

in 



Now in the expreion, " the tree* are flourishing, nnd Oxrrfare the ! called the Inductive Syllogism, u no syllogism, that is, no neoewry 

 soil mutt be rich" (if for taxtt be we write if, which ought to be done), conclusion, unions all the particulars are enumerated, or assumed to bo 

 it may be meant to affirm, either that the trees are flourishing, and 



that the quality of the soil is unknown ; or H may be meant that the 

 trees are flourishing, and that the soil also is rich. In the former case 

 the richness of the toil is concluded, according to the common expres- 

 sion, from the suppressed premiss of the invariable coincidence of 

 flourishing trees ami rich soil, and as Uio world knows or says (which 

 for the present purpose is the same thing) that a rich soil is necessary 

 in order that tree* may flourish, the richness of the soil is in fact, 

 according to the common notion of cause and effect, here also con- 

 sidered to be the cause of the luxuriance of the trees, if we look to the 

 matter of the syllogism. In the latter case, if both things are affirmed, 

 both that the trees flourish and that the soil is rich, the same thing is 

 affirmed as in the sentence, " the ground is rich and therefore the trees 

 flourish ;" and in both these cases, when the two propositions are con- 

 sidered as affirmations, not connected in the way of conclusion, 

 nothing more is effected by the word therefore than to suggest 

 the notion of the invariable coincidence of flourishing trees and rich 

 oil. 



The Conclusion of the " ground being rich became the trees on it 

 are flourishing" (the richness of the ground in question not being known 

 otherwise than by the trees) cannot be made except from the premiss, 

 " wherever trees flourish, there the ground is rich." Now though it 

 may be true that " wherever trees flourish, there the ground is rich," 

 it may not be true that " wherever the ground is rich, there trees 

 flourish," for the ground may be rich, and covered with water in which 

 trees will not flourish. But if we affirm that " the trees flourish 

 beeaute the ground is rich," we affirm both " that the trees flourish" 

 and "that the ground is rich," which again is nothing more than 

 affirming by implication that " wherever trees flourish, there the 

 ground is nch," leaving it, as before, possible that there may be rich 

 ground where trees do not ( for some reason or other) flourish. 



Now it is said that in the former case, where a Conclusion is made, 

 the luxuriance of the trees is considered to be the cause of my knoidny 

 the fertility of the soil ; that is, in the conclusion, " the ground is rich 

 because the trees on it are flourishing ;" " the ground is rich" is my 

 (concluded) knowledge, and because is there used to express cause 

 and effect, as between " flourishing trees" and " my knowledge." In 

 the latter case, where both propositions are affirmative, but neither of 

 them in the way of conclusion, it is said that the luxuriance of the 

 trees does not require proof, but requires to be accounted for ; that is, 

 richness of soil and luxuriance are here considered in the relation of 

 cause and effect. According to this, a relation of cause and effect, 

 though not of the same cause and effect, is indicated in both cases by 

 the word becaiue : and in the former case the richness of the soil is 

 considered to be proved also. 



This is rather perplexing, but perhaps the perplexity may be got rid 

 of thus : " The ground is rich because the trees on it are flourishing," 

 is necessarily true, if it is also true that " wherever trees flourish, there 

 the ground is rich ;" but this general proposition must be proved in 

 some way or assumed, in order that the logical conclusion may also be 

 a true conclusion. " The trees flourish, because the ground is rich :" 

 here both facte are prorai or assumed (which for the present purpose 

 is the same thing), and it is also affirmed by implication that 

 " wherever trees flourish, there the ground is rich." The difference 

 between the two sentences then is this : the former affirms that a 

 particular soil is rich, if soil is always rich under similar circum- 

 stances ; and the reduction of the expression to the complete syllogis- 

 tic form shows us what must be proved or assumed in order that the 

 conclusion shall be true in this particular case. The latter affirms the 

 particular thing to bo true, which in the former is only true upon a 

 certain condition ; and it also affirms by implication the truth of this 

 certain condition. The former is a syllogism, because that which i.s 

 said of the whole may be said of a part. The latter is nothing more 

 than the implicit statement of a general proposition contained in the 

 explicit statement of a particular instance : it is no logical inference ; 

 it is no logical induction ; it is simply a statement of a thing being 

 true in a certain case, with an implicit assertion that the same thing 

 is true in all similar cases; in other words, the form of language 

 implicitly contains the affirmation of a general proposition, which 

 can only be the result of an induction in the non-logical sense of that 

 t .... 



