IIS 



ORGANON. 



ORGANQN. 



lie 



But how is this major to be established, by virtue of which we are to 

 have a logical illation and a true conclusion ? It is admitted that in 

 induction, properly so-called, a general material truth is to be affirmed 

 by virtue of particular facts being investigated and known. But if we 

 affirm some proposition which is more general than and comprehends 

 that which we wish to establish, and then so construct our syllogism 

 that the conclusion shall be a logical inference, it cannot be a true one 

 unless we establish this more general premiss. But the object of the 

 true induction is to establish the general truth from particular facts 

 that are known and investigated. If, in the case supposed, the syllogism 

 is valid, the particular facts are useless ; the conclusion is logically 

 good, and it becomes materially true when the more general proposi- 

 tion is established which contains the conclusion. But it is not the 

 object of the investigation and collection of facts to establish a 

 proposition different from and more general than that for the 

 establishment of which the facts are investigated and collected; in 

 other words, it is not the matter in hand to investigate and collect 

 facts for a particular purpose, and then not to use them for that 

 purpose. 



In this so-called syllogism then we have a suppressed major of this 

 form, " that which is true of some is true of all," which must mean 

 either " everything which is true of some is true of all," or, " this one 

 thing which is true of some is true of alL" In the former case, the 

 suppressed major expresses a general proposition, which we must 

 establish in order that our illation, which is logically correct, may be 

 true materially ; but then this is not the proposition which we pro- 

 feea to be desirous to establish, and, more than that, it cannot be 

 established by the facts investigated and collected. If it means that 

 this oneilhing which is true of some is true of all, this is nothing more 

 than to make the conclusion the major premiss, and so to conclude the 

 conclusion from itself. It cannot be supposed that Dr. Whately 

 has any such absurd meaning as this : but his language is capable 

 of this meaning. He does however mean either this or the other; 

 and it is not easy to say which is the less logical meaning of the 

 two. 



A few more words seem necessary on another passage in Dr. 

 Whately's work, by way of clearing the way to a right comprehension 

 of the province of logic. It has been already observed that discourse 

 or speech generally assumes the form of a syllogism with one of the 

 premises suppressed ; which is by many modern logicians called an 

 enthymeme.* 



Dr. Whately observes that the enthymem* (the enthymeme of 

 modern logicians) " is not ttrictly sijlloyittic, that is, its collusiveness 

 is not apparent from the mere form of the expression, without regard 

 to the meaning of the terms ; because it is from that we form our 

 judgment as to the truth of the suppressed premiss. The expressed 

 (qu. tuppreaed) premiss may be true, and yet the conclusion false." 

 The reason here given why the (so-called) enthymeme is not strictly 

 syllogistic is, that we form our judgment of the truth of the suppressed 

 premiss from the meaning of the terms. This is a singular reason. 

 The truth, of the suppressed premiss has nothing to do with the 

 validity of the conclusion as an inference. If the suppressed premiss 

 were expressed, the question as to the conclusion would be, not 

 whether the suppressed premiss were true but whether it necessitated 

 the conclusion. If the conclusion is already made and one premiss 

 only stated, the truth of the suppressed premiss is not the matter in 

 question, but only what it is ; and when we have ascertained what the 

 premiss must be in order that the conclusion may be valid as an 

 inference, we may then inquire if the suppressed premiss is true. The 

 expressed premiss cannot be true and the conclusion false, for the 

 proper suppressed premiss is virtually involved in the conclusion and 

 the expressed premiss. Besides, the mere form of the expression does 

 indicate the suppressed premiss ; if it did not, the enthymeme, that is, 

 tin- incomplete syllogium, the syllogism of common discourse, would 

 be incapable of being expressed in the form of a complete syllogism. 

 If we say A is C, became or for it is B, which is the mere form of the 

 expression, we see that the suppressed premiss is, B is c, that is, B is 

 \ aed in or is co-extensive with c ; and every person who can com- 

 1 the nation of a containing whole and its contained parts will 

 understand what is meant if it is expressed in this form ; A is con- 

 tained in c because A is contained hi B. As if a man had found that 

 any one thing could be contained in another (second) thing, and this 

 other (second) thing were contained in a third, he would conclude 

 mentally that thU one thing was contained in the third ; and the form 

 of his expression would be, it is contained in the third became it is 

 contained in the second, in which he would tacitly suppose that the 

 I is contained in the third, and would then necessarily conclude 

 that the first is contained in the third. 



We are now in a condition to show what are the limits of pure logic, 

 or of a pure logic. All propositions and all syllogisms are the subject 



* It has been obsCTred by Sir \Vm. Hamilton ('Edinburgh Review,' No. 115) 

 that this i not the meaning of the cnthymcmc of Aristotle, which i quite true ; 

 nor IK it the meaning of the enthymcrac of Cicero. The following pannages may 

 be referred to as showing the nuaning of the old enthymeme (iM/Mifat), 

 which seems to have been taken by different writers in different senses : 

 Aristotle ('Analyt. Prior.,' ii. 27): Cicero, ('Topica,' 13, 14); Demetrius 

 Phalerens (<< 'E<*wij'*<, s. 30). The enthymeme of Boethius is the modern 

 ntkymcme (' Comment, in Cic.' Topic., 1. c. 2.) 



