701 



MIRAGE. 



MISPEISION. 



702 



" confounds the principle of belief with the subject-matter to which it 

 is to be applied." (Starkie, ' On Evidence,' i., p. 473, note.) * This is 

 the case hi the first part of Hume's ' Essay on Miracles ; ' the second 

 part merely professes to show that no miraculous events have ever been 

 established on so full evidence as may amount to entire proof. 



Every person understands what is meant by the laws of nature. 

 The material world and the world of thought are subjected to certain 

 general laws, or, to speak more accurately, the phenomena succeed one 

 another in a certain order, which, as far as evidence extends backward, 

 has been generally unaltered. We say, generally, for deviations from 

 this order are alleged to have occurred at various tunes and in various 

 places. Now deviations from those laws are supposed to present, and 

 indeed do present, events which stagger the belief of many persons, 

 and which are regarded by others as totally untrue. Some have gone 

 so far as to say that such events are impossible ; thereby destroying 

 the very ground of all evidence, for we can never determine before- 

 hand the truth or falsehood of the matter offered to be proved ; unless 

 indeed the thing asserted and proposed to be proved should be a 

 general proposition, and a man should be able by his own experience 

 to contradict it in one or more particular instances : in such case, a 

 man might beforehand deny the thing proposed to be proved. This is 

 in fact Tillotson's argument against the real presence, which Hume 

 " flattered himself " was of " a like nature " with the argument that 

 he " had discovered/' 



Hume's definition of a miracle, at least the first part of it, appears 

 unobjectionable : it is denned by him to be " a transgression of a law 

 of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition 

 of some invisible agent." 



The true notion of a miraculous event then is an event that was 

 inconsistent with the course of nature, as known at the time when the 

 event is alleged to have taken place, and would be inconsistent with 

 it if it were to take place now ; and further, it must be such an event 

 as by the supposition is inconsistent with and cannot take place by 

 virtue of the laws of nature as established. If it is an event that 

 happens by virtue of what is called a law of nature, known or 

 unknown, it is not a miracle as the term is properly understood. 



If the raising of Lazarus from the dead was an event which took 

 place by virtue of a pre-established law or course of events, in which 

 this one event, to us an apparent exception, was in fact a necessary 

 consequence of this pre-established law or course of events, such event 

 is not a miracle, nor such an event as is generally understood by the 

 word miracle. Those men who would bring miracles within what are 

 called the laws of nature, mistake the question. If the event of the 

 raising of Lazarus from the dead, and all the attendant circumstances, 

 took place in the course of things, agreeably to a general law unknown 

 to us, such an event is as much an event consistent with what are 

 called the laws of nature, as the event of any man's death ; but in that 

 case, it is not the kind of event which the New Testament presents to 

 us. Whether however it is the one kind of event or the other, 

 matters not as to the evidence of it, which is in no way concerned about 

 the kind or quality of the event. 



To take then the case of a man being raised from the dead ; can the 

 evidence of such a fact amount to proof ? It can amount to proof as 

 strong as that which a man would derive from being an eye-witness of 

 such .in event, and having every opportunity of examining it. Whether, 

 in a given instance, the proof is so strong as this, must be ascertained 

 by weighing the evidence, which 'is quite a different matter from the 

 possibility of such an event being proved, which is all that is here 

 , insisted on. Whether the proof, when made as strong as we have 

 supposed, will convince a man, is no longer a matter that in any way 

 belongs to the general question of evidence. The judgment that a 

 man will form on the report of others must be left to himself. As a 

 man must always decide for himself whether he will trust his own 

 senses, so he must also decide whether he can believe that which a 

 credible witness says he has seen. 



Other views of the nature of miracles, of their antecedent proba- 

 bility, historical character, and what is called 'evidential' value, differ- 

 ing in ore or less from what is set forth above, and, in their sceptical 

 or critical point of view, from that of Hume, have, during the last 

 few years, been repeatedly put forth and answered with great learning 

 and logical acumen on the Continent (especially in Germany) and in 

 our own country. The nature and extent of the controversy would 

 vr render it impracticable, even if it were desirable, to enter into 

 it fiere, where all that has been attempted is to show the principle 

 involved as a question of evidence and antecedent probability. The 

 writings of Faulua, Rosenmiiller, Wegscheider, and De Wette in German, 

 and of Theodore Parker, F. Newman, &c., in English, will show the 

 various phases of the recent sceptical and rationalistic reasonings 

 against the credibility of miracles, whilst those of Archbishop Whately, 

 Deans Lyell, and Trench, and Mr. Manscll will supply the arguments 

 by which their objections have been met by what are regarded as the 

 orthodox authorities. With these may perhaps be compared 

 thevii'w.- <>f writers like Ncander, Professor Jowett, and B.Powell. 

 MlliAOK | Ilia J.CITIO.N AND REFRACTION, ATMOSPHERIC, EXTBA- 



\HY.] 



It may not be improper to ucld, that the writer by no means assents to all 

 the arguments contained in the note referred to. 



MIRROR. [SPECULUM.] 



MISDEMEANOR is a term applied in the law of England to 

 crimes and offences, whether of commission or of omission, less than 

 felony. [FELONY.] 



