kind of events having taken place before, he could n. 

 mence hix inquiry by making such admission ; for the admission that 

 such an event might have taken place could only bo made when the 

 event was proved to have taken place, and would then be u 

 Further ; prior to receiving any evidence, we cannot say that the 

 is one that could not have taken place. Whether a shower of stones, 

 as recorded by Livy, did fall or not, depends for proof exactly on the 

 same principles as other events recorded by him. 



Now many of the facts or events which ore called miracles are of 

 the kind which may be considered as unlike any othei 

 record ; the fact, for example, of Jesus raising I dead, 



which we will suppose, for the present purpose, to be the first 

 of the kind on record. With reference to an B1 !.ind, Hume 



remarks, " In order to increase the probability against the testimony 

 of witnesses, let us suppose that the fact which they 

 being only marvellous, is really miraculous ; and suppose also that the 

 testimony, considered apart, and in itself, amounts to an entire i 

 in that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must 

 prevail, but still with a diminution Oi .in proportion to t 



ita antagonist." Then] Hmne 



calls experience, a word which he has used in I 

 sense, r'r.nn what has been .* article, it will lie pei 



that the view which the writer take* of evidence is altogether different 

 from that of Hume. II 'the " te:-tiiii"iiy, n<n-idered apart and in itself, 

 amounts to an entire proof," the lliini; "V BVenl whether it 



be one kind of thii ml this cor Really eon- 



t lined iii II, v.-ever clear that Hume did not 



mean to say that w I > mean : for he urges against this, 



wlik'li 'itire proof if the thing were not miraculous, the 



objection that it is miraculous ; and this is the whole of the matter 

 that his Essay in effect contains, which, as it has been well remarked, 