The difference Ixitween logical Deduction and Induction is explained 

 in the article INDUCTION. Hut it will not be out of place to say a few 

 words on the subject here. In the Deductive Syllogism, we proceed 

 from the whole to its parte, from tli thing containing to the things or 

 ouie of the things contained ; and this is true notwithstanding it is 

 not fo expressed in the common form of language. For the particular 

 conclusion, as already observed, is the thing which in ordinary language 

 is mH to be proved ; but there is no demonstrative evidence to the 

 mind, except it is shown that the particular conclusion is contained in 

 a general proposition. The deductive syllogism as already explained 

 how* what this general proposition is, and this general proposition is 

 awumed to be true, or is known to bo true in some other way (by 

 induction, properly to called, for instance) than by means of the 

 syllogism. Hut there is another mode of ojwration by which the mind 

 can proceed from particulars to g.ti"ral<; but this, which maybe 



enumerated ; and in this consists the difference between the Inductive 

 Syllogism and Induction, or what is sometimes, but, we think, not 

 with strict propriety, called Inductive Heas mini,', which however is no 

 operation of reason, but one of the understanding only ; or, to prevent 

 disputes about terms, it is not the same mental process as that of 

 the Logical Induction, for its conclusion is not necessary. This Induc- 

 tion then, which leads us from the observation of one or more like 

 facte to make a general assertion which will comprehend like facts not 

 observed, is a material illation of quite a different character [from the 

 other. This process has sometimes been absurdly considered as a 

 peculiar discovery of modern times, though it must have been 

 practised by the first man who ever made use of his eyes. The 

 process of investigating and collecting facts which are among the 

 phenomena of the material world, has been greatly improved in 

 modern times. 



That syllogistic form which is properly called Inductive (/iroywyJ)) 



is explained, though very briefly, by Aristotle (Analyt. Prior., ii. -:! ; 



i. 12), and is not confounded by him with the material induction 



of a general law or rule from the examination of a number of particular 



cases of a like kind.* 



If we wish to prove syllogistically the mortality of a given individual 

 John, we say 



All men arc mortal ; 



John U a man ; 



Therefore John Is mortal. 



Now this conclusion is necessary, because "John" is contained in 

 "all men." But suppose we wish to prove our primary prop"- 

 that " all men are mortal," what is the process that we must follow ? 

 We may affirm mortality of all men who have died, but we cannot 

 affirm it of all who are living and who shall live, for that is the tiling 

 to be proved. This is a case in which there can be no logical, that 

 is, no necessary conclusion. 



Dr. Whately says (p. 229) " that in the process of reasoning by 

 which we deduce from our observation of certain known cases an infer- 

 ence with respect to unknown ones, we are employing a syllogism in 

 Barbara with the major premiss suppressed ; tliat being always sub- 

 stantially the same, as it asserts ' that whatever belongs to the 

 individual or individuals we have examined, belongs to the whole class 

 under which they come.' " 



And he further says that induction, " so far forth as it is an >/ 

 mail (which has previously, in the same work (p. 55), been defined to 

 be a ' syllogism when regularly expressed'), may of course be stated 

 syllogistically; but so far forth as it is a proccit of inquiry to- obtain 

 the premises of that argument, it is of course out of the province of 

 logic." But a syllogism will be equally good (p. 14) if we substitute 

 arbitrary symbols for the terms, without any regard to the things 

 signified by them ; and (p. 23) " every conclusion is deduced from two 

 other propositions or premises." This so-called induction then, stated 

 syllogistically, turns out to be nothing different from a proper syllo- 

 gism : if the premises are true, the conclusion is necessarily true. The 

 syllogism then has done nothing, and it leaves the process of inquiry 

 precisely where it was before the induction was put into this so-called 

 syllogistic form. 



This mistake requires a few more words, as it has been declared to 

 be " a just, and, so far as we are aware, an original remark ; and its 

 consequences are extremely important." (Weatmintter Jlevicic, No. 17, 

 p. 169). 



The deducing an inference from facts investigated and collected is 

 said to be an argumentative process, and. like other arguments (that is, 

 syllogisms), capable of being syllogistically expressed. If it is a syllo- 

 gistic process, it is undoubtedly susceptible of the strict syllogistic 

 form. Now this so-called inference is the making a universal .1!' 

 tion founded on a number of particulars ; and if it is a syllogism, the 

 universal affirmation is the conclusion ; and if it is a syllogism, the 

 conclusion is necessary. The conclusion is by the supposition a .-.in- 

 clusion from certain known things as to other unknown things; and 

 the universal conclusion is, that something is true of the unknown 

 things which is known to In- tnie of the known ones; in other words, 

 that this something is true both of the known and the unknown 

 things. Now in order to attain this syllogistic conclusion, it is said 

 that we employ a syllogism, in which the major premiss is of this 

 form : everything which is true of the known is true of the unknown, 

 or everything which is true of the known is true of the known and the 

 unknown. 



To take Dr. Whatcly's own example : " from an examination of 

 the history of several tyrannies, and finding that each of them was of 

 short duration, we conclude that the same is likely to be the case with 

 all tyrannies." And it is said that in such syllogisms as these, we 

 assume " that flatterer belongs to the individual or individuals that we 

 are examining belongs to the class under which they come." Now 

 this universal allinnation is a proposition to be proved in some way or 

 other. If it be assumed, it in the major of a deductive syllogism, and 

 the conclusion is logically necessary, and also true, if the major is tmc. 



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 irlpov fjinpof latfior rf ftta-f av\\'.>yl<rur9ui. 