ARTS AND SCI. MV. VOL. VI. 



of a pure logic only so far as they have all something in common. 

 They have only something iu common so far as they are all capable of 

 being reduced to a common form or forms ; that is, a pure logic is 

 formal only. Neither the syllogism nor its parts regard the matter, 

 and the propositions which enter into the syllogism are only the object 

 of logic so far as they are connected by is and ia not. And since all 

 propositions, when viewed solely as the parts of a syllogism, must be 

 capable of beiug reduced to the game form or forms, it follows that all 

 propositions as logical elements connected by is and is not are only 

 viewed in that way in which the reason does, and must because it 

 does, view all things which are so presented to the mind independeutly 

 of the matter, namely, with relation to the notion of a containing 

 whole and contained parts. 



If this exposition seem tedious, the fault is with those who, while 

 they profess to teach pure logic, confound it both with an applied logic 

 and with other things also. 



There seems to us another error in Dr. Whately, which is worth 

 noticing : he says, " No conversion is employed for any logical purpose, 

 unless it be illative ;" and he adds, " the reader must not suppose from 

 the use of the word ' illative,' that this conversion is a process of 

 reasoniny : it is in fact only stating the same judgment in another 

 form." Now if we say A is B, meaning that A is contained in u, it is a 

 logical consequence or conclusion, though not a syllogistic one, that B 

 is not contained in A. In this case then there can be 110 unlimited 

 logical conversion of the proposition. If A is co-extensive with B, then 

 B is co-extensive with A ; iu which case there is a logical conversion. 

 The laws of thought necessitate the non-conversion in the one case and 

 the conversion in the other ; and if these are not logical conclusions, 

 there is no such thing as a pure logic or reasoning. 



It is generally said that logic teaches us to reason correctly, or that 

 it shows the process which takes place in the mind when a man does 

 reason correctly. It is however difficult to admit the accuracy of this 

 statement. If a man reasons at all, in the strict logical sense, he 

 reasons correctly. Language is seldom expressed in the form of 

 syllogisms, and it is not usual to express, in any way, both the pro- 

 positions from which we deduce a conclusion. We generally express 

 ourselves by way of a conclusion and one premiss. Now this being so, 

 the suppressed premiss may always be discovered by somebody, though 

 the speaker or writer may not always be able to discover his own 

 suppressed premiss. The conclusion and one premiss being given, the 

 suppressed premiss is also given, for the conclusion and the expressed 

 premiss necessitate the proper suppressed premiss. They who say a 

 man argues incorrectly, when he states a conclusion and one premiss 

 only, aitume that his suppressed premiss is not that suppressed pre- 

 miss which the two data require, but some other. But if some other, 

 it is impossible that they can find it out, and therefore they cannot 

 confute him. It is only because the suppressed premiss (perhaps uot 

 known to the speaker) pointed to by the data, is the real one, that we 

 can confute the speaker. We show what the suppressed premiss is, 

 and then we are in a condition to dispute it) and to ask him for proof 

 of it. A man then does reason correctly when he reasons by a con- 

 clusion and one expressed premiss. The syllogistic form shows what 

 the premiss must be, that is, it leads to the full interpretation of the 

 speaker's meaning. But suppose a man expresses all the terms of a 

 syllogism, and his syllogism is vicious, is it vicious because he reasons 

 wrong, or because he has given a meaning to some of his terms which 

 other people do not, or has altogether mistaken them ? We think 

 that his reasoning, as sud, is and must be correct. His apprehension 

 may be and often is wrong. In this view, reasoning, <M reasoning, is 

 always correct reasoning. It has been objected to this by a friend, 

 that many persons who are not familiar with logical considerations, 

 on being asked whether, if every A is B, every B is also A, will admit 

 this conversion to be true. It is then asked if, in admitting this, they 

 reason correctly. The answer to this difficulty is furnished by the 

 objector, who goes on to say, that if the person who admits this con- 

 version is asked the same question as to a material conversion, such as, 

 every goose is an animal, he immediately perceives that he cannot 

 say every animal is a goose. This shows that his apprehension of the 

 expression, every A is B, was incorrect, that is, he did not understand 

 it, but took it to mean something different from what the person 

 intended by it who put the question. 



In argumentation the conclusions are the matters which are directly 

 disputed ; but the suppressed proposition is generally the real matter 

 in dispute, or the meaning of a term is the matter in dispute. The 

 use of logical forms consists in showing fully and explicitly what is 

 expressed imperfectly and only implicitly in the common form of 

 language ; and its use is uot a bit the less because it neither teaches to 

 reason nor convicts our reason of error. Its use is to indicate to us all 

 the formal elements and conditions of dependent truth. It points out 

 to us and leads us to the consideration of the several propositions 

 which discourse contains, and from the consideration of the several 

 propositions it leads to the terms, and there it leaves us. 



The cause of this confusion between logic and metaphysic is obvious, 

 and lies in the necessity which all men feel of a metaphysic of some 

 kind or other. General terms and general propositions, the elements 

 of every material syllogism, are deeply fixed in the mind long before 

 its consciousness is awakened to the cognisance of the operations of 

 the reason ; and in many minds this consciousness is never called into 



