141 



ORGAXOX. 



ORGANON. 



142 



an affirmative sentence also : their reasons for this are stated, 

 though somewhat obscurely, by Apuleius. (' Philosophy of Plato,' 

 lib. iii. ) 



Simple sentences are generally combined in written or spoken dis- 

 course in such a manner that the whole meaning of the speaker 

 cannot be reached, except by considering two or more sentences 

 together. Sentences may be so combined, either in the way of 

 co-ordination or sub-ordination, but this distinction, which is made 

 by Dr. Becker in hia excellent German grammar, though it is 

 applicable to some extent to all languages, ia perhaps more par- 

 ticularly applicable to the German language than to our own. Two 

 sentences are combined by way of co-ordination when they are 

 connected by such a conjunction as and, as " he eats and drinks," 

 where we have two distinct sentences, each of which contains 

 a separate and independent affirmation ; but we cannot reach the 

 whole of what is said of the subject " he," without contemplating the 

 two sentences together. The conjunction " but " is also often used to 

 unite co-prdinate sentences, as " he speaks German, but not fluently," 

 where thie sentence beginning with " but .." limits the generality of 

 the former assertion ; and the whole sentence does not differ in mean- 

 ing from " he speaks German, and he speaks German not fluently." 

 Subordinate sentences are connected with the principal sentence in a 

 great variety of ways, among which the union by means of the pronouns 

 and words of pronominal origin is perhaps the most frequent : as, " I 

 do not know when he will come ; " " he lives luxuriously, while others 

 are starving." 



In both cases, both the combination of co-ordinate sentences and 

 the combination of subordinate with a principal sentence, certain 

 words are used, which are generally distinguished from other words 

 which connect sentences, by the name of cauial ; such are in English, 

 " for," " therefore," '' then," and " since " (not as words indicating 

 time), " because," and some others. All languages have words which 

 correspond in meaning to these words. Now it is the combination of 

 sentences produced by such words as these which generally makes up 

 a large part of discourse, written or spoken. When the discourse is 

 bare narration of facts, it is often little more than a succession of 

 affirmative or negative propositions, but so connected and expressed as 

 to render the discourse more pleasing than if the propositions were 

 enunciated separately and in their simple form ; but still not logically 

 connected. Besides the ornament and variety which we are enabled to 

 give by written discourse to mere narrative, there is generally a kind 

 of coherence or sequence in the bare facts of narration, which, when 

 some facts are known, can be anticipated by the hearer, or reader, 

 and this again helps to render the language of bare narration less 

 tedious. 



But when discourse is not limited to bare narration of facts, it 

 assumes a form which still more interests the hearer or reader, and 

 keeps hia intellectual powers in constant exercise. Here the discourse 

 does not barely communicate something from the writer to the reader : 

 it does more ; it is constantly addressing itself to those faculties of the 

 reason which the reader and the writer have in common, and it is con- 

 stantly proceeding on the assumption that a great number of universal 

 propositions are admitted to be true by the reader and the writer. 

 Thus, if we say of a certain man " he is not liked, because ho is pre- 

 sumptuous," two things are affirmed ; first, that a "certain man is not 

 liked ; " second, " that he is presumptuous." But by the use of the 

 won! " because," the writer means to affirm something more than the 

 truth of the two propositions; for we may suppose it possible to 

 affirm many propositions of a man without considering the propositions 

 related to one another in any other way than as all relating to one man 

 as the subject. The words " because he is presumptuous " are designed 

 by the writer to express some connection with or relation to " not 

 being liked," which connection or relation must exist in the mind of 

 all other persons as well as in his own, or it cannot be understood, 

 what U that connection which he and all mankind, and a large 

 part of mankind unconsciously, contemplate when this compound 

 sentence is enunciated ? The subject of the whole sentence is some 

 given person or individual who is said " not to be liked," a proposition 

 universally intelligible. He is said " to be presumptuous," which is 

 also universally intelligible. Now, the word "because" has this 

 office : it introduces something to the reader's notice to which the 

 universal judgment of mankind attaches the notion of dislike; some- 

 thing which ia followed by dislike ; something without which there 

 may be dislike, but with which there must be dislike ; that is, must be 

 in this sense : the reader does not know the individual spoken of, and 

 therefore does not know that he is disliked till he ia told so ; but he 

 knows something of that individual, namely, his presumption, and he 

 also knows that be dislikes a presumptuous individual. He therefore 

 understands the writer, and he admits that statement which is intro- 

 duced by the word " because " as a reatnn (to use the common expres- 

 sion) why the man ia disliked. He has in fact aaaented to the universal 

 proposition that " a presumptuous man ia disliked ; " he has already 

 mentally formed for himself a general rule that all presumptuous 

 are disliked, and it ia by virtue of himself and the writer 

 A lodging tliU universal affirmation as true, that he collects the 

 writer's meaning. But there is no logical inference here ; there is no 

 ayllogum. 