At common law, persons convicted upon an indictment [INDICT- 

 MENT] for a misdemeanor are punishable by such fine, or by such 

 term of imprisonment short of imprisonment for life, or by such 

 amount both of fine and imprisonment, as the court before which 

 the offenders are convicted, in its discretion awards. By several 

 statutes special modes of punishment are provided for some particular 

 misdemeanors. But it frequently happens that even in creating new 

 misdemeanors, the legislature affixes no particular punishment. In 

 such cases, the newly constituted offence is punishable as a misde- 

 meanor at common law. Generally, wherever a statute prohibits an 

 act, as a matter of public grievance, or commands an act, as a matter 

 of public convenience, all things done or omitted contrary to the 

 prohibition or command are punishable as misdemeanors at common 

 law; it being a common-law offence to disobey a statute, even 

 though the act or omission be not attributable to a corrupt motive. 

 Where a statute, in respect of an offence which was a misdemeanor 

 at common law, provides a mode of proceeding different from that of 

 the ordinary course by indictment, either the- extraordinary or the 

 ordinary mode may be adopted. Thus if a statute give authority to 

 the court of quarter-sessions to make an order respecting some par- 

 ticular matter, and prescribes a particular remedy in case of disobedi- 

 ence, a party disobeying an order made in pursuance of the statute 

 may be proceeded against either in the mode prescribed by the statute 

 or by indictment. He would be guilty of a misdemeanor at common- 

 law, both as having disobeyed a public statute, and as having disobeyed 

 an order made by a court having authority to make such order. Where 

 however a statute has made a matter a felony which before was a mis- 

 demeanor only, the offender cannot be indicted for the misdemeanor, 

 as the minor or lower offence is said to be merged, that is drowned or 

 absorbed, in the higher [Misrnisiou] ; but the statute 14 and 15 Viet., 

 c. 100, s. 12, provides that if on a trial for misdemeanor, the facts 

 given in evidence amount in law to felony, the accused is not by reason 

 thereof to be entitled to acquittal ; and no person tried for misdemea- 

 nor is liable to be afterwards prosecuted for felony on the same facts, 

 unless the court discharges the jury from giving a verdict, and directs 

 an indictment for felony. Where a statute creates a new offence, by 

 making unlawful that which was lawful before, and appoints a sum- 

 mary mode of proceeding, the specific statutory course must be pur- 

 sued, and an indictment will not lie. An act done in contravention of 

 a statute which extends only to private persons, or relates to disputes 

 of a private nature, cannot be made the subject of an indictment ; for 

 no injuries of a mere private nature not in any degree concerning the 

 king, and not accompanied by a breach of the peace, can be made the 

 subject of a criminal prosecution. Nor will an indictment lie for 

 an infraction of the bye-law of a corporation. But under some circum- 

 stances an indictment will lie for a personal injury, where the act 

 or omission amounts to a violation of duties incumbent on the party 

 as a member of civil society, as in the case of a parent wilfully 

 omitting to supply proper food to an infant unable to provide for 

 itself. Where a child is put out apprentice by an order of magis- 

 trates, the master, if he refuse to provide for the child, may be 

 indicted for disobedience of such order. Any act of wilful negli- 

 gence, whereby human life is endangered, is a misdemeanor ; as to 

 put on board a ship a package containing gunpowder, oil of vitriol 

 (sulphuric acid), or other dangerous articles without giving notice of 

 the contents of the package, so as to enable the master of the vessel 

 to use proper precautions in stowing it. Every act doue for the 

 purpose of committing either a felony or a misdemeanor, is itself a 

 misdemeanor. By the 14 and 15 Viet., c. 100, s. 9, a person indicted 

 for any misdemeanor may be found guilty of an attempt, and punished 

 accordingly. 



As to the former and present course of proceeding upon indictments 

 for misdemeanors, see TRAVERSE. 



Where a peer or a commoner is impeached by the House of Com- 

 mons for a misdemeanor, the lords spiritual as well as the lords tempo- 

 ral are judges. The judgment is pronounced by the lord chancellor, 

 and it is binding though the king dissent from such judgment ; whereas 

 in capital cases the royal assent is necessary, and the judgment is pro- 

 nounced by the lord-high-steward. [STEWARD.] 



MISI'RISION (from mespnndre,' which means sometimes to deal 

 improperly with, sometimes to treat with contempt), is a term used in 

 English law in different senses. 



I. In the sense of criminal nonfeasance, or neglect to perform 

 important public duties, the term is applied to concealment of treason 

 or felony. Misprision of treason consists in a party's withholding his 

 knowledge of a treason committed, or about to be committed, or in 

 omitting to give information respecting it within a reasonable time to 

 some public authority. If the concealment or omission to reveal the 

 treason be accompanied by express assent to the treasonable act or 

 purpose, or by any circumstances from which a tacit assent will be 

 implied, the party is guilty of high treason, as well as of misprision of 

 treason ; and the crown may prosecute either for the higher or the 

 lower offence. Misprision of treason is a misdemeanor [MISDEMEANOR], 

 punishable by imprisonment for life and the forfeiture of the personal 



