"!:; UTOH. 



OBO \N"V. 



times umatomic, u in oxide of cacodyl, UK! sometimes teratomlc, M in 

 cacodylic acid (Aa<C,H,)0,). Again, arseniomonomethyl (AsC.H.) is 

 biatoimc in anmiious dioxymethide and quadratomic iii 

 arsenic acid. 



oliC AN OX. [In the article LOGIC we bare explained our reasons 

 for allowing this article, from the peo of the editor of the ' Penny 

 Cyclopedia, to remain without any attempt to bring it into connection 

 with the new matter of the present work. To it in added the article 

 from the fint Supplement to the ' Penny Cyclopndia.'] 



It U not possible to give a definition of any science which shall 

 convey iU full import, and particularly to a penon who does not 

 already know what it is. This difficulty will be experienced by any 

 one who attempt* to give a definition of Logic. Without then 

 MBSfOng a definition, or admitting the completeness or correctness 

 of any definition hitherto given, it may be sufficient, for the purpose of 

 ahowing what that matter is about which we are discoursing, tosay 

 that logic U conversant about the formal laws of thought,and that it 

 u not conversant about the matter which if subjected to such laws. 



This thing, whatever it may be, about which logic is conversant, in 

 presented to us, and is considered by us generally under the form of 

 language. Whatever are the operations of the mind which are 

 involved or contained in the exercise of thought, those operations may 

 be generally expressed by language. It w assumed here, that by what- 

 ever names we designate the relation of the various consecutive and 

 connected trains of ideas which paw through the mind, this relation is 

 in all minds essentially the same. When two persons then possess a 

 common language, one of them can express in this language, with a 

 certain degree of accuracy, the various consecutive and connected 

 trams of ideas which have passed through his mind, with respect to 

 any matter or matters. Another penon, who, to use the common 

 expression, understands this language, can, through this medium, com- 

 municate with the other person's mind; and if the expression of such 

 ideas baa been accurately mode according to the form of the language 

 they are properly interpreted, the person who hears or roads 

 what the other has written or said, may in his own mind perceive the 

 same various consecutive and connected trains of ideas which the 

 writer or speaker baa experienced. If language can effect this, it 

 follows that the mental operations or processes in the two ind; 

 are connected and assimilated by virtue of their both being conform- 

 able to the same general laws. It is, however, the laws of thought 

 about which logic is conversant, and with language no further than as 

 being the form of expression in which the thoughts of others are made 

 known to us, and by which we are enabled to compare those thoughts 

 with our own. 



Under the article LANOCAOK it has been stated in a general way 

 what language is ; but mainly as to the materials of which it is com- 

 posed. It remains now to consider its form. 



What is called a sentence comprehends in its simplest form a subject 

 and a predicate, with something by which a relation between the 

 subject and the predicate is expressed. "Men die" is a sentence in 

 which" men "u the subject, of which "dying" or "death" is pre- 

 dicated, that is, in this sentence a judgment is expressed. The sentence 

 indicates that two notions are present to the mind, " men " and " death." 

 What the relation is which the mind really contemplates between 

 these two things, and how it is possible for the mind to contemplate 

 ir any other relation between two things, belongs not to the 

 present inquiry, nor to the province of logic. It will be sufficient to 

 observe, that this judgment or relation does not express or mean as 

 some writers say, any agrttment or ditagreemcnl between the two 

 jons, or that one of them belongs or does not belong to the other 

 nor i* it the eompariton in the mind of these two notions, at least' 

 logically considered, it is not the comparison in the mind of the two 

 notions as to the matter of them. 



The sentence "men die" may also be expressed thus,-" men are 



where mortal w the predicate. The grammatical relation 



between men and "mortal," which is the symbolic representation 



of that conceived by the mind, is expressed in our language by the 



uteUntive verb "are," which is accordingly, in such sentence, as this, 



called the copula. In some languages, as the Latin and Greek, which 



ich in terminations, the relation between " men " and " mortal " 



11 1 atao expressed by a termination attached to the word " mortal " in 



Uon to the copula, as "homines sunt mortales;" and sometimes 



the copula at u omitted. When there is not a copula, either in the 



form of the verb " to be " or in some other verb of equivalent meaning 



the copula is either expressed solely by the order of the words, which 



is the case with those languages which, like the English, have few ter- 



tninations, or the copula is expressed by a verbal termination which 



has a certain relation of fitness to the nominal termination, as in Latin 



Greek, and in some cases by the order of the words also, as 



homines inoniintur." The copula in itself hag no meaning: its office 



> to indicate ttiat the subject and the predicate of the sentence are 



contemplated at once, and each in some relation to the other, in that 



ration of the mind of which the words men are mortal " is the 



visible or sensuous sign. But the subject itself may be qualified by an 



attribute, or the generality of the subject (which according to the 



common interpretation of language is understood when it is not 



limited) may be restricted or confined by the use of appropriate words, 



as, dying men are prophetic," or ' some dying men are prophetic " 



Again, the predicate may in like manner be qualified or limited ; as, 

 he wntoa, "he writes a letter," -he writes letters sometimes." 