The speaker or writer might, however, say, all that he knew of a 



certain man was " that he was presumptuous ; " and lie might add to 

 the sentence, and " therefore I conclude that he is disliked." If the 

 reader or hearer assented to the conclusion introduced by the word 

 " therefore," he would assent to the following mode of stating what he 

 had heard : 



1. All presumptuous persons are disliked. 



2. This man is a presumptuous person ; 



3. Therefore he is disliked ; 



which is called a syllogism, and is one of the most common forms of a 

 syllogism, in which the first part, or major premiss, is not expressed. 

 The greatest part of written and spoken discourse is either in this form 

 or in that of a consecutive series of syllogisms, called, by logicians, 

 sorites. 



The first two propositions are generally called the premises, and the 

 third is called the conclusion; and in such a syllogism everything 

 which is called a conclusion is deduced, or considered as deduced, from 

 two other propositions, one of which, as already observed, is commonly 

 suppressed, but is referred to by such a word as " because," " there- 

 fore," &c. It is, however, very clear that nothing is proved even by a 

 syllogism. In the common form of language something is affirmed 

 particularly as a fact, and something is said in the way of a conclusion. 

 The mind perceives no reason why this conclusion is made in the par- 

 ticular instance, more than it should be in any other given instance of 

 the same kind. But while something is in form concluded particularly, 

 something is by implication affirmed universally. A person not accus- 

 tomed to analyse his own thoughts may not always be able to discover 

 what is that universal affirmation which contains the particular con- 

 clusion ; but if the argument, as it is generally termed, be expressed 

 in the complete form of a syllogism, he at once perceives what 

 universal proposition must be admitted or proved, in order that the 

 particular one shall be true ; if he has already given his assent to the 

 proposition as stated, without a clear conception of the extent of the 

 admission which he will be considered to have made, he is enabled by 

 means of the syllogistic form to examine more clearly that mental 

 operation which to him was before confused. The conclusion of the 

 syllogism proves nothing; as an inference or illation it necessarily 

 follows from the premises, that is, the mind cannot conceive it other- 

 wise ; and in this operation it is subjected to laws of thought which 

 are irresistible. When the truth of the premises is ascertained or 

 admitted (which, for the purpose of argumentation, is the same thing) 

 the conclusion, which before was logically correct, now becomes also 

 true. All discourse of the kind called argumentative, indeed all dis- 

 course so far as it contains inferences, may be reduced to the form of a 

 series of syllogisms, from which it will appear what universal affirma- 

 tions or negations are implicitly contained in the discourse. It will 

 also show what universal affirmations or negations are used as a means 

 of attaining to other affirmations or negations which are not true 

 unless the first are true, and which when attained become the premises 

 of other conclusions. Discourse of the argumentative kind has for it.s 

 object to establish particular things, or things which are comprehended 

 within other things. Particular things, so far as they are the object 

 of sensuous perceptions, are directly established by evidence, as for 

 instance, the qualities of any material object ; but there are many 

 things which are not susceptible of this kind of evidence, and of which 

 there is no evidence but the universal consent of mankind. In an 

 argumentative discourse therefore the writer who has particular things 

 to prove, alleges, expressly or by implication, universal truths, and he 

 affirms, either expressly or by the implication of language, that the 

 particular things are contained within the universal. If the reader 

 assent to the universal truths, and also admit that the particular things 

 are contained therein, the writer accomplishes his purpose, and his 

 demonstration is complete. He is said to have deduced something, or 

 to have made a deduction. If ^all written or spoken discourse were in 

 the form of perfect syllogisms, there could be little confusion or dis- 

 pute about what is called the premises and the conclusion, for the 

 whole matter would be so placed before the reader, that he would 

 always perceive the general proposition within which it is affirmed 

 that the particular is included. It is then the general condition of 

 every syllogism imperfectly expressed, that when we are speaking of 

 what we call one thing, we are in effect speaking of many things : for 

 that which is asserted of one can equally be asserted of all things of 

 the kind, and it is not possible to conceive it true of one without 

 conceiving it true of all. 



Some writers have observed that the causal conjunctions are 

 employed to denote respectively cause and efl'ect, as well as premiss 

 and conclusion ; as in the following examples : " This ground is rich 

 because the trees on it are flourishing;" or, " the trees are flourishing, 

 and therefore the soil mutt be rich ;" where the conjunctions because 

 and therefore are considered to be used to denote the connection of pre- 

 miss and conclusion. But in the following sentences, " the trees flourish 

 became the ground is rich ;" or " the ground is rich, and therefore the 

 trees flourish ;" the same conjunctions, it is said, are used to denote 

 the connection of cause and effect ; and it is added that in the latter 

 case "the luxuriance of the trees, being evident to the eye, would 

 hardly need to bf ,././', but might need to be accounted for;" 

 and an to the former case, it is remarked, " that the luxuriance of 

 the trees is not the cause of the soil's fertility, but only the cause of 

 my lenowiny it." 