 Inus every senton complicated it may appear, is rediu il.lc 



the form of subject, predicate, and copula. A t.dl m m mi horse- 

 back in comnlete armour wu MMI nmMino * *\o*m a i 1( | rapid river on a 



IUMJWV, |fiuuiuio, aim copula. A ul 



in complete armour was seen crossing a deep and ._, 



winters day,' ^and other sentences of the kind with which ordinary book* 



v* ' * ^wwwjpo vt nit- KIIIU wiiu WHICH t'ruinary DOOKS 



of narrative abound, may all be reduced to a simple form. It is true 

 tthe number of diflerent things or notions which such a sentence 

 brings before the mind often create a degree of confusion 

 the apprehension of the affirmation or negation, which every simple 

 sentence contains, a matter of some difficulty; and this is part;. 

 the case when a sentence to constructed brings before the mind n.'t 

 material objects with which we are familiar, but notions which express 

 things which are not subject to the cognisance of the senses. And 

 hence it happens that argumentative discourse is not always the most 

 difficult to apprehend. Indeed the difficulty of apprehension is some- 

 times greatest when the discourse consists of a long scries of propooi- 

 tions in which under one set of circumstances one flung is affirmed or 

 denied, or commanded or forbidden ; and under another set of circum- 

 stances other things are affirmed or denied, or commanded or forbi. Men ; 

 or when things are stated, affirmatively or negatively, with a great 

 many exceptions and limitations. A perusal of a modern act of 

 jnrliament will show that this is so. 



Sometimes there may appear to be, and in fact may be, a difficulty 

 even in a very similar sentence, as to the resolution of it into subject 

 predicate, and copula. The discussion of this matter belongs to the 

 doctrine of propositions ; but so much may be here said, that so far as 

 all propositions are contemplated in their formal and not their material 

 character, they agree in this, that the subject is viewed as something 

 cither co-extensive with or included in the predicate. Both the form 

 of language and the form of thought of which language is merely the 

 exponent, forbid us to contemplate a subject in a greater extent than 

 its predicate. The sentence "I hope to succeed" is thus reduced 

 0V hately's ' Logic, 1 p. 59) : 



"> pred. 



To succeed is what I hope; 



which is the same tiling as " success is my hope; " and the remark is 

 that an infinitive (which the author has already defined to be a 

 noun substantive) is never the predicate, except when another iiii 



thut 6 - BUt We may ' iU8t M WeU eipre88 the P ro l >osition 



sub. pred. 



What I hope is to succeed; 



that is "my hope is success." Now as both "hope " and " success " 

 are general terms, that is, are words capable of being applied severally 

 to an infinity of particular things ; and as neither hope nor success are 

 conceived by the mind in any relation of subordination to one another 

 as that either of containing or contained, or of species and Ramui 

 [GENUS], it is indifferent whether we use the phrase my hope (sub ) is 

 mccaa (pred.), or success (sub.) is my hope (pred.). But this sentence, 

 we conceive, would by most people be reduced thus : 



sub. pred. 



hope to succeed ; 



n SUCcess 1S that which the "object, ego, predicates of 

 iteelf, that is, these words indicate a mental operation in whirl, the. 



,it matters not whether contemplating itself or contenii .1 

 by another) is viewed (logically) simply as within certain limits of 

 predication. 



Every simple sentence which is intelligible is reducible to the form 

 A is or is not B; but it should be observed that the former sentenc 

 has two meanings, as already observed. It may mean either that A is 



'^^ ln j,'- r . that t J" T*** with B > where A is th 8 b ie<*. 

 and B the predicate, and u the copula. It is important to bear in mind 

 this double meaning of the sentence " A U B." If it should be said 

 tliat A is B may also mean "A contains B," we can then say that B 



contained in A ; and so we are where we were before. In ordinary 

 language the ambiguity of the form A is B is sometimes removed l,y 

 words of limitation, as "all," " every," " some ; " but frequcnth 

 are no such words used, and the consequence is ambiguity 



I he sentence ' A is not B " may mean either that A is not co-exten- 

 sive with B or that no part of A is contained in B, or that some part of 



fnl n n ?'i nD ,i, bUt "V" ftmbi 8%^ generally abided 

 m common speech by the use of words of limitation, or by attaching 



a?& tothCSUb ?- Ct . t It , i '' bvi0 " 8 ** negaUvepropRionf 

 are subject to mowrnbignttjr than affirmative propositions Negative 

 propositions have g.ven logician, much trouble, and it is clear , 1 

 only obtain a clear notion of their import by a tacit reference 

 amrroat. propositions. In itaelf a negative pr^posS 1, 

 ing; by the very supposition of its being negative. [ M the 



notion of all ugruficancy ; and yet by means of such , llg we 



attain to knowledge The Sto,cs (who seem to have had a logic 

 their own) called such a sentence as " Pleasure is not good " 



